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VOLUME 45 SPRING 1968 NUMBER 2
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL
INTRODUCTION*
W HEN the University of Denver enrolled its first law students
75 years ago, controlling the environment meant settling the
West, building the institutions of civilization on the frontier. Now,
on the occasion of the law school's 75th anniversary, we can flatly
say that the city is the frontier. Water and air pollution, the threat
of pesticides, and a vanishing natural landscape are crises which
need no elaboration to most of us.'
Managing the quality of our environment ultimately involves
some measure of restriction on human behavior and the free use of
property. Restriction can mean zoning for five-acre minimum housing
lots to preserve the country club look of a neighborhood, or limiting
family size to preserve enough earth for man to live on. What kinds
of property enjoyment and behavior are restricted depends on the
felt necessity for action to improve the quality of the environment.
We may still call the pleasant looking neighborhood an amenity, a
luxury. But we are beginning to consider population growth a threat
to acceptable living conditions which eventually must be faced.
The ends of environmental control are identified and catalogued
in the political process by the priorities society gives to each. How
government prosecutes these controls is the issue which has chal-
lenged democratic legal thought since long before law reviews began
to discuss the subject.' Seldom has this issue been phrased more ably
than in a speech to the American Society of Planning Officials by the
vice-president of Litton Industries. He said:
It is unfortunate that socio-economic planning has so long been
identified with a loss of individual freedom, the growth of central
government, and even the oppression of totalitarian regimes. We
should be trying to make it precisely the opposite. The future should
be subject to democratic processes just as current issues are. It is no
* The editors are grateful to Loren L. Mall, formerly Note Editor of the Journal, for
his work in planning this issue and transforming a "rough idea" into a collection of
articles.
'See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, MAN: AN ENDANGERED SPECIES? (1968); F. DARLING,
FUTURE ENVIRONMENTS OF NORTH AMERICA (1966); S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS
(1963).
2See Cribbet, Changing Concepts in the Law of Land Use, 50 IOwA L. REv. 245
(1965).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
less irresponsible and unwise for citizens to ignore the future than
to ignore the present. It is instant in the present. Great changes will
erupt from it in kaleidoscopic succession whether or not we attempt
to shape it.
And what if we do not attempt to shape it? Will our air, our
water, our land unfoul themselves? Will our urban environment for
everyday living - for education, recreation, aesthetic satisfaction, the
development of community responsibility- improve itself ?3
Legal research and writing which recognizes our environmental
ills, particularly the urban condition, is increasingly apparent in the
periodicals,4 casebooks,5 services,' and more general studies.' This
gratifying new attention comes largely from existing specialized fields
of law. But the challenge which will confront legal education' is
the creation of generalists - urbanists some call them- capable of
seeking solutions to a wide range of social ills once the private
domain of caseworker or comprehensive planner.
Professional planners were recently told by one of their pioneers:
Because the younger generation has recognized the problems of
urbanization as a critical aspect of man's future, more idealists are
entering the field... once claimed by the glamorous or more estab-
lished professions ....
While this augurs well for the... future, neither the existing
planning faculties nor the written study material is equal to the
challenge. Some of the great old timers are either dead or time-worn.
The current crop of teachers came into the field as architects, land-
scape designers, housing reformers, lawyers, or specialists in one of
the related areas. Meanwhile, the scope of urban planning has ex-
panded so extensively in recent years that the existing corps of teach-
ers is hard put to keep up with it.9
s Rubel, Fate or Freedom, in PLANNING (1967), at 6. See also Cribbet, Some Reflec-
tions on the Law of Land-A View from Scandinavia, 62 Nw. U. L. REv. 277, 312-
13 & n.100 (1967); Reich, The Law of the Planned Society, 75 YALE L.J. 1227
(1966).
4 See, e.g., Symposium: The San Francisco Bay Area- Regional Problems and Solu-
tion, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 695 (1967); Land-Use Symposium, 50 IowA L. REv. 243
(1965) ; Urban Problems and Prospects, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1965) ; Land
Planning and the Law: Emerging Policies and Techniques, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 707
(1965); Symposium: New Towns, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 1.
The interest of legal writers in the environment is also reflected in the trend to
specialized format law reviews. The Universities of New Mexico, Wyoming, and
Detroit now publish law reviews which devote major attention to the subject area.
They are, respectively, the Natural Resources Journal (begun in 1963), the Land and
Water Law Review '(begun in 1965), and the journal of Urban Law (begun in 1966).
5 E.g., D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT: CASES, TEXT AND
PROBLEMS (1966). To see how this casebook fills a need beyond older, more special-
ized materials and confronts the "total urban problem" see Tarlock, Book Review, 20
J. LEGAL ED. 117 (1967).
6 A noteworthy new contribution is CCH, URBAN AFFAIRS REPORTER (Spring, 1968).
7 E.g., E. MURPHY, GOVERNING NATURE (1967).
S Compare Clark, Teaching Resources Law, 18 J. LEGAL ED. 165 (1965) with Tarlock,
supra note 5, at 117-18 n.2. An example of the "total environment" approach is dis-
cussed in McAuliffe, The Urban Law Program of the University of Detroit, 20 J.
LEGAL ED. 83 (1967).




The task in legal education, we submit, is no less great. While
we have the engineering know-how to clean up the water and purify
the air with filters other than our own lungs, and while we have some
of the legal tools to implement needed environmental controls, there
is evidence that new tools and the statesmanship to use them will be
demanded of the legal community in the future. As Charles Haar
reminded us, "American society freely turns to law for solutions to
even its most incommensurable problems. The legal profession can
translate into specific workable programs this body of ideas which is
the common heritage of all professions concerned with the develop-
ment of the American city in the best interests of the public."'
1
Furthermore, the immediacy of urban problems has not diminished
our national interest in preserving the beauty of the countryside.
The legal profession also has an important legislative and adminis-
trative role to play in protecting rural landscapes from undesirable
and, in many cases, irreversible change.
Each of the articles collected in this issue illustrates a specific
workable program of environmental control. Likewise, each in some
manner raises the fundamental dilemma of subjecting controls to
the democratic process. The nature of a technical solution to any
immediate problem might temporarily require undemocratic action,
but as Commissioner Stein's paper illustrates, the enlightened govern-
ment will seek to alleviate such situations by good judgment and
compromise. Michael McCloskey, conservation director of the Sierra
Club, tells of the values and issues in preserving forest aesthetics in
the face of increasing commercial demands -demands resisted or
accomodated largely by administrative action which sometimes has
been neither democratic nor wise." Professor Cunningham's article
on scenic easements explores the modern use of an ancient property
concept for improving the appearance of our highways, to the benefit
of millions of travelers.
Other problem areas considered by our authors touch more
directly on fundamental freedoms, as does the health inspector's
conflict with search and seizure protections discussed by Mr. Sidney
Edelman, Chief of the Environmental Health Branch, Office of the
General Counsel in the Department of Health, Education and Wel-
fare. Professor Delogu goes beyond an expression of commonly
shared concerns for the vanishing open space around our cities. He
proposes some novel uses of taxation, one of the oldest instruments
of control, to build a more attractive environment.
These papers were selected by the board of editors to be typical,
not exhaustive, of the issues and problems in environmental control.
10 Haar, Foreword to Land-Use Symposium, 50 IOWA L. REV. 243, 244 (1965).
11 See Reich, supra note 3, at 1230-70.
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Even so, they teach us that in the future, at each place where man
is finally able to apply a solution to an environmental defect, a legal
issue of some magnitude is likely to take shape around the then
"required" change in the individual exercise of human and property
rights.
It is in the spirit of challenge, then, that we dedicate this issue
of the Denver Law Journal to the faculty of the University of Denver
College of Law, and to the members of the Denver and Colorado
Bar Associations. It is they and we who will soon join them who
must lead the profession in applying the values of our legal system
to the need for a quality future living environment for us all.
Robert T. Page
Mobil Oil Corporation supports the Natural Resources Program at the University of
Denver College of Law, which support helps make this special issue possible.
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A LANDSCAPE POLICY FOR PUBLIC LANDs
By MICHAEL MCCLOSKEY*
The plight of conservation of natural beauty in the rural
landscape has been much discussed in recent years. Mr. McCloskey
suggests that the proper place to start any preservation program is
on federally owned lands. He points out the difficulties involved in
developing criteria for determining what scenic features should be
protected and discusses methods currently in use for establishing
such criteria. Mr. McCloskey charges the federal agencies who
administer federal lands with the failure to develop coordinated
policies for classification and protection of scenic resources despite
existing statutory authority. He concludes that while a broadly
conceived national landscape policy would not be a panacea, it
could serve as a framework to protect the beauty of public lands.
M OST people now accept the premise that natural beauty is an
Simportant component of a livable environment, a goal being
sought with growing urgency by a collaborative effort among the
design professions, natural scientists, conservationists, and others.
By its character, however, natural beauty is a concept which eludes
clear understanding. As a result, no basic statement of national policy
respecting the treatment of the American landscape has emerged
from the President's program on natural beauty. Instead various
federal agencies have contented themselves with gestures toward the
concept. They identify contributions being made by established
recreation programs, and they point to the need for more open space,
landscaping, and better planning in urban areas.
Clearly the problems of the urban environment are staggering
and warrant a concerted national effort. But this fact should not
obscure the importance of what becomes of the rest of the American
landscape. This landscape provides indispensable relief from the
less hospitable aspects of the urban landscape. Non-urban lands are
a place of refreshment, refuge, and recreation as well as a source of
commodity supply. They are a complementary part of the environ-
ment that needs to be handled less roughly. Some of the most impres-
sive parts stand in danger of being spotted with mining dumps,
indiscriminate logging, power lines, and road cuts. Superlative areas
such as Mount Baker in Washington State have already been defiled
in this manner.
The most logical place to begin developing a national landscape
policy is on public lands. One-third of the surface of this nation is
* Conservation Director, Sierra Club.
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owned by the federal government.' This vast real estate holding is
administered principally by the Bureau of Land Management, which
administers 480 million acres, and the Forest Service, which admin-
isters 186 million acres.2 These lands, and those administered by the
National Park Service and the Bureau of Sports Fisheries and Wildlife
are among the nation's most scenic. Here model programs of steward-
ship can be applied to lands already under public control. It would
seem self-evident that these agencies should pledge themselves to
protect the natural beauty which is found on the lands placed under
their custody. Yet they have not clearly done so. The policies estab-
lished by these agencies do not contain a straightforward commit-
ment to protect scenery as a public value. This is the case partly
because of commercial conflicts, but even more because concepts of
natural beauty are still embryonic and fragmentary. By drawing
existing experience and policy together, a useful start could be made
toward developing a national landscape policy for public lands.
I. IDENTIFYING SCENIC LANDS
A. Theory
The modern empirical mind has difficulty in coming to grips
with the concept of natural beauty. In principle, its value may be
acknowledged, but because it is indeterminate and undefinable, it
tends to be treated in practice as an unreal quality. Land planners
and managers tend to regard natural beauty as a hopelessly elusive
concept. When the subject is raised, it is easy to retreat into total
subjectivity - Chacun a son gout, or, everyone to his own taste.
Yet total subjectivity would deny the existence of art or beauty
as a concept having public value. Historically, artistic achievement
has been an important index of the worth of a civilization. Where
the leaders of a civilization could make a choice, they have chosen
personal surroundings which most would describe as having elements
of natural beauty. Among such leaders there does seem to be some
agreement that certain surroundings are more desirable and valuable
than others. Should similar surroundings on lands available to the
public be valued any less?
Up until the 20th century, philosophers dealing with esthetics
have touched upon the subject of natural beauty only intermittently,
and in the 20th century they have done so hardly at all. Some philos-
ophers have asserted that natural beauty is an objective quality, but
Santayana asserted at the end of the 19th century that it had an
I BREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, PUBLIC LAND STATIS-
TICS 1966, at 1, 11. This includes Alaska, which is about 98 percent federally owned.
The figure for the 48 states is roughly one-fifth.
2 Id. at 14-18.
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objective quality only in the sense that there is a prevalent and lasting
affinity between those with an esthetic capacity and certain types of
scenery. 3 In other words, natural beauty can be defined by patterns
of susceptibility of those whose esthetic faculties are acknowledged
in a culture. This approach may smack of elitism, but no more so
than in the design arts. The artistic is usually identified by those
who specialize in artistic pursuits.
In the area of natural beauty, one would expect then that
landscape architects would be the guiding specialists. To a degree
this has been so, but the profession has been more concerned with
practical questions of integrating man-made constructs into the land-
scape than it has with analyzing components of natural beauty. The
profession's contributions must be viewed in the context of the rela-
tionship that specific design projects have to other land management
programs.
B. Present Approaches
Primarily in response to increasing needs for outdoor recreation,
planners and land managing agencies have evolved programs reflect-
ing an interest in the character of the landscape. These programs
reveal limited ways of approaching natural beauty, of identifying its
characteristics, inventorying its extent, and according it suitable
protection.
Four basic approaches are implicit in these programs. The most
prevalent approach is to identify landscapes that attract people for
different recreational pursuits, such as boating, fishing, picnicking,
and hiking. In areas suitable for such uses, other conflicting activities
are often restricted. Similarly, a second approach consists of identify-
ing travel routes and protecting the setting along them from dis-
figurement. Here natural beauty is guaranteed in a negative sense
by the prevention of ugliness. A third approach focuses on the land-
scape itself and consists of an effort to identify the most visually
striking and dominant elements. A fourth approach pragmatically
attempts to determine public preferences by standards of popularity
and accords protection to those landscapes drawing the greatest use.
While all of these approaches have their limitations, an examination
of each may suggest ways of progressing further through a synthesis
of them.
1. Recreational Inventories
When the Congress authorized establishment of an Outdoor
Recreational Resources Review Commission in 1958, 4 many conserva-
3 G. SANTAYANA, THE SENSE OF BEAUTY 130 (1955).
4 16 U.S.C. § 17k *(1964).
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tionists expected the Commission to devise a classification system
for inventorying recreational lands and that such an inventory of
public holdings would be conducted. However, the Commission
only devised a broad system for classifying lands, and the job of
conducting the inventory was left in succeeding years to the Bureau
of Outdoor Recreation (BOR)."
The Forest Service, however, did conduct its own inventory in
1959- the National Forest Recreation Survey (NFRS). National
forest lands throughout the nation were inventoried according to
their usefulness for various recreational pursuits: camping, picnick-
ing, swimming, skiing, boating, hiking, wilderness travel, hunting,
fishing, et cetera. Detailed location maps and statistical summaries
were prepared. This information has never been published but is
used for planning purposes by individual national forests. By com-
bining data on inventoried sites for those activities which are sensitive
to landscape appearance, some measure of the extent of landscapes
dcserving protection could be derived. In addition to this inventory
of recreational potential, the Forest Service, of course, has a system
of well-established areas: camp grounds, recreation areas, scenic
areas, wilderness areas, natural areas, and botanical areas.'
The Classification and Multiple Use Act of 19641 authorized the
Bureau of Land Management to classify public domain lands for
sale, transfer, or retention and to designate portions retained for
various purposes, including recreation. Under implementing regula-
tions, the Bureau plans to designate recreation areas of several
thousand acres "where recreation is or is expected to be a major
use."" Examples of such areas include "[s]cenic areas of natural
beauty such as waterfalls; habitat of interesting, rare or unusual
plants or animals; gorges; natural lakes; geological areas of out-
standing structural or historical features of the earth's development
such as caves, glaciers and other phenomena; roadless areas in which
the primitive environment is preserved, sometimes referred to as
wilderness, wild, primitive, roadless or virgin areas."9 While the
Bureau has withdrawn some areas of this type from mineral entry
and disposal, little has been accomplished in designating recreation
areas. This work is awaiting completion of basic classification of
land for disposal or retention in public ownership. Until the recom-
mendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission'0 are
5 16 U.S.C. § 4601 (Supp. I, 1965).
6 Reserved under Forest Service Reg. U-3 and 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1964).
7 43 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964).
843 C.F.R. § 1727.1(b)(1) (1967). The first such area, the Red Rocks Recreation
complex, was officially established in December 1967, outside Las Vegas, Nevada.
9 Id.
10 43 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1400 (1964).
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received and acted upon, little progress may be made toward recrea-
tional designations. When made, however, these designations will
be broad enough to constitute an inventory of many of the more
interesting landscape features on the public domain.
The establishment of a uniform system for classifying outdoor
recreation resources was one of the principal recommendations of
the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC)."
A system comprised of six categories was outlined, to aid inventory
of public recreation resources and to promote orderly management
of these resources. The system has now been adopted by major federal
land management agencies, including the Forest Service, the Bureau
of Land Management, and the National Park Service. In a preliminary
way the system has been applied to public holdings under these
agencies, and the data presumably will be part of the Nationwide
Outdoor Recreation Plan which the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation
will submit to Congress in 1968.
Five of the six classes of land under the system pertain to areas
where the retention of natural beauty is a major objective: high
density recreation areas (Class I), general outdoor recreation areas
(Class II), unique natural areas (Class IV), primitive areas (Class
V), and historic and cultural sites (Class VI).12 Only natural
environment areas (Class III) include major commercial activities,
such as logging and mining, which could significantly detract from
the appearance of the landscape. Of the other five classes, two in
particular are designed to cover large expanses: unique natural areas
and primitive areas. Unique natural areas are "areas of remarkable
natural wonder, high scenic splendor, or scientific importance."' 13
The inventory of such areas in public ownership should constitute
the beginning point for a national landscape policy. The ORRRC
report recommended that all such areas inventoried "should be
preserved for inspirational, educational, or scientific purposes.''14
The six classifications need to be refined further to make it clear
whether the categories are mutually exclusive, as for instance Classes
IV and V, and to determine whether Class III areas are disqualified
because of the amount of conflicting disturbance by commercial
activities. Once definitions are clearer and uniform approaches are
prescribed by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation, the classification
system should render valuable data regarding portions of public
holdings where landscape values are highest. At the present time,
however, the National Park Service and the Forest Service are apply-
1 1 
OUTDOOR RECREATION RESOURCES REVIEW COMMISSION, OUTDOOR RECREATION FOR
AMERICA 96-97 (1962).
121d. at 109.




ing the classifications in a different manner, and the Bureau of Land
Management is going to limit application of the classifications to
lands already designated for recreation, even though its recreation
designations and BOR classifications are not coextensive.
2. Scenic Routes
Because most people are introduced to wildlands by highways,
main through roads have become a a focal point for much discussion
of natural beauty. Since the early 1920's, landscape architects have
been involved with choosing routes for parkways and scenic roads
and with protecting and improving their settings.
In a recent report on scenic roads and parkways prepared for
the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty, the
Department of Commerce suggests factors in comparing alternative
routes to determine which are most scenic.
Mountains must be higher, more rugged, more unusual in
their setting, more dramatic, and more visible.
Bodies of water must be deeper, bluer, cleaner, wilder, faster
moving, etc.
Flowers and wildlife must be colorful, more varied, more
plentiful, and more easily seen.
Landscapes must be more varied, more interesting, and have
more impact in terms of visible resource uses, panoramas, contrasts,
harmony, and National or State significance.15
In choosing scenic routes, landscape architects in the state of Wash-
ington used these criteria: "(1) surface qualities and configura-
tion of observed features; (2) three-dimensional quality of objects
and their landscape interrelationships; and (3) the quality of view-
points and the landscape visible from them.'"
A corollary of these efforts to determine positive esthetic qual-
ities is a concern for preventing disfigurement. In Germany controls
on land use along highways include "restrictions against disfigure-
ment," defined as a condition which "offends the sensibility of an
esthetically intelligent observer."' 7 In Wisconsin where the state has
bought over 300 miles of scenic easements along its highways, scenic
beauty is measured "by the absence of things; the absence of signs,
of junkyards and trash, of lime quarries and garbage dumps."'" The
state's chief acquisition officer says that the more deeply involved
you become in preservation work the more you find that no one is
an expert on beauty. In the face of a legislative directive to "protect
1 5 
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR SCENIC ROADS AND PARK-
WAYS 171 (1966) [hereinafter cited as SCENIC ROADS].
16 Id.
17C. TUNNARD & B. PUSHKAREV, MAN-MADE AMERICA: CHAOS OR CONTROL? 35
(1963).
18 Leverich, The Preservation of Scenic Beauty, in JUNKYARDS, GERANIUMS, AND
JURISPRUDENCE: AESTHETICS AND THE LAW 154 (Am. Bar Ass'n 1967).
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scenic resources," he asserts that though "we may not know exactly
what they are, or what we are doing, . . . we are protecting beauty."10
Restrictions on billboards and junkyards along federal interstate
highways reflect the same concern for minimizing intrusions into the
natural scene, as does a growing concern with the routing of high
voltage transmission lines.2"
In the national forests, protective zones are now defined along
main travel routes and water courses. Called travel and water
influence zones, these zones include portions of the lateral view
zones visible from highways, railroads, trails, tramways, rivers, lakes,
and reservoirs. They are to be reserved wherever (1) the scenery is
an important part of the environment, and (2) public use is signifi-
cant.21 In California, the Forest Service plots distant view zones out
three miles or more from the travel route. The zones vary in width
according to visibility and other factors, with greater protective
measures applied to close areas.
The Forest Service in California (Region 5) is unique in direct-
ing in its regulation that "[fjorest resources are to be managed to
provide protection of scenic values. ' 2 2 No other office of the Forest
Service or other federal land management agency involved in
commodity production is willing to make this basic commitment to
protect the public interest in scenery. In practice, however, the
commitment is less than complete. In the Pacific Northwest, the
Forest Service is also willing to extend protection to landscape fea-
tures beyond major roads and water courses. In upper elevation
forests - those between 3000 and 5000 feet - landscape protection
is also extended to scenery around (1) small lake basins and com-
binations of lakes, meadows, and clump-like stands of timber;
(2) rock outcrops, avalanche chutes, and other terrain breaks of
scenic significance; and (3) the timbered fringes of alpine areas. -3
No test of significance in terms of public use is applied to these
areas. At such elevations, conflict with commercial timber values
usually is slight. At lower elevations, where timber values are great,
protection is not accorded to such features unless they fall within
travel and water influence zones.
Areas receiving protection within such zones or in upper eleva-
tion forests are called landscape management units. These units
'Old. at 158.
2 0 E.g., Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (Supp. I,
1965); proposed amendments to the Federal Power Act cited infra, note 53. See also
Professor Cunningham's discussion of scenic easements in the highway beautification
program elsewhere in this issue.






usually do not coincide completely with inventoried recreation sites.
Presently the Forest Service has set aside 933,900 acres of such units
in the Pacific Northwest and 804,000 acres of them in California,
amounting to about 4 percent of its holdings in both regions.
Comparable nationwide figures are not available.
3. Landscape Patterns
A number of approaches to integrated land planning for large
areas are now being developed and evaluated. 4 Few, however, focus
on the character and quality of the landscape. One method which
does was developed by Philip H. Lewis, Jr., for use in developing an
outdoor recreation plan for Wisconsin.2 5 Lewis, a landscape architect,
developed a rough system for rating the quality of landscapes by
the prominence of various natural features: streams, lakes, wetlands,
other water features, topography, fauna, and other special features
such as caves, chasms, rock outcroppings, and natural bridges. These
features were given points according to their size, frequency, or
uniqueness. By mapping locations of these features and preparing
composite overlays, environmental corridors were depicted on maps.
These are land units which embrace high concentrations of these
features, as well as collections of many more detailed local features
of recreational, scenic, biological, geologic, or historic importance.
Lewis' most significant discovery was that he found that environ-
mental corridors identified by major landscape features in Wisconsin
also turned out to include 90 percent of the attractive local features
that were identified separately. His rating system showed which parts
of the environmental corridors had the highest public values calling
for protection. 6
While Lewis' system is not based primarily on view zones
identified on the ground, it does appear to have been successful in
finding the areas that will be most attractive to the public in a
variety of complex ways. Further research is being done on his
system, and a similar and even more elaborate survey of the same
type has just been conducted in the coastal regions of England by
the Nature Conservancy.
4. Pragmatic Planning
Despite Lewis' concrete, quantitative approach, some planners
regard his methods as value-laden and based on romantic commit-
24 See, e.g., LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE RESEARCH OFFICE, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF
DESIGN, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THREE APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL RESoURCE
ANALYSIS (1967).
25
WISCONSIN DEP'T OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, RECREATION IN WISCONSIN (1962).




ments to naturalism. 28 Alternatives appear to consist of a never-
ending quest for scientific certainty in an area of human judgment
and preference, or a pragmatic approach consisting of giving the
public what it wants.
The Commerce Department report on scenic roads suggests,
"A pragmatic approach would be to determine the public's relative
use of various routes which offer particular types and mixes of
recreation and landscape resources .... Like a merchant, the planner
learns by experience which styles offer the greatest and most lasting
appeal to his customers. He also discovers the optimum mix of
'goods,' recreational in this instance, to be carried in his inventory. "2"
In this vein, some recreation researchers are testing public
reactions to various views by interviewing, counting crowds, clocking
the duration of visits, and counting the number of repeat visits.
Laboratory experiments are being designed to test eye movements in
response to slides of different scenes. Curiously enough, the billboard
industry is using a major research institution to try to prove through
such tests that the public really doesn't notice billboards and that
some classes of people are bored by open country.80 Though meas-
urements of mass tastes may reveal some unsuspected preferences,
inherently the approach suffers from the fact that mass taste has
never been regarded as synonomous with good taste. As taste is a
variable of education, experience, and other socio-economic factors,
mass tastes can be expected to change as these factors improve.
Moreover, while pragmatic planning may assure that certain minimum
recreation facilities are provided, it cannot assure that subtler aspects
of environmental quality receive sufficient attention.
5. Summary
The first step in devising a workable landscape policy for public
lands consists of an inventory of scenic resource associations. As we
have seen, acceptable criteria and classifications for such an inven-
tory are not easy to formulate.
Nevertheless, a good beginning can be made by combining
inventory data now partially in hand. By preparing composite maps
showing the combined extent of the five BOR classes which disallow
commodity use, as well as the extent of Forest Service and Bureau
of Land Management recreational inventories, along with national
forest Landscape Management Units, a pattern would probably
emerge which would identify the majority of the most impressive
2
8 Id. at 91.
2SCENIC ROADS 171.
30 Herrmann, Using Research Experimentation to Improve the Urban Environment, in




and irreplaceable scenic features in public ownership. This inventory
pattern could serve as the first corpus for a national landscape policy.
Probably less than 10 percent of the public landscape would fall
within this pattern.
As a second step, the adequacy of inventory data should be
reviewed, both to find areas that were overlooked and to resolve
inconsistencies in inventory technique. The crests of most western
mountain ranges, for instance, should probably be in the inventory,
but these probably have not all been included in inventories made
to date.
As a third step, the composite pattern could be tested against
techniques such as Lewis'. Ideally, his inventory technique, refined
in the light of the English coastal survey and criteria used in some
scenic highway studies, could be applied to all public holdings to
determine whether significantly different patterns emerge. If they
did, a choice would have to be made between techniques based on
evaluations of their comparative strengths. If the differences were
minor, they could be resolved through local assessments in the field.
If budget limitations make it difficult to apply the Lewis approach
generally, it could be spot tested in random cases to discover similar-
ities and disparities. Spot testing might be sufficient to test the
adequacy of existing inventory data.
II. PROTECTION
Once the most valuable public landscapes have been identified,
it is natural to ask what protection should be accorded to them.
Under a variety of broad statutory mandates and administrative
regulations, protection of differing sorts is already being given to
much of the landscape in question here. Weaknesses, gaps, and
inconsistencies, however, pervade these protective policies. As a
matter of public policy, strong, uniform, and consistent protection
measures should be applied to the holdings of the federal
government.
A. Zoning
The beginning point for most existing protective policies is
identification of easily damaged natural zones within landscape units.
Obviously greatest protection is given to the more sensitive zones.
Zones are identified according to ecological factors, recreation pat-
terns, and visual criteria. Ecological factors embody such considera-
tions as soil erosibility, hardiness or fragility of vegetative cover, and
habitat needs of wildlife. Recreation factors include the nature of the
satisfactions sought in a recreational pursuit, the relationship of these
to the terrain, use and movement patterns, seasonality, and site
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dependence. National forest multiple use plans for ranger districts,
as well as NFRS and BOR inventory data, reflect concern for a
combination of ecological and recreational factors, though often
in a rudimentary way.
Visual criteria for zoning landscape units have been articulated
mainly in schemes for scenic roads and parkways and in the Forest
Service's landscape management units. Along scenic roads the concept
of a scenic corridor has been developed, which is "defined by land-
scape elements such as land forms, large bodies of water, trees or
other vegetation, and manmade objects which restrict the view of
the observer.' ' 31 In the Commerce Department study the corridor
consists of an inner and outer zone, the inner part of which may
extend out perhaps as far as 500 feet from the roadway.3 2 While
the outer zone may extend as far as the horizon, attention is focused
on the inner zone or foreground area where scenic easements may
be acquired. Boris Pushkarev advocates purchase of scenic easements
in a visual control zone extending out 1000 feet on either side of the
scenic highway.
33
In Wisconsin, scenic easements usually include restrictions
against (1) disposal of trash; (2) erection of advertising signs;
(3) removal or uncontrolled excavation of surface materials; and
(4) denuding the area.34 Scenic easements acquired by the National
Park Service along the Blue Ridge Parkway in Virginia and North
Carolina and along the Natchez Trace Parkway in Alabama, Missis-
sippi, and Tennessee include even stronger restrictions. They go on to
(1) prohibit unauthorized cutting of trees and shrubs, though certain
maintenance is planned; (2) restrict construction of new buildings
and structures; (3) control erection of new public facilities and
utilities; and (4) prevent any activity which detracts from the
appearance of the property.
35
In its landscape management units, the Forest Service in
California also identifies inner and outer zones, which it calls near
and distant view areas. Where the line of sight is unobstructed, the
near view zone ends at the first major terrain break or at that point
where high stumps can no longer be clearly seen. This distance might
be as much as a mile from a road or lake. The distant view zone
might extend out as far as 3 miles or to the point where a 10 or 20
31 SCENIC RoADs 43.
32 d. at 50.
33 C. TUNNARD & B. PUSHKAREV, supra note 17, at 261.
3 R.C. Leverich, Understanding a Scenic Preservation and Enhancement Program
(report to Seminar on Right of Way Acquisition, Am. Right of Way Ass'n, Madison,
Wis., Sept. 30, 1967).
35 SCENIC RoADs 51.
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acre clear-cut logging unit might become obscure. In the Northwest,
the Forest Service breaks down the near view zone into an occupancy
zone, an immediate foreground zone, and a primary foreground
zone. The occupancy zone would include the site for a campground,
for instance. The immediate foreground zone includes that part of
the forest where trunks and ground cover are viewed from the
occupancy zone. The primary foreground consists of the forest beyond
where the canopy is viewed at close range.
Within occupancy zones, only selective sanitary logging is
allowed to remove dangerous and diseased trees. Certain types of
light cutting for non-commercial purposes are allowed in the imme-
diate foreground zone. Finally, in the primary foreground zone
commercial logging is allowed, but its methods are modified to lessen
adverse impact on the scenery. In California, restrictions are even
greater. Within near view areas, no clear cutting is allowed save in
exceptional cases. In distant view areas, clear cutting is permitted
but no more than one or two clear cuts are allowed in any one vista,
and these are to be natural in shape, with those in the center of views
kept smaller than those at the periphery. Additional restrictions are
placed on logging techniques and on the standards and location of
logging roads so as to minimize visible scars."'
In any properly elaborated landscape policy, a landscape zoning
system similar to that used by the Forest Service in its travel and
water influence zones could be applied to all units in the landscape
inventory of public lands. The Bureau of Land Management does not
yet use such a system, even though in places in Oregon its logging
units abut Forest Service holdings. It is illogical for two federal
agencies managing forest resources side-by-side to treat the landscape
in far differing fashions. Moreover, the Forest Service's system
should not be limited just to areas where public use is significant.
It is manifestly difficult to foresee trends in public use, and in many
cases protective measures must be taken for periods beyond the fore-
seeable future. Even where public use is light, as in wilderness, public
values may be great. A nation as rich as ours can afford to protect
its natural scenic endowment regardless of present or easily fore-
seeable intensities of use.
The Forest Service's visual criteria for zoning landscape units
can be combined with ecological and recreational data to produce
maps showing sensitive zones. Protective restrictions can be elaborated
for each zone to fit the degree of sensitivity, although within wilder-
ness areas, the restrictions are set by the Wilderness Act. 7
so Mcloskey, supra note 21.




Most federal land management agencies presently have restric-
tions against many of the activities that scenic easements and other
controls are designed to prevent on private lands which abut public
roads. Thus, dumping and signs are generally not a problem on public
lands, though violations do occur and policing, no doubt, could
improve. Borrow pits, gravel piles, excavations, and mines, however,
are more of a problem. There is a growing tendency to hide borrow
pits from main views, but consistent policies are needed to keep these
out of sensitive landscape areas. Excavations made under the Mining
Act are a major problem in that the administering agency usually
does not participate in the choice of their location, which is a matter
of private option."8 But conspicuous excavations should certainly be
kept out of sensitive zones wherever possible, through mineral with-
drawals if necessary. Certainly, no minerals should be offered for
lease under the Mineral Leasing Act39 in sensitive zones.
The construction of public buildings, utilities, and transport
facilities also needs to be carefully controlled. While these are
sometimes necessary to service the recreation public, they also can
seriously mar the landscape, as where wide swaths are cleared for
power lines. Wherever possible, the amount of building in sensitive
zones should be minimized by transferal to other less sensitive zones,
and preferably to locations completely outside landscape units.
Finally, administering agencies need to impose strict limitations on
the amount of commercial activities they allow in sensitive zones.
Logging, grazing, and road construction can all be controlled under
existing authority. Commercial pressures for these activities, however,
will generate a reluctance to impose significant limitations unless
national policy requires it.
C. Harmonizing Intrusions with the Landscape
The degree to which various human constructs and activities
are thought to intrude upon the landscape depends on how the land-
scape is perceived. Apologists for commercial activities usually
assert either that their activity is inherently interesting and there-
fore ought to be welcomed or that in any event their activity is too
important economically to be circumscribed.4" Conservationists usually
assert that nature is not improved upon by human constructs and that
the prevention of disfigurement is the closest practical guide we can
devise to safeguard natural beauty. Thus, they stress maximum
restrictions on human intrusions.
38 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1964).
39 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq. (1964).
40 McCloskey, supra note 21.
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The design professions occupy something of a middle ground.
Landscape architects, in particular, have a basic commitment to the
premise that man-made constructs can be insinuated into the land-
scape with pleasing results. Though they have little to offer in the
way of theory to justify this premise, the results of their art have
often been successful enough to warrant some confidence. If land-
scape architects controlled decisions on the degree and manner of
integrating intrusions into the landscape, doubtless the problems
could be narrowed considerably. All too often, however, landscape
architects are employed by public agencies only to make the best of a
placement and design decision that someone else has already made.
In the Forest Service, for instance, landscape architects generally
cannot advance from the role of supporting staff into the line of
authority, an area traditionally reserved for foresters.
Even if landscape architects were given free rein, some basic
problems would remain. Robert Twiss and Burton Litton have
pointed out that the landscape is perceived not only as the locus of
natural forces but also as a place that is understood in terms of
associated meanings and images, as well as in terms of its visual
components. 41 One's reaction to the landscape is colored by one's
attitudes, experiences, beliefs, values, and expectations. Those who
feel insecure in natural areas may welcome marks of man, while
those who are fleeing the clutter of the cities may resent its following
them into the mountains. Man's intrusions into the landscape may
also affect the ability of the landscape to evoke strong and satisfying
images. These images may have a symbolic significance which tran-
scends their visual impact. It is difficult to know what symbolic
import results by changing images of the landscape.
Even leaving images and associated meanings aside, little has
been done in the field of visual analysis of the natural landscape. The
only treatment of the subject that seems helpful grew out of 19th
century romanticism and landscape painting, little having been done
since. In the 18th and 19th centuries there was a revival of interest
in the classical distinction between the sublime and the beautiful.
Whereas the beautiful referred to customary subjects of painting
and sculpture - royalty, ruins, the gods, and familiar forms - the
sublime meant those scenes in nature having powerful, awesome, and
monumental effects.42 The romantic writers' discovery of the Alps
prompted continuing discussion of the paradox posed by the sublime:
how could anything terrifying also be attractive? There was no doubt
41 Twiss & Litton, Resource Use in the Regional Landscape, 6 NATURAL RES. J. 76
(1966).
42 See McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 ORE.
L. REv. 288, 290 (1966).
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that sublime scenes in the Alps were attractive. Santayana suggested
that an "epicurean equipoise" was engendered. 43 Gradually as the
mountains were explored and climbed, terror subsided with knowl-
edge, and the paradox became less acute.
Writers on art, like Ruskin, theorized about what gave the Alps
their charm. In contrasting lowland forests to those in the Alps, he
pointed to the "power of redundance - the mere quantity of foliage
visible in the folds and on the promontories of a single Alp being
greater than that of an entire lowland forest."44 In addition to
redundance, he pointed to the fact of "clearer visibility - tree after
tree being constantly shown in successive height, one behind another,
instead of the mere tops and flanks of the masses, as in the plains.
' 45
He also identified distance as an important factor in natural compo-
sition. "Are not all natural things, it may be asked, as lovely near, as
far away? Nay, not so. . . . If you desire to perceive the great
harmonies of the form of rocky mountain, you must not ascend upon
its sides .... If you approach nearer, that kind of beauty is lost, and
another succeeds, to be disorganized and reduced to strange and
incomprehensible means and appliances in turn.... For every distance
from the eye there is a peculiar kind of beauty, or a different system
of lines of form; the sight of that beauty is reserved for that distance,
and for that alone. . .. [T]he discrepancy between apparent and
actual beauty is greater in proportion to the unapproachableness of
the object."
46
Both Ruskin's theories and fashions in landscape painting
stressed the importance of distant and elevated views. From the 17th
century to the 19th century, it was common for artist's landscapes to
look out from a promontory toward a distant scene. The painting is
organized around a horizon line, which may be in either the bottom
or upper third of the frame. A series of diagonal lines or curves
usually wend their way toward the horizon line from one of the
lower corners, creating a sense of depth and the basic structure of
the composition. The angular structure of the picture is usually offset
by large mounds of foliage at the sides or by clouds if the sky is a
major feature.47 The eye is usually led to a vanishing point near the
center of the picture just above the horizon. No feature is ever placed
in the center of the picture to distract from the vanishing point.
Though real landscapes are not viewed through static view
frames, these 19th century studies stand as testimony from the artistic
43 G. SANTAYANA, supra note 3, at 241.
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community on the importance of distant views. Such views are not
accorded much protection under current policy, nor are they thought
to be of much importance. Much of the power of the sublime still
exists, however, and the critical importance of what happens near
the horizon line should not be forgotten. As Ruskin suggests, the
eye is often drawn to the most naturally perfect composition, and
new lines and forms should not be intruded into the scene without
thought of impact on the composition. Angular road scars, for
example, may completely work against a natural interplay of rounded
hills, destroying the balance of the composition. Although a compo-
sitional analysis of the landscape may not produce conclusive answers,
landscape architects should at least be given the opportunity to think
in these terms.
III. AuTHoRiTy
The organic acts of federal land management agencies appear
to be broad enough to support promulgation of a national landscape
policy for public lands. The Forest Service's Organic Act of 1897
permits zoning to protect forests, 48 and the Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield Act of 1960'1 clearly authorizes allocation of land to such
non-commercial purposes as recreation and wilderness. " The Bureau
of Land Management's Classification and Multiple Use Act is only
interim legislation, but as long as it lasts it too authorizes allocations
of indeterminate extent for various non-commercial purposes.5
These are the two main agencies which would be affected by a land-
scape policy, as the National Park Service and the Bureau of Sports
Fisheries and Wildlife are already managing their lands under
restrictions against significant commercial use.
In light of the broad statutory authorities which presently exist,
a viable national landscape policy could be brought into existence by
executive order, or by agreement of the President's Council on
Recreation and Natural Beauty. This latter committee consists of
the secretaries of the following departments: Interior; Agriculture;
Defense; Transportation; Health, Education, and Welfare; Housing
and Urban Development; and the chairmen of the Federal Power
Commission and Tennessee Valley Authority; and the Administrator
of the General Services Administration.5" Through agreement of the
48 30 Stat. 35 (1897), as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 551 '(1964).
49 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1964).
50 See Note, Natural Resources - National Forests - The Multiple Use-Sustained
Yield Act of 1960, 41 ORE. L. REv. 49 (1961).
5143 U.S.C. § 1411 (1964). This act has been extended to remain in force pending
the recommendations of the Public Land Law Review Commission. Pub. L. No.
90-213, § 2 (Dec. 18, 1967), 81 Stat. 660, amending 43 U.S.C. § 1418 (1964).
5 2 Exec. Order No. 11017, 3 C.F.R. 597 (1962), 16 U.S.C. § 17k (1964), as modified
by Exec. Order No. 11278, 3 C.F.R. 107 (1966), 16 U.S.C. § 17k (Supp. II, 1966).
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members of this Council, a policy could be devised which all agencies
could pledge to observe, to the extent that their governing statutes
permit.
In the course of time it would be desirable to have certain
statutes amended to give the land managing agencies broader
authority to resist undesirable intrusions. For instance, the Federal
Power Act could be amended to allow dams and reservoirs to be
kept out of landscape zones except in extraordinary cases. Currently
pending legislation which would give the Federal Power Commission
authority to regulate routing of transmission lines would also allow
the Commission to consider landscape values in its determinations;58
this legislation could be strengthened even further in this regard.
The Department of Transportation Act gives parks and wildlife
refuges protection against invasion by federally aided highways,
unless there is no feasible and prudent alternative route.54 This legis-
lation could also be broadened to recognize wider landscape values.
Finally, the Mining Act of 1872 needs to be reformed to make
mineral entry a matter of governmental grant where it is desirable,
and not a matter of private right. By placing all minerals under the
Mineral Leasing Act, landscape zones could be given appropriate
protection.55
IV. SUMMARY
Josiah Royce felt a community's appearance reflected its ideals.
By the same token, the appearance of the national landscape is a
commentary on America's ideals. If our ideals still have vitality, we
will take conscious action to protect that which is best and most
unique in our American landscape. This action should find expression
in a national landscape policy.
The place to begin applying such a policy is on the lands we
all own in common, the federal lands administered by the Depart-
ment of the Interior and the Department of Agriculture. The first
step in developing such a policy consists of an inventory to determine
which lands are most scenic. Existing data can be combined to produce
a composite picture, which can serve as a point of departure. Further
refinements can follow. As a second step, the most sensitive zones
can be identified, with heaviest restrictions on commercial intrusions
applied in these zones. Drawing upon both theory and practice,
landscape architects can decide on the degree to which various intru-
sions can be accepted. As a third and final step, various statutes can
5
3 See, e.g., H.R. 12322, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
54 80 Stat. 934 (1966), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (Supp. 1967).
55 See McCloskey, Can Recreational Conservationists Provide for a Mining Industry?,
13 RocKy MT. MiN. L. INST. 65 (1967).
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be improved by amendment to give the administering agencies greater
authority to protect landscape zones.
The federal government should pledge itself to do its part to
keep America beautiful. While a broadly conceived national land-
scape policy would be no panacea, it could serve as a framework for
evolving uniformly high standards of esthetic stewardship on public
lands.
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SCENIC EASEMENTS IN THE HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM*
By ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM**
Professor Cunningham examines the total concept of the scenic
easement as a device to implement the Highway Beautification Pro-
gram. In doing so, he discusses its historical origin, its recent appli-
cation in selected localities and highway projects, and the legal
problems arising from its use. The scenic easement has been widely
advocated as a means of protecting and preserving our roadside
natural beauty, and the author thoroughly examines all aspects con-
nected with its application. This work should have considerable
value to planners concerned with highway beautification. Because
of the thoroughness of the article, we have included the preceding
table of contents.
ITLE III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965' provides
for an allocation to each state of federal funds equal to 3 per-
cent of the funds appropriated to that state for federal-aid highways
for any fiscal year, on a non-matching basis, "for acquisition of
interests in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the
restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent
to such highways, including acquisition and development of publicly
owned and controlled rest and recreation areas and sanitary and
other facilities within or adjacent to the highway right-of-way
reasonably necessary to accommodate the traveling public."' Al-
though this provision obviously contemplates acquisition of land in
fee simple for "development of publicly owned and controlled rest
and recreation areas and sanitary and other facilities," the reference
to "interests in ... strips of land necessary for the restoration, pres-
ervation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such [federal-
*This article is a preliminary product of a research project on Valuation and Legal
Implications of Scenic, Conservation, and Roadside Easements sponsored by the
American Association of State Highway Officials, in cooperation with the Bureau
of Public Roads, as part of the National Cooperative Highway Research Program
administered by the Highway Research Board of the National Academy of Sciences
-- National Research Council. The principal investigator for this project (NCHRP
Project HR 11-3) is Mr. Donald T. Sutte, Jr., of Hinsdale, Illinois. The author is
serving as legal consultant.
Publication does not necessarily indicate acceptance of the findings, opinions,
conclusions, or recommendations expressed or implied in this article by the Highway
Research Board, the National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council,
the Bureau of Public Roads, the American Association of State Highway Officials, or
any state highway department. The views expressed are those of the author alone.
No copyright to any portion of this article is claimed by the author or by the
Denver Law journal.
*"Professor of Law, University of Michigan; S.B. 1942, LL.B. 1948, Harvard
University.
123 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319 (Supp. 1, 1965).
2 Id. § 319.
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aid] highways" clearly contemplates that less-than-fee interests may
be acquired for such purposes.
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 authorized
an appropriation of up to $120 million for the fiscal year ending
June 30, 1966, for landscaping and scenic enhancement, and a like
appropriation for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1967. Public Law
89-309, approved October 1, 1965, appropriated $60 million for
landscaping and scenic enhancement for the fiscal year 1966, and
$59.5 million of this amount was actually obligated to the several
states as of June 30, 1966. On January 10, 1967, the Bureau of
Public Roads, pursuant to Title III of the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965, submitted to Congress a detailed estimate of the cost
of carrying out the provisions of the act, and a comprehensive study
of the economic impact of such programs (including advertising
control and junkyard control) on affected individuals and commer-
cial and industrial enterprises, the effectiveness of such programs
and the public and private benefits realized thereby, and alternate
and improved methods of accomplishing the objectives of the act.
The Bureau of Public Roads report' contains two sets of cost
estimates. For a "minimum" program to be carried out over some
10 years at a cost in the range of $200 million per annum, a total
of $189,170,000 would be allocated for acquisition of scenic strips
(or interests therein) adjacent to the highway right-of-way.4 For an
"ultimate" program to be undertaken at a cost in the range of $300
million per annum for a 10-year period, a total of $391,435,000
would be allocated.
In view of the very substantial amounts of federal funds made
available on a non-matching basis for the fiscal year 1966, and the
additional amounts likely to be made available thereafter, many
state highway agencies have become interested in the possibility of
acquiring "scenic easements" adjacent to existing and planned
federal-aid highways. In a large number of states which lacked
adequate enabling legislation, new legislation to authorize the acqui-
sition of scenic interests (including easements) was enacted in 1966
3 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON 1967 HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM,
S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print 1967).
4 In addition to control of outdoor advertising and junkyards, this program would
provide only:
(1) acquisition or improvement of those scenic strips which have superior
or inherent scenic value or those where there is a high probability that other
uses of the land would soon destroy the inherent scenic value; (2) that
landscaping and roadside development at minimum cost which will provide
outstanding highway roadside beauty in conjunction with the adjacent
environment (or because of a lack of any existing appropriate treatment) ;
and (3) those safety rest areas or scenic overlooks which would have the
highest probable use to the traveling public or are sites of outstanding inter-
est and attractiveness.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 3, at 5, 12.
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and 1967. It is the purpose of this article to describe the past experi-
ence and future plans of those state and federal agencies concerned
with the use of "scenic easements" for highway beautification, and
to indicate some of the constitutional, statutory, and other problems
that may attend such use.
I. SOME PROBLEMS OF DEFINITION
Although the term "scenic easement" has been the subject of
much writing and discussion during the last decade, it is used in
only a few of the state statutes authorizing acquisition of less-than-
fee interests in land adjacent to or near highways.5 Only two of
these statutes, the Arkansas and Missouri acts of 1939 providing
for creation of a Mississippi River Parkway,6 contain a definition:
"Scenic, landscape, sightly or safety easement" shall mean a
servitude devised to permit land to remain in private ownership for
its normal agricultural, residential or other use consistent with park-
way purposes determined by the secretary [U.S. Secretary of the
Interior], and at the same time placing a control over the future use
of the area to maintain its scenic, landscape, sightly or safety values
for the parkway in this state.7
This definition is similar to the definition contained in the
National Park Service's Requirements and Procedure to Govern
the Acquisition of Land for National Parkways, developed for use
in connection with the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace National
Parkways.8 Although the congressional legislation authorizing appro-
priations to assist in creation of a Mississippi River Parkway - now
called the Great River Road - did not define "scenic easement," the
report entitled Parkway for the Mississippi,9 contained the follow-
ing discussion of "scenic easements":
Outright purchase of the farm scene, widespread through the
valley, would be unnecessary. Instead, scenic easements or reserva-
tions would be sought, averaging 300 feet wide, along both sides of
the construction right-of-way. There would be purchased from the
owner only his right to convert a certain part of his farm land to
residential or commercial uses. While he could not add new houses
or erect billboards, paralleling pole lines, or other structures, he
would continue to exercise all other privileges of ownership and in
5 See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 7000 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-
201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.280 (1949).
A.RK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1801 to -1811 (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430
(1949).
7ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-1804(3) (1957); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.280(3) (1949).
8
See W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 12 n.3 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959). Congressional
enactments dealing with the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace National Parkways may
be found in 16 U.S.C. §§ 460, 460a '(1964).
OTransmitted to Congress on November 28, 1951 by the Bureau of Public Roads and
the National Park Service, prepared pursuant to 63 Stat. 626 (1949), which author-
ized the Department of the Interior and the Federal Works Agency "to make a joint
survey of a route for a national parkway to be known as the Mississippi River Park-
way." Congress appropriated $250,000 for this survey.
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no way would be restricted in his agricultural pursuits. Neither
would the public have any right to enter upon these lands for any
purpose. This method of scenic conservation should result in large
savings over outright purchase, retire less farm land from the tax
rolls, and attach the pastoral views permanently to the parkway with-
out cost to the public for maintenance. 10
The Appraisal and Terminology Handbook of the American
Institute of Real Estate Appraisers defines a "scenic easement" some-
what more broadly as "a restriction imposed upon the use of the
property of the grantor for the purpose of preserving the natural
state of scenic and historical attractiveness of adjacent lands of the
grantee, usually the city, county, state or federal government." In
short, under the A.I.R.E.A. definition a "scenic easement" is a nega-
tive easement appurtenant designed to preserve scenic and historical
values. It should be noted, however, that there is nothing in the
nature of the interest requiring a "scenic easement" to be appur-
tenant, although "scenic easements" designed to preserve scenic
and historical values along highways will, normally, be appurtenant
to the highway, with the highway constituting the dominant estate.
From the point of view of the servient landowner, then, a
scenic easement is primarily a restriction upon the uses which he
might otherwise lawfully make of his land. From the point of view
of the persons entitled to the benefit of the easement, e.g., the travel-
ing public on a public highway to which a scenic easement is appur-
tenant, the scenic easement is essentially an easement of view. As
such, it may provide a benefit in at least three ways: (1) something
attractive to look at within the easement area; (2) an open area
to look through in order to see something attractive beyond the
easement itself; and (3) a screen to block out an unsightly view
beyond the easement area.
Since one of the chief advantages of the scenic easement is
flexibility, there is no one standard form. Within limits, the ease-
ment provisions are tailored to the needs of the servient landowner
and the particular landscape qualities desired to be preserved. In
general, however, scenic easement forms now in use include the
following:
(1) A restriction of new building construction or major
alteration of existing structures to farm and residential build-
ings only, with an express prohibition of new commercial struc-
tures and a saving clause permitting the continuance of existing
uses and structures;
(2) An authorization for necessary public utility lines and
roads;
(3) A prohibition against cutting "mature trees and
10 PARKWAY FOR THE MilSsissippi, supra note 9, at 11.
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shrubs," but with a provision authorizing normal maintenance;
(4) A prohibition against dumping;
(5) A prohibition against outdoor advertising, except for
advertising of activities located on the premises.
In addition to the above restrictions or negative rights, a scenic
easement may also include one or more affirmative privileges, such
as a right of entry in the state highway agency to remove structures
or plantings which are in violation of the restrictions, to repair
damage done to plantings or other vegetation in violation of the
restrictions, to cut and prune brush and trees in order to keep a scenic
view open, or to engage in landscaping operations."
It is obvious that scenic easements are at least first cousins to
conservation easements. Indeed, there is clearly a good deal of over-
lap between the scenic easement and the conservation easement. If,
as is stated in the Missouri and Arkansas enabling legislation for
the Great River Road,' a scenic easement is "a servitude devised
to permit land to remain in private ownership for its normal agri-
cultural, residential or other use consistent with parkway purposes,"
the conservation of land for agricultural use is clearly one of the
purposes, and one of the results as well, of a scenic easement acqui-
sition program.
A proposed Pennsylvania statute defined "conservation ease-
ments" as follows:
An aggregation of easements in perpetuity designed to preserve
in their natural state lands of cultural, scenic, historic, or other public
significance. Such easements could include restrictions against erect-
ing buildings or other structures; constructing or altering private
roads or drives; removal or destruction of trees, shrubs or other
greenery; changing existing uses; altering public utility facilities;
displaying of any form of outdoor advertising; dumping of trash,
wastes, or unsightly or offensive materials; changing any features of
the natural landscape; and any changes detrimental to existing drain-
age, flood control, erosion control, or soil conservation; any other
activities inconsistent with the conservation of open spaces in the
public interest. Conservation easements will permit all present
normal and reasonable uses, not conflicting with the purposes indi-
cated above, to be engaged in by the landowners, their heirs, suc-
cessors and assigns. 13 [Emphasis added.]
Although the proposed statute from which the above definition
is taken was not enacted, Pennsylvania did enact, in 1964, a statute
14
1 1 
See UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, WORKSHOP MANUAL FOR CONFERENCE ON SCENIC
EAsEMENTs IN ACTION 10 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 16-17, 1966) [hereinafter cited as
WORKSHOP MANUAL].
12 Statutes cited note 6 supra.
13 This proposed statute, which was not enacted, is set out in full in W. WHYTE,
supra note 8, at 59.
14PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72 §§ 3946.1-.22 (Supp. 1966).
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authorizing "the [public] acquisition of lands for recreation, con-
servation and historical purposes before such lands are lost forever
to urban development or become prohibitively expensive."" "Con-
servation purposes" was defined to mean "any use of land for water
supply, flood control, water quality control development, soil erosion
control, reforestation, wild life reserves or any other uses that will
maintain, improve or develop the natural environment of soil, water,
air, minerals or wild life of this Commonwealth so as to assure their
optimum use."' 16 "Lands" was defined to mean "real property,
including improvements thereof or thereon, rights of way, water,
riparian, and other rights, easements, privileges, and any other
physical property or rights or interests of any kind or description
relating to or connected with real property."' 7 Thus a "conservation
easement" under the Pennsylvania statute would be an easement
designed to further any of the "conservation purposes" listed above.
New Jersey enacted a somewhat similar statute, the New Jersey
Green Acres Land Acquisition Act of 1961,1' which authorizes public
acquisition of "lands for recreation and conservation purposes,"'"
meaning "use of lands for parks, natural areas, forests, camping,
fishing, water reserves, wildlife, reservoirs, hunting, boating, winter
sports and similar uses for public outdoor recreation and conserva-
tion of natural resources. ' 2 0 The definition of "lands" in the New
Jersey statute2' is substantially identical with that in the Pennsyl-
vania act, and in addition the New Jersey act expressly authorizes
public acquisition of "an interest or right consisting, in whole or in
part, of a restriction on the use of land by others including owners
of other interests therein; such interest or right sometimes known as
a 'conservation easement.' "22
It would thus appear that the objectives of "conservation ease-
ments" are somewhat broader than those of "scenic easements" in
that the conservation easement may be designed to conserve all kinds
of natural resources such as agricultural land, water, forests, and
wildlife, as well as scenic landscape values. Moreover, conservation
easements may often be coupled with affirmative easements designed
to promote public recreational use of and access through private
151d. § 3946.2(4).
I6 1d. § 3946.3(2).
1
7 Id. § 3946.3(3).
18 N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:8A-1 to -18 (Supp. 1959-1961).
19Id. § 13:8A-4.
2°Id. § 13:8A-3(c).




land for hunting, fishing, boating, and camping.2" In addition, con-
servation easements may be employed to preserve open space in
order to "pace and place urban development,"24 or even to preserve
"open-space-just-for-open-space's-sake.''25 Viewed as a tool for use
in a highway beautification program, the conservation easement
offers an opportunity to achieve other objectives along with the
primary scenic objective of the federal highway beautification pro-
gram. In this article, however, we shall be concerned primarily with
scenic easements in the narrower sense, that is, those less-than-fee
interests which will contribute to "the restoration, preservation, and
enhancement of scenic beauty' 26 along our highways and which
the state highway agencies may acquire with federal funds pursuant
to Title III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.
However, there still remains a more technical problem of defi-
nition: are scenic easements really "legal easements," or are they
really "equitable servitudes"?
Under the definition of a "legal easement" given in the Restate-
ment of Property,27 six factors are stressed: (1) it is an interest in
land which is in the possession of another, and therefore cannot be
classified as an estate in land; (2) the essence of the interest is a
limited privilege of use or enjoyment of the land in which the
interest exists (the servient tenement); (3) the interest is legally
protected against interference by third persons, as well as by the
possessor of the servient tenement; (4) the interest is not terminable
at the will of the possessor of the servient tenement, but may con-
tinue in perpetuity, or for a designated lifetime, or for a term of
years; (5) the interest is not a normal incident of a possessory estate
in land; and (6) the interest is capable of creation by conveyance.
Easements can be classified in various ways. For present pur-
poses, the significant categories are "affirmative" and "negative."
If the owner of an easement is privileged to enter on the servient
tenement and to do acts thereon, e.g., to maintain a way across it, or
2 See WORKSHOP MANUAL 47, defining "conservation easements" as follows: "hunt-
ing rights, right to enter and manage waters, right of access to lake, right to insist
that cover and other habitat remain undisturbed '(a negative right), right to fish
from private land, etc." On the other hand, "the right to prevent any development
in a flood plain or to protect wetlands from drainage and agricultural use" is given
as an example of an "easement against development." For a good discussion of the
use of conservation easements to protect watersheds and to conserve agricultural land,
see W. WHYTE, supra note 8, at 16-17.
2 Beuscher, Conservation Easements and the Law, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE 20 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 13-14, 1961);
W. WHY rE, supra note 8, at 18.
25 Beuscher, supra note 24, at 20.
26 The quoted language is from Highway Beautification Act of 1965, Title III, 23
U.S.C. § 319(b) (Supp. I, 1965).
27 RESTATEMEN'r OF PROPERTY § 450, and comment thereon (1944). See also 3 H.
TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 756 (3d ed. 1939); 2 AMERICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY §§ 8.4, 8.5 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952) ; 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 405 (recomp. ed. 1967).
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to cause it to be covered with water, the easement is classified as
affirmative, since it privileges the owner of the easement to do
affirmative acts on the servient tenement which, but for the ease-
ment, would be unprivileged and tortious. Similarly, if the easement
privileges a possessor of land to do acts on his own land, such as
maintaining a factory that pollutes the air or causes excessive noise,
which, but for the easement, would be tortious under the law of
nuisance, the easement is classified as affirmative. A negative ease-
ment, on the other hand, essentially gives the owner of the easement
a veto power. The owner of a negative easement has the power to
prevent the possessor of the servient tenement from doing acts on his
own land which he would otherwise be privileged to do. A negative
easement may, for example, assure to its owner the access of light
to his windows over the servient tenement by giving him the power
to prevent the erection on the servient tenement of structures that
would obstruct the light; or it may assure the easement owner of
more lateral support from the servient tenement or more benefit
from a stream of water than he would otherwise be legally entitled
to receive, by prohibiting the exercise by the possessor of the servient
tenement of some of his "natural rights.""8
From what has already been said, it is clear that scenic ease-
ments must be classified primarily as negative easements, since the
essence of such interests is a restriction of the uses that might other-
wise be made of the servient tenement.2 Whenever a scenic ease-
ment includes a right of entry for any purpose, however, it is clearly
to that extent an affirmative easement.
Recognizing that scenic easements are primarily negative restric-
tions on the use of the servient tenement, the question must still be
raised whether the Anglo-American common law recognizes such
easements at all." °
A negative easement of prospect or view seems to have been
recognized by the civil law of Europe."' But in England it was held
at an early date that, although there can be an easement of light
where a defined window receives a defined amount of light, there
can be no easement of prospect (i.e., the right to a view) .2 As the
court rather quaintly said, "for... prospect, which is a matter only
of delight, and not of necessity, no action lies for stopping thereof
.... [T]he law does not give an action for such things of delight.1
s3
2 See 3 R. POWELL, supra note 27.
29 See text accompanying note 11, supra.
30 That is, whether scenic easements are recognized as legal easements as distinguished
from equitable servitudes.
31 E. WASHBURN, EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 20 (4th ed. 1885).
32 William Aldred's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1610).
33 Id. at 58b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
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It is possible, of course, that if the need for it should arise today,
the English courts would overrule this old precedent and recognize
a "legal" easement of prospect. A continued refusal to recognize
such easements at law could not be based on the theory that the list
of permissible "legal easements" is closed, for the English courts
have recognized that "the category of servitudes and easements must
alter and expand with the changes that take place in the circumstances
of mankind.' '34 Rather, such continued refusal would have to be
based on the view that the list of easements is "not open to interests
which do not conform to the rules about the general nature of ease-
ments, ''" and that "the extent of the right claimed must be capable
of reasonably exact definition, for otherwise it could not be granted
at all.' ' 6 As we have seen, one requirement of an easement is that
it be capable of creation by conveyance.
Where the content of a scenic easement is carefully defined,
i.e., the restrictions on land use are carefully spelled out, it is hard
to see any objection to regarding the easement as a "legal" interest
in land. Even assuming that the English courts will refuse to recog-
nize a "legal" scenic easement, however, it should be noted that in
England "it is often possible to secure by way of contract rights
which are too indefinite to be easements; and a restrictive covenant
properly framed may be used to confer a right of amenity, e.g., an
unspoilt view, upon one piece of land as against another, so as in
substance to create a right of property to that effect.' '
37
In the United States there is a substantial body of case law
recognizing a common law negative easement of prospect or view.
Although there are dicta in Michigan"8 and South Carolina8" cases
to the effect that no such easement is recognized in those states, the
dicta in both cases are based on cited earlier cases which are clearly
not in point."' The Michigan court, moreover, suggested in another
34 Dyce v. Lady James Hay, 1 Macq. 305, 312 (H.L. 1852).
3 5
MEGARRY & WADE, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 808 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter
cited as MEGARRY & WADE]. The most famous statement of this general principle is
Lord Brougham's assertion in Keppell v. Bailey, 2 My. & K. 517, 535, 39 Eng. Rep.
1042, 1049 (Ch. 1834), that "it must not therefore be supposed that incidents of a
novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any
owner."
3 8 
MEGARRY & WADE at 809.
87 Id. at 810.
8Hasselbring v. Koepke, 263 Mich. 466, 475, 248 N.W. 869, 872 (1933).
39 Schroeder v. O'Neill, 179 S.C. 310, 315, 184 S.E. 679, 681 (1936).
40The diotum in Hasselbring is based on Hawkins v. Sanders, 45 Mich. 491, 8 N.W.
98 (1881), and Kuzniak v. Kozminski, 107 Mich. 444, 65 N.W. 275, 61 Am. St.
Rep. 344 (1895), neither of which deals with easements of view or prospect.
Schroeder bases its dictum on Bailey v. Gray, 53 S.C. 503, 31 S.E. 354 (1898),
which is also not in point.
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case41 that there is such a thing as a "common-law negative ease-
ment of air, light, and view." A common law negative easement of
prospect or view has been recognized in California, 42 Massachusetts,43
and Rhode Island, 44 at least, and apparently also in New York,
45
Vermont,4" and Wisconsin. 4' The Wisconsin case specifically recog-
nizes a scenic easement as such.
It is thus apparent that there is substantial American case law
supporting the view that an easement of view or prospect is a recog-
nized "legal" interest in land,48 particularly when the purpose of
the easement is to secure light and air as well as a scenic view across
the servient tenement. Moreover, there is substantial case law recog-
nizing and enforcing negative easements somewhat similar to scenic
easements, viz., "clearance easements" around airports49 and around
the sites of guided missile (Nike) installations.5" "Clearance ease-
ments""' give the agency operating the airport (1) the right to
prevent new construction from protruding into the airspace above
the glide angle prescribed by the Federal Aviation Agency; (2) the
right to remove the projections of any buildings that do so; (3) the
right to cut and trim any vegetation growing up into this space; and
(4) a right of entry to enforce the above rights. Similar easements
are obtained around the sites of Nike installations, authorizing the
elimination of obstructions around such sites in order to prevent
interference with radar beams. 2 Most of the cases are concerned
with the valuation of "clearance easements" taken under the power
of eminent domain, but they appear to recognize the "clearance ease-
ment" as a permissible type of property interest.5
More generally, it would seem that scenic easements of the
type now under discussion would meet the requirement of "definite-
41 Johnstone v. Detroit, G.H.&M. Ry, 245 Mich. 65, 79, 222 N.W. 325, 330 (1928).
42 Peterson v. Friedman, 162 Cal. App.2d 245, 328 P.2d 264 (1958).
43 Ladd v. Boston, 151 Mass. 585, 24 N.E. 858 (1890) ; Attorney General v. Williams,
174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 (1899).
Cadwalader v. Bailey, 17 R.I. 495, 23 A. 20 (1891).
45 Latimer v. Livermore, 72 N.Y. 174 (1878).
46 Fuller v. Arms, 45 Vt. 400 (1873); Hopkins the Florist, Inc. v. Fleming, 112 Vt.
389, 26 A.2d 96 (1942).
47 Kamrowski v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
48 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, comment k at 2909 (1944).
49 See N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION- ANALYSIS OF
SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS 43 '(Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission
Study Report No. 16, 1962).
50 Id.
5 1 These are sometimes known as "avigation easements" or "aviation corridor ease-
ments."
52 These easements are sometimes known as "electronic easements."
53 See cases cited in N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 43 nn.32-38.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
ness of content" suggested by the Restatement of Property54 as a
significant criterion for recognition of a new type of easement in
American law. In any event, it seems clear that scenic easements will
be recognized and enforced by appropriate equitable remedies as
equitable servitudes, whether such interests are recognized and
enforced "at law" or not. Tulk v. Moxhay,5 5 the case generally con-
sidered as establishing the doctrine of equitable servitudes, really
involved "scenic restrictions."
The precise significance of Tulk v. Moxhay in England, where
only the burden of lease covenants could "run with the land at law,"
was the subject of some dispute for a considerable period of time. In
1882, Jessel, M.R., stated in London and South Western Railway v.
Gomm56 that the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay was
either an extension in equity of the doctrine of Spencer's Case to
another line of cases, or else an extension in equity of the doctrine
of negative easements; such, for instance, as a right to the access of
light, which prevents the owner of the servient tenement from build-
ing so as to obstruct the light.... Where there is a negative covenant
expressed or implied, as, for instance, not to build so as to obstruct
a view, or not to use a piece of land otherwise than as a garden,
the Court interferes on one or other of the above grounds. This is
an equitable doctrine, establishing an exception to the rules of the
Common Law which did not treat such a covenant as running with
the land, and it does not matter whether it proceeds on analogy to a
covenant running with the land or on analogy to an easement.
But in London County Council v. Allen5 7 the English Court of
Appeal clearly adopted the easement analogy.
In the Allen case, the London County Council had entered into
a covenant with Allen, a builder, purporting to bind Allen, his heirs,
and assigns not to "erect or place, or cause or permit to be erected
or placed, any building, structure, or other erection upon" two plots
owned by Allen which the Council intended to reserve "for the
making of roads." Allen mortgaged one plot and transferred the
equity of redemption to his wife, who built three houses on it. The
Council then sought a mandatory injunction to pull down the houses.
The trial judge found that neither Mrs. Allen nor the mortgagee had
"satisfied him they had not notice, actual or constructive, of the
covenant," and "apparently treated the duty and interest of the
county council in the matter of new streets as sufficient to make the
54 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450, comment m at 2910 (1944).
55 2 Phil. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
- 20 Ch. D. 562, 583 (1882).
57 [19141 3 K.B. 642.
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covenant bind the land in the hands of assigns from Allen." On
appeal, it was held that Mrs. Allen and the mortgagee were not
bound, because, in order to affect them, the right created in the
Council by the covenant must be in the nature of a negative ease-
ment; that an easement required both a dominant and a servient
tenement; and that as the Council had no land to which the benefit
of the covenant could attach, there could be no dominant tenement,
and therefore no negative easement binding on a servient tenement,
but only an easement in gross, which did not bind assigns of the land.
In view of the English courts' refusal to recognize easements
in gross, by not allowing them to "run with the land," the decision
in London County Council v. Allen is said to be logical, but subject
to criticism because of its tacit admission that equity's concept of
property interests must be restricted to the categories established by
courts of law.
In the United States, the courts have generally recognized the
concept of equitable servitudes created by covenant, even where the
burden of the covenant would not "run with the land at law." But
since in most American jurisdictions the rules limiting the running
"at law" of burdens created by covenant are much more liberal
than in England,58 many covenants are enforceable in the United
States either on the ground that the burden runs with the land
at law or on the ground that the covenant creates an equitable
servitude. Although the courts tend to speak in terms of equitable
servitudes when the equitable remedy of injunction is sought, in
many instances the injunction could be granted on the theory that
the burden of the covenant runs with the land at law but the legal
remedy of damages is inadequate. Hence it is understandable that
some American courts tend to enforce restrictive covenants pri-
marily as contracts concerning land, while other courts tend to
enforce them on the ground that they create equitable interests
58 In England, the burden of a covenant will "run with the land" only as between land-
lord and tenant "at law"; it will not "run" as between owners of adjacent land in
fee simple because there is no privity of estate between such owners. Webb v. Russell,
3 T.R. 393, 100 Eng. Rep. 639 (K.B. 1789). No American jurisdiction except New
Jersey has adopted the strict English rule, however. In most states, privity of estate
may exist by virtue of a conveyance of some interest in land between the parties to
the covenant, the covenant being contained in the deed and relating in some way to
the use of the land conveyed to the grantee or land retained by the grantor. In Mas-
sachusetts, the existence of an easement will supply the necessary privity of estate so
that the burden of a "covenant in aid of the easement" will "run with the land at
law." The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, § 534 (1944) asserts that either type of
privity is sufficient to allow the burden of the covenant to "run with the land at
law." For criticism of the privity of estate requirement, and an argument that most
American jurisdictions do not in fact impose such a requirement at all, see C. CLARK,
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 111-43, 206-
59 (2d ed. 1947).
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analogous to easements. Still other courts waver back and forth
between the contract and the easement theory.
59
It would seem that, under the contract theory, there is less reason
for American courts to insist on a dominant tenement to which the
benefit of the equitable servitude can be appurtenant. On the other
hand, since American courts have uniformly recognized legal ease-
ments in gross, 0 there is reason to suppose that equitable servitudes
in gross will also be recognized and that the doctrine of London
County Council v. Allen6 will be rejected in the United States. It
must be admitted, however, that recognition of legal easements in
gross has been limited to affirmative easements; and, as a matter
of fact, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine an easement of
light and air, or of support, or any other negative easement recog-
nized at common law which could be enjoyed except by one who
possesses a dominant tenement. There are very few American cases
dealing with enforcement of restrictive covenants where the benefit
is in gross, and the decisions are in conflict.62
In any case, as we shall see later, the question whether the
burden of scenic restrictions will run with the servient land is not
likely to turn on whether the interest of the party seeking to
enforce the restrictions is classified as a legal easement or an
equitable servitude. In the great majority of cases, moreover, the
equitable remedy of injunction will be the one sought when violation
of scenic restrictions occurs; and this remedy will be available
whether the interest of the plaintiff is classified as a legal easement
or an equitable servitude. In the relatively few cases where the
legal remedy of damages is sought, the recovery will be possible
in most states either on the theory that the plaintiff has a legal
easement or that the burden of the scenic restrictions runs with
the servient estate at law as well as in equity.
59 For a fuller discussion of the contract and easement theories of enforcement, see 3
H. TIFFANY, supra note 27, § 861; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 27,
§ 9.24; C. CLARK, supra note 58, at 171-77; 3 R. POWELL, supra note 27, 420.
G0 That is, American courts have held that the burden of an easement in gross passes
with the servient estate when it is transferred, so that the original owner of the ease-
ment, at least, can enforce it against any subsequent possessor of the servient estate.
In contrast, the English courts will enforce the easement in gross only as a personal
contract between the original parties. As we shall see, however, American courts have
not uniformly regarded the benefit of an easement in gross as transferable.
61 [1914) 3 K.B. 642.
62 Cases holding the burden of an equitable servitude in gross will run with the servient
land: Pratte v. Balatsos, 99 N.H. 430, 113 A.2d 492 (1955); Van Sant v. Rose,
260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913). Contra: Kent v. Koch, 166 Cal. App.2d 579, 333
P.2d 411 (1958); Foreman v. Sadler's Executor, 114 Md. 574, 80 A. 298 (1911);
Genung v. Harvey, 79 N.J. Eq. 57, 80 A. 955 (1911).
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II. NATIONAL PARK SERVICE EXPERIENCE WITH
SCENIC EASEMENTS"3
A. The Blue Ridge Parkway and the Natchez Trace Parkway
During the 1930's the National Park Service embarked on a
program to build scenic parkways in Virginia and North Carolina
along the Blue Ridge between the Shenandoah and Great Smokey
Mountains National Parks, and along the old Natchez Trace in
Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi between Nashville and Natchez.
Started in 1933, the 469-mile Blue Ridge Parkway is now about 96
percent complete. About 60 percent of the Natchez Trace Parkway
has been completed. These parkways are essentially elongated parks
encompassing scenic and historical values of national significance.
They contain a motor road designed for slow or moderate speed
within a right-of-way averaging 125 acres per mile. There is partial
to complete control of access, and commercial traffic is prohibited.
When the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways were
planned it was decided, partly in order to keep costs down and
partly because the primary public use of adjacent land was to be
the observation of scenic beauty, that only a portion of the land
needed for the parkways would be purchased in fee simple and
that scenic easements would be purchased in the remaining land.
The actual formula was 100 acres in fee simple and 50 acres
subject to scenic easements per mile of parkway. The parkways
have been constructed entirely with federal funds on land acquired
by the states and donated to the federal government. Scenic ease-
ments were also acquired by the states and transferred to the
National Park Service. Ultimately, the scenic easements acquired
along the Blue Ridge Parkway covered nearly 1,500 acres, 4 and
the scenic easements acquired along the Natchez Trace Parkway
covered more than 4,500 acres.6" In general, the scenic easements
63 This discussion is based largely on the following sources: Disque, The Great River
Road -A Model for Americds Scenic Routes, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH RECORD No.
161, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT 34-49 (Highway Research Board 1967); W. Matusze-
ski, Less Than Fee Acquisition for Open Space: Its Effect on Land Values 4-7, Jan.,
1966 (unpublished paper, Institute of Legal Research, University of Pennsylvania) ;
R. NETHERTON AND M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION:
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND METHODS, PART I, at 68-69 (Highway Research Board,
1965); U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR SCENIC ROADS AND
PARKWAYS 59, 98-99, 125-27 (1966); WORKSHOP MANUAL at 11-12; W. WHYTE,
supra note 8, at 12; N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45; P. Wykert, Environmental
Easements 38-43, Sept. 1965 (unpublished student paper at the University of
Michigan).
64 This is the figure given by W. Matuszeski and P. Wykert, supra note 63, and the
WORKSHOP MANUAL. N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45, and U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 63, both give a figure of 2,500 acres.
65 This is the figure given by W. Matuszeski and P. Wykert, supra note 63, and the
WORKSHOP MANUAL. N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 44-45, and U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, supra note 63, both give a figure of 5,000 acres.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
along these parkways included the land use restrictions listed in
section I, above. No public right of entry was acquired.
The National Park Service's experience with the scenic ease-
ments along these parkways was rather unhappy. The purchase of
the easements was negotiated by state agents. It has been suggested
that this procedure resulted in the landowners not being fully
apprised of the rights they were relinquishing, since the state agent
tended to be concerned only with getting the landowner's signature
on the easement deed. Moreover, there were no set standards for
appraising the rights acquired. The states were given a lump sum
and instructed to buy as many scenic easements as possible. Con-
sequently, there was much dickering and very little uniformity in
the prices paid. The net result was that many landowners did not
understand just what rights they had sold, and many of them were
bitter at what they regarded as unfair treatment when they discovered
that they had been paid less than other landowners were paid for
the same easement over similar land. The difficulty was com-
pounded when the original owners of the servient land were suc-
ceeded by their heirs or grantees, who had not signed the easement
deeds. These successors of the original grantors of the scenic ease-
ments often were ignorant of, or did not feel bound by, or were
inclined to minimize the importance of, the easements granted by
their predecessors in title. As a result, friction between the National
Park Service and the servient landowners increased; the number
of violations steadily increased; and the cost of policing the scenic
restrictions became substantial.
Difficulties with the scenic easements along the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways arose chiefly from two causes: either
the landowner wanted to harvest standing timber, or he wanted
to subdivide and develop his land for resort or residential use. The
National Park Service had particular difficulty in enforcing the
usual scenic easement restriction against cutting "mature trees and
shrubs." It was often difficult to obtain an injunction to prevent
anticipated violations because of judicial reluctance to issue injunc-
tions in advance of actual damage. After a violation occurred,
however, it was often difficult to prove damages.
In at least two cases a United States district court ultimately
issued an injunction. In United States v. Darnell," the issues were
(1) whether certain trees and shrubs - some allegedly already cut,
and others which the servient landowner was allegedly threatening
to cut- were in fact "mature trees and shrubs," and (2) whether
the United States could prove the likelihood of irreparable injury
68 Civil No. 100-W, M.D.N.C., May 30, 1949.
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from cutting so as to warrant injunctive relief. In United States v.
Bedsaul,67 another case before the same judge to enforce another
series of scenic easement rights, the court issued detailed instructions
(in the words of the easement involved) on the methods to be
followed "in accordance with good farming practice" to thin and
trim white pines, to remove scrub pines, and to remove and clear
thickets; and also enjoined cutting of "mature trees and shrubs."
As a result of the friction with landowners, difficulty in poli-
cing scenic easements, and difficulty in getting local state courts and
United States district courts to grant complete injunctive enforce-
ment, the National Park Service practically discontinued the pur-
chase of scenic easements in the 1950's and turned to a full fee
simple purchase program for both the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace
Parkways. 8 As a result of this change in policy, the Department of
Interior requested and obtained legislation in 1961 to authorize the
exchange of scenic easements over certain lands along the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways for smaller areas in fee simple.69
B. The Great River Road
The Great River Road - a scenic highway on both sides of the
Mississippi River from New Orleans to Lake of the Woods in
Canada - was originally conceived and planned in the late 1930's
as the Mississippi River Parkway, along lines similar to the Blue
Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways. The states were to acquire ease-
ments and rights-of-way.70 But because of the intervention of World
War II no state actually acquired any land for the proposed parkway
until the post-war period.
Through the efforts of the Mississippi Parkway Commission,71
federal funds were provided in 1949 for a study to determine the
feasibility of developing a Mississippi River Parkway. 72 The study
was conducted jointly by the Bureau of Public Roads and the
National Park Service and presented as a report to Congress in
195 1.7 The report recommended against development of a com-
pletely new traffic facility patterned after the Blue Ridge and Nat-
chez Trace Parkways. Such federal parkways are "scenic routes for
67 Civil No. 138-W, M.D.N.C., Dec. 19, 1951.
68 N. WILLIAMS, supra note 49, at 45.
69 16 U.S.C. § 460a-5 (1964). See H.R. REP. No. 5765, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
70 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949). As we have seen, supra text at note 6,
this is one of the few statutes which defines a scenic easement.
71 This commission now consists of 10 persons from each of the 10 states bordering
the Mississippi, plus 10 persons from each of the two Canadian provinces of Mani-
toba and Ontario. Appointments are made by the governor of the state or premier of
the province.
7263 Stat. 626 (1949).
73 PARKWAY FOR THE MISSISSIppI, supra note 9.
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pleasure travel in the ideal sense of the words. ' 74 But along the
proposed route of the Mississippi River Parkway, many desirable
riverside locations were already pre-empted by existing highways,
railroads, cities, and commercial and industrial development. Acqui-
sition of new rights-of-way in these areas, and in highly productive
agricultural areas, would have been prohibitively expensive and
would have resulted in duplication of existing highways at least
potentially adequate for traffic purposes. The report concluded that
federal development, administration, operation, and maintenance of
a Mississippi River Parkway along the lines of the Blue Ridge and
Natchez Trace Parkways would be too difficult and too expensive
to be justified.
The 1951 report to Congress did, however, recommend a plan
by which the 10 Mississippi River states could improve existing
highways close to the river to give them a parkway-like character
and connect them where necessary with newly constructed parkway
sections to form a continuous route. Many of these existing highways
were already units of state federal-aid systems, and improvements to
them could be made through ordinary federal-aid procedures. The
report proposed a scenic route having the following characteristics:
(1) Ownership and control by the individual state;
(2) Design and construction by the states with federal
advisory service furnished when requested;
(3) Federal assistance in financing through the usual
federal-aid channels plus additional federal aid to provide
parkway features;
(4) Partial or complete control of access;
(5) An adequate scenic corridor protected by land use
control of the adjacent roadside through acquisition of wider
right-of-way and the use of scenic easements;
(6) Adequate interpretive and public-use facilities to por-
tray scenic, recreational, historical, cultural, geographic, and
other features along the route;
(7) Use of existing highways where these have parkway
potential or where no reasonably available route of parkway
calibre exists;
(8) Use of new location wherever conditions warrant;
(9) Commercial traffic excluded or regulated in sections
on new location, wherever reasonably available alternate traffic
facilities exist.
This scenic route plan was endorsed by the Mississippi River
Parkway Commission in 1952. Congress indicated its support of the
74 Disque, supra note 63, at 41.
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plan when it approved, as part of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1954, 7  an authorization for the Secretary of Commerce to spend up
to $250,000 to assist the 10 states bordering the Mississippi River
in "expediting the interstate planning and coordination of a con-
tinuous Great River Road and appurtenances thereto traversing the
Mississippi Valley from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico. ' 76 Under
this congressional authorization, and a similar authorization in 1964
to spend up to $500,000, 77 the 10 states have available to them the
services of highway engineers of the Bureau of Public Roads and
landscape architects of the National Park Service who are highly
skilled and experienced in parkway development and land-use
planning.
Since 1954, the highway agencies of all 10 Mississippi River
states have requested and obtained advisory service reports from
Bureau and Park Service consultants. These reports have recom-
mended routes consisting in part of existing roads and in part of
new roads, with recommendations for development of areas adjacent
to the routes for scenic, recreational, and other public uses. Addi-
tional studies containing detailed recommendations for land acqui-
sition, scenic easement acquisition, and control of access have been
completed for five states and are in process for three others.
No special federal funds have been made available for con-
struction of or right-of-way acquisition for the Great River Road,
but a very substantial part of the total mileage of the road is coinci-
dent with existing routes of the federal-aid primary and secondary
highway systems. The section extending south from St. Louis to
West Memphis, Arkansas, is in the traffic corridor of Interstate
Route 55. Such landscaping as may be desirable will be eligible for
interstate highway funds on the regular basis of 90 percent federal
and 10 percent state funds. The acquisition of scenic easements along
any part of the Great River Road will be eligible for non-matching
federal-aid funds -the so-called "3 percent funds" -under Title
III of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965.78
Prior to passage of the Highway Beautification Act only six of
the 10 Mississippi River states79 had adopted legislation to authorize
75 68 Stat. 70 (1954) (codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
76 68 Stat. 70, 75 (1954). This changed the name of the proposed road from Mississippi
River Parkway to Great River Road and extended the northern terminus from Lake
Itasca in Minnesota to the Canadian border. Ontario and Manitoba are now members
of the Mississippi Parkway Commission.
778 Stat. 1092 (1964).
7879 Stat. 1032 (1965), amending 23 U.S.C. § 319.
79
See AaK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-1801 to -1811 (1957), and §§ 76-1812 to -1818 (Supp.
1967); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 308.1-.5 (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
161.1419-145 (1960 and Supp. 1966); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 5964-74, 5978-84
(1952); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280.430 (1949); Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965).
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acquisition of scenic easements and other action necessary for devel-
opment of the parkway features of the Great River Road, and only
Wisconsin had actually carried out any substantial scenic easement
acquisition. As a result of the failure of the other states to take
effective action, it is estimated that at least one-half of the scenic
values available when the Great River Road was proposed in the
1930's have been lost by diversion of land to adverse uses. But
passage of the Highway Beautification Act has stimulated several
other Mississippi River states to enact enabling legislation which
will authorize the acquisition of scenic easements along all federal-
aid interstate, primary, and secondary roads.80 This legislation, of
course, will provide a basis for scenic easement acquisition along the
Great River Road, as well as other highways in these states. Minne-
sota has already worked out a plan to obtain scenic easements cover-
ing its part of the Great River Road with "3 percent funds" under
Title III.
The Great River Road as now conceived will be a continuous
scenic route extending generally along both sides of the Mississippi
from Lake Itasca to the Gulf of Mexico, with two extensions north-
ward through Minnesota into Manitoba and Ontario to form a loop
around the Lake of the Woods. Its total length will be nearly 3,800
miles. The Canadian loop will connect with the 5,000 mile Trans-
Canadian Highway.
C. Other National Park Service Experience
The experience of the National Park Service with scenic ease-
ments along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Parkways was unsat-
isfactory, as we have seen. Although the Service has continued to
encourage the Mississippi River states in carrying out the Great River
Road project, which utilizes the scenic easement device on a large
scale, its disillusionment with the scenic easement led the National
Park Service to oppose (unsuccessfully) the use of scenic easements
in connection with the proposed Ozark Rivers National Monument.
This opposition was based on the grounds that 20 years of experi-
ence with scenic easements had demonstrated that such easements
breed misunderstandings, cause administrative difficulties, are diffi-
cult to enforce, and cost only a little less than the fee simple. As
finally adopted in 1964, the enabling legislation8' authorized the
Secretary of Interior to acquire scenic easements within the desig-
nated Riverways area.
The National Park Service in recent years has made significant
use of the scenic easement in special situations to which it seems
80 It would appear that all of the Mississippi River states except Tennessee now have
enabling legislation sufficient for scenic easement acquisition.
81 16 U.S.C. §§ 460m through 460m-7 (1964).
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particularly well adapted. For example, the Park Service has obtained
a 48-acre scenic easement at Cumberland Gap National Historical
Park, a 46-acre scenic easement at Harper's Ferry National Historical
Park, a 21-acre scenic easement at Manassas National Battlefield
Park, and scenic easements covering at least 325 acres in the Piscata-
way Park area on the Potomac River shoreline opposite Mount
Vernon. The Piscataway easements were acquired under a 1961
congressional joint resolution82 which authorized the Secretary of
Interior to acquire scenic easements and other interests in land in a
defined area along the Maryland shore opposite Mount Vernon by
donation or other appropriate means, and also to enter into "agree-
ments and covenants" with property owners for the purpose of pre-
serving the scenic beauty of the area. Of a total of 3834 acres within
the designated area, 2682 are to be acquired by donation of scenic
easements by the present owners (some 150 to 160 of them). The
remainder of the area, comprising 1152 acres immediately adjacent
to the Potomac and the stage front of the Mount Vernon overlook,
is to be acquired in fee simple either by gift or by purchase.
More dramatic and controversial was the recent action of the
National Park Service in taking a scenic easement on 47 acres of the
Merrywood Estate adjacent to the George Washington Memorial
Parkway in Virginia. Builders had purchased the tract and had
succeeded in getting the local zoning changed to permit high-rise
apartments. The National Park Service then invoked a federal
statute8 3 to condemn a scenic easement which would preclude any
development for other than single-family dwellings and thus protect
the scenic quality of the Potomac River palisades which form the
frontage of the tract. The purchase price to the builders had been
$650,000 before the rezoning. As plaintiffs in a suit against the
government, they claimed the easement had reduced the value of
the land from $2,354,700 to $295,000. The United States contended
that $500,000 was a fair price for the easement. The condemnation
jury awarded the plaintiffs $744,500, which was in excess of the
original cost before the zoning change, but well below the differ-
ences between the original cost and the estimated value when zoned
for high-rise apartments.
The area adjacent to the Merrywood tract, totalling about 215
acres, is composed of some 69 private holdings. Donations of scenic
easements from the owners of these private holdings are now being
solicited by the National Park Service. Such easements, generally
similar to those obtained in the Piscataway Park area, will restrict
lot size to one acre or larger, permit only single-family residential
8275 Stat. 780 (1961).
316 U.S.C. § lb(7) (1964).
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development with homes limited to 40 feet in height, and prohibit
all industrial and commercial development.
The National Park Service has also been authorized to acquire
scenic easements at Antietam National Battlefield Site,84 and it has
drawn up a document especially for this purpose.
Under its present policy, it would seem that the National Park
Service may acquire some scenic easements along the Foothills Park-
way, the George Washington Memorial Parkway, and the Palisades
Parkway. The Foothills Parkway in Tennessee was authorized in
1944 and, now about 50 percent complete, will provide not only a
68-mile scenic panorama of the Great Smoky Mountains National
Park but numerous recreation developments as well. The George
Washington Memorial Parkway, authorized in 1930, will be approx-
imately 48 miles long. About 65 percent of it is now completed. The
3-mile Palisades Parkway in Washington, D.C., is still in the design
and planning stage. It will follow the top of the palisades overlook-
ing the Potomac River and connect with the George Washington
Memorial Parkway at the Maryland line.
In closing this discussion of the National Park Service's experi-
ence, it might be noted that the Park Service has approximated the
effect of a scenic easement in some areas adjacent to the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways where it has acquired the land in fee
simple, by giving neighboring landowners "special use permits"
which authorize use of the parkway land for grazing or the growing
of crops. The neighboring landowners pay a small fee for the priv-
ilege, and also relieve the Park Service of the cost of maintaining
some of the land adjacent to the parkways.
III. STATE SCENIC EASEMENT ENABLING LEGISLATION
A number of states had highway legislation authorizing scenic
easement acquisition8 5 prior to enactment of the Highway Beauti-
16 U.S.C. §§ 430nn-430oo (1964).
8 5
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040(7) (1962); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532(f)
(1957); CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 1238(18) (West 1958); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 191-
92, 7000-01 (West 1966); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.3 (West 1956); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 17, § 132(c) (4) (1953) (semble) ; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-
201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT. § 36.2946 (Supp. 1967); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 313.67 (Supp. 1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.20, 173.01-.05,
173.31-.35 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 39-1320(2)(f) (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 366.345 (1965); TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. art. 6674w-3, § 1(a) (1960) ; Wis. STAT. § 84.09 (1965).
See also the Great River Road enabling statutes, supra note 79. In addition to
statutes authorizing state highway agencies to acquire scenic easements, there are a
number of pre-Highway Beautification Act statutes which authorize acquisition of
scenic easements by state park, recreation, or conservation agencies. See, e.g., CAL.
PuB. RES. CODE § 5006 (West 1956); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 887.2-.3 (West
Supp. 1967); Ky. REV. STAT. § 148.061 (Supp. 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1B-
15.9 (semble), 13:8A-6, -8, -12(b) (Supp. 1966); N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 676-a.1
(McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 72, §§ 3946.1-.22 (Supp. 1966); TENN.




fication Act of 1965.8" Some of this pre-Beautification Act legislation
rather specifically authorizes acquisition of scenic easements;" some
of it simply authorizes the acquisition of any kind of property inter-
est for purposes so broadly defined as to include, on a reasonable
construction of the statutory language, acquisition of scenic ease-
ments;88 and some of it authorizes acquisition of property for very
narrowly defined scenic purposes in connection with highways.89
The only substantial program of scenic easement acquisition initiated
under any of the pre-Beautification Act statutes is the Wisconsin
program.
Since enactment of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, at
least 24 states 0 have adopted scenic highway legislation inspired by
86 79 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. §§ 131, 136, 319'(1964).
87 See, e.g., CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 887.2-.3 (West Supp. 1967); CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 7000 (West 1966) ; Wis. STAT. §§ 84.105, 15.60(6) (i) (1965). See also
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121, § 4-201.15 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 36.2946 (Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.280-.430 (1949).
88 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 19.05.040 (1962) '("acquire property" and "preserve and
maintain the scenic beauty along state highways"); IOWA CODE ANN. § 313.67
(Supp. 1967) ("construction, reconstruction, improvement, and maintenance of...
scenic beautification areas along the primary roads of the state including the acquisi-
tion of such property and property rights needed to accomplish said purposes");
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 173.01-.05 '(Supp. 1966) ("all rights in property.. neces-
sary to carry out the purposes" which, broadly defined, are "to conserve the natural
beauty of areas adjacent to certain highways"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-1320(2)
(1960) ("State highway purposes...shall include... preservation of objects of
attraction or scenic value adjacent to, along, or in close proximity to highways and
the culture of trees and flora which may increase the scenic beauty of such high-
ways"); ORE. REV. STAT. § 366.345 (1965) ("may acquire ... any right or interest
... deemed necessary for the culture of trees and the preservation of scenic or historic
places and other objects of attraction or scenic value adjacent to, along or in close
proximity to state highways"); and TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. art. 6674w-3, § 1(a)
(1960) ("Any land in fee simple or any lesser estate or interest... necessary or
convenient for ... any... purpose related to the laying out, construction, improve-
ment, maintenance, beautification, preservation and operation of State Highways")
(emphasis added).
89 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 76-532(f) (1957) ("For the culture and support of
trees and shrubbery which benefit any State highway by aiding in the maintenance
and preservation of the roadbed, or which aid in the maintenance and Promote the
attractiveness of the scenic beauties associated with any State highways") (emphasis
added).
90 ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-2520, -2521 (Supp. 1967); CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE
§§ 895-97 (West Supp. 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 120-3-10(2) (1963), as
amended, Ch. 38, [1966] Colo. Laws 178; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 13a-85a (Supp.
1966); Act. no. 270, [1967) Ga. Laws; HAWAII REv. LAWS § 129-12(c) (1955), as
amended, Act. no. 43 [1966] Hawaii Acts; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 40-2801,-2802 (Supp.
1967) ; Ky. REV. STAT. § 177.090 (Supp. 1966); LA. REV. STAT. § 48:269 (Supp.
1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§ 153, 154 (Supp. 1967) ; Mo. CODE ANN.
art. 89B, §§ 236-38 (Supp. 1967) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 81, § 13B, added by Mass.
Acts 1967, ch. 397; MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 252.251-.253 (Supp. 1966) ; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 8023.3 (Supp. 1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 226.750-.770 (Supp. 1966);
MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 32-2422 to -2425 (Supp. 1967); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 27:7-22.4, -22.5 (Supp. 1967); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-14 (Supp. 1967);
N.Y. H'WAY LAw § 21 (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-17-09,
para. 4 (Supp. 1967); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5529.03-.04 (1954), as amended,
S.B. 66, §§ 1-3, [1967] Ohio Laws; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 670-413.1 (Supp.
1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 37-6.2-1 to -4 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 33-74.1 (Supp. 1966); Ch. 85, [1966] S.D. Laws; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-
109.1 to -109.3 (Supp. 1967) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 261, 262 (Supp. 1967);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-133, -134 (Supp. 1966); WASH. REV. CODE § 47.12.250
(Supp. 1965); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-2A-17(h) (Supp. 1967).
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Title III of the Beautification Act." In almost every case the new
legislation is broad enough to permit state highway agencies to
acquire scenic easements adjacent to federal-aid highways. In Cali-
fornia and Missouri the new legislation supplements earlier legis-
lation authorizing acquisition of scenic easements adjacent to state
highways. 2 Elsewhere the new legislation provides authority for
scenic easement acquisition that was previously lacking. In Louisiana
the new scenic legislation has been buttressed by a constitutional
amendment.93
A majority of the post-Beautification Act statutes simply author-
ize the state highway agency, in substance, to acquire "interests in...
strips of land necessary for the restoration, preservation, and
enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to... [federal-aid] high-
ways," using either the exact language of the Highway Beautification
Act of 1965 or language of similar import.94 Most of these statutes
authorize acquisition of the fee simple or any lesser interest for scenic
purposes.95 Only three states have statutes which define what may
be acquired ("strips of land") so narrowly as to raise a serious
question whether scenic easements may be acquired. 6
The California statute97 expressly declares that "the acquisition
of interests in real property for the preservation, maintenance or
conservation of scenic lands or areas adjacent to" interstate and
federal-aid primary highways "constitutes a public use and purpose."
The North Dakota and Virginia statutes" expressly provide that
acquisition of scenic interests is "in the public interest."
A number of the post-Beautification Act statutes declare vari-
ously that acquisition of scenic interests shall be deemed for a "high-
way purpose,"99 that such interests shall constitute "part of the
OlAmending 23 U.S.C. § 319 to provide -3 percent non-matching funds" for scenic
"restoration, preservation, and enhancement" of lands adjacent to federal-aid high-
ways.
92 See CAL. STs. & H'wAYS CODE §§ 895-96 (West Supp. 1967); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 226.280-.430 (1949).
93 LA. CONST. art. 6, § 19.3, adopted by popular referendum on Nov. 8, 1966. This
amendment, in substance, authorizes the legislature to implement the Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965, and validates the advertising control, junkyard control, and
scenic preservation legislation enacted in Louisiana in 1966.
94 California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota,
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, Washington, and
West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
9 California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York (very broad
definition), North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Utah,
Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra. The Ohio
statute does not permit fee acquisition more than 300 feet from the right-of-way,
however.
96 See Connecticut, Mississippi, and South Carolina statutes cited note 90 supra.
97 Statute cited note 90 supra.
98 Statutes cited note 90 supra.
99 See New Mexico statute cited note 90 supra.
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adjacent or nearest highway,"' 100 that the cost of acquisition shall be
deemed a "highway cost,"'' or that "highway construction and
maintenance" shall include acquisition of such interests.1'0 A few
states provide expressly that only federal funds may be used for
acquisition of scenic interests,10 3 or that state funds may be used
only when they will be fully reimbursed from federal funds.
0 4
Pennsylvania authorizes the expenditure of up to 110 percent of the
amount that can be reimbursed from federal funds.' 0
Most of the state statutes expressly authorize acquisition of
scenic interests by condemnation as well as by other methods. 0
The most popular formula is "purchase, gift, exchange, or condemna-
tion.'O'1° A few statutes omit the reference to "exchange, ' "0 8 and a
few add "lease."' 0 9 Although one statute mentions only "purchase
or condemnation, ''11 it is almost certain that "gift" and "exchange"
would be considered to fall within a broad definition of "purchase."
Only three states completely bar the use of condemnation,"' while
one state allows condemnation only to a distance of 100 feet from
the edge of the right-of-way," 2 and another allows condemnation
only to a distance of 500 feet from the edge of the right-of-way."'
One state prohibits acquisition of any commercial building, 1 4 while
another prohibits acquisition of any dwelling.'" 5 Two states prohibit
condemnation of scenic interests within any industrial or commercial
area, 1"6 and one state prohibits acquisition by any means at all in
areas zoned industrial or commercial.
117
100 See Utah statute cited note 90 supra.
101 See New Jersey and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
1
0
2 See South Carolina statute cited note 90 supra.
103 See Mississippi and Montana statutes cited note 90 supra.
104 See California and Colorado statutes cited note 90 supra.
105 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra.
106 Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Virginia, and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
107 See Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, North Dakota,
and West Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
108 See Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia statutes cited note 90 supra.
109 See, e.g., Louisiana statute cited note 90 supra. See also Massachusetts ("eminent
domain, purchase, or otherwise") and Mississippi ("gift, purchase, or otherwise")
statutes cited note 90 supra.
110 See Colorado statute cited note 90 supra.
111 See Connecticut (purchase only), Montana (gift, purchase, or exchange only), and
Utah (same) statutes cited note 90 supra.
112 See Virginia statute cited note 90 supra.
113 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra, which allows acquisition of "property
or such lesser estate or interest" by gift or purchase to a distance of 1000 feet
from the right-of-way, and authorizes acquisition by condemnation "in base fee" to a
distance of 500 feet from the right-of-way.
114 See California statute cited note 90 supra.
115 See Georgia statute cited note 90 supra.
116 See Michigan and New York statutes cited note 90 supra.
117 See Connecticut statute cited note 90 supra.
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One state limits acquisition for scenic purposes to "strips of
land of limited width.""' One state authorizes acquisition to land
"not to exceed one thousand (1000) feet from the right of way,""'
and another to land "parallel to and contiguous with the highway
and... not exceed[ing] a width of 1000 feet from the adjacent right
of way line.' °2 0 On the other hand, one state expressly authorizes
acquisition of scenic interests extending more than 660 feet from the
edge of the highway right-of-way.'
At least two states expressly permit acquisition in fee simple
for scenic purposes, followed by resale or lease "subject to such
reservations, conditions, covenants or other contractual arrangements
... as will preserve the scenic character or beauty of the area trav-
ersed by the highway.
' 
"12
In at least three states, authorization for acquisition of scenic
interests is tucked away in the statute dealing with control of out-
door advertising along the highways.'2
IV. STATE EXPERIENCE WITH SCENIC EASEMENTS AND
PLANS FOR FUTURE USE
A. Visconsin1
4
As previously indicated, Wisconsin is the only state with any
substantial experience in the use of scenic easements to preserve
scenic beauty along highways. At the present time, Wisconsin has
acquired approximately 1125 scenic easement parcels' 25 covering
'Is Id.
119 See Pennsylvania statute cited note 90 supra, and quoted in note 113 supra.
120 See Idaho statute cited note 90 supra.
121 See North Dakota statute cited note 90 supra.
12 See California and Ohio statutes cited note 90 supra.
12 See Minnesota statutes cited note 85 supra, and Michigan and North Dakota statutes
cited note 90 supra.
1m The discussion of Wisconsin's scenic easement program is largely drawn from the
following sources: Disque, supra note 63; Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Ease-
ments: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND ECONOMICS 343-65 (1963); Leverich,
Appraisal, Communication, Negotiation, Administration, in PROCEEDINGS OF CON-
FERENCE ON SCENIC EASEMENTS IN ACTION 35-48 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 16-17,
1966) ; W. Matuszeski, supra note 63, at 17-18; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wis-
consin Progress (Report to 1966 Conference of American Association of State High-
way Officials, Wichita, Kan., Nov. 30, 1966); B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Tech-
niques of Conveyancing (Report to American Bar Association National Institute,
Chicago, June 3, 1967, in ABA, JUNKYARDS, GERANIUMS AND JURISPRUDENCE: AES-
THETECS AND THE LAW) ; R. NETHERTON AND M. MARKHAM, supra note 63, at 68-70;
Note, Progress and Problems in Wisconsin's Scenic and Conservation Easement Program,
1965 Wis. L. REv. 352 [hereinafter cited as 1965 Wis. L. REV.]; Sawtelle, Scenic
Easements for the Great River Road, in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE 47-52 (Madison, Wis., Dec. 13-14, 1961); WORK-
SHOP MANUAL, supra note 11, at 12-25; WHYTE, OPEN SPACE ACTION 71-89 (Out-
door Recreation Resources Review Commission Study Report No. 15, 1962); P.
Wykert, supra note 63, at 36-38.
12 Letter from B. J. Mullen, Director of Right of Way, State Highway Commission of
Wisconsin, to the author, June 19, 1967.
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about 12,500 acres of land and protecting some 282 miles of high-
way.' 26 To date, all of these scenic easements have been acquired
either as part of the Great River Road project or in certain limited
areas specified by statute.
1. The Great River Road
Wisconsin enacted enabling legislation in 1939127 to permit
participation in the Great River Road project, then known as the
Mississippi River Parkway, but the expected federal legislation was
not forthcoming until after World War II, and Wisconsin did not
acquire any land for the proposed parkway until after World War II.
Original plans provided for purchase in fee simple of an 825-foot-
wide right-of-way for the Great River Road to preserve scenic views.
But it soon became apparent that fee simple purchase of such right-
of-way would mean the taking of -many farm houses and other farm
buildings which the state did not want, and which abutting farm
owners would not wish to relinquish. Consequently, the state high-
way commission decided to acquire scenic easements along the Great
River Road right-of-way, 128 on the assumption that, with proper
restrictions to preserve scenic beauty, the landowners affected (mostly
farmers) could continue to use the land as before, the local tax base
would not be substantially reduced, and the state could save a great
deal of money by not purchasing the full fee simple.
Rather surprisingly, in connection with the first nine projects
for scenic easement acquisition along the Great River Road, it was
necessary to condemn only 28 percent of the parcels. And overall, it
has been possible to purchase about 90 percent of the desired scenic
easements by negotiation, without resort to condemnation. To date,
no landowner has successfully argued to a Wisconsin court that the
"taking" of a scenic easement over his land by condemnation was
"unnecessary" or "not for a public use." Recently, the Supreme Court
128 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
127 The 1939 legislation, in modified form, is now part of Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965).
Para. (6) of that section provides (in part):
All lands for right of way to be acquired in fee simple and all easements
necessary to be acquired for the purposes of the proposed national parkway
development shall be acquired by the state highway commission in the name
of the state, as may be required by the act of the United States congress
applicable thereto.... The commission may acquire such lands by gift,
purchase agreement, or by exercising the right of eminent domain in any
manner that may be provided by law for the acquirement of lands for public
purposes....
'
2 8 This could be accomplished either under Wis. STAT. § 84.105 (1965) or under the
general highway acquisition enabling act, which is now Wis. STAT. § 84.09 (1965);
the latter provides (in part): "(1) The state highway commission may acquire by
gift, devise, purchase or condemnation any lands for establishing, laying out, widen-
ing, enlarging, extending, constructing, reconstructing, improving and maintaining




of Wisconsin, in Kamrowski v. State," 9 squarely rejected the land-
owner's contention that the public enjoyment of scenic beauty adja-
cent to a highway is not a "public use" of land which justifies use
of the power of eminent domain. The court accepted the legislative
determination that "protection of scenic resources along highways is
a public purpose," and rejected the landowner's argument that a
ncg.ttive easemrnent cannot be a public use because public use requires
physical occupancy by the public. In so doing, the court accepted the
trial judge'.- view that a scenic easement permits "visual occupancy"
by the motoring public. The court also pointed out, "Whatever may
be the law with respect to zoning restrictions based upon aesthetic
considerations, a stronger argument can be made in support of the
power to take property, in return for just compensation, in order to
fulfill aesthetic concepts, than for the imposition of police power
restrictions for such purpose.' '13 0 And the court rejected the land-
owner's contention that he was denied equal protection of the laws
because scenic easements were not to be taken from the owners of
all lands abutting the Great River Road.
By September 1, 1961, Wisconsin had acquired scenic easements
adjacent to 53 miles of the Great River Road right-of-way at an
average cost of $575.26 per mile.13 ' Of this amount, payments to
landowners averaged $484.13 per mile.' The average cost per acre
was $19.17'3 as compared to a fee simple cost of $41.29 per
acre for land acquired for the right-of-way itself.'3 4 Considering
only the payments to landowners, the average cost per acre for scenic
easements was only $16.25.' s 5 On September 1, 1961, Wisconsin
embarked on a 10-year, $50 million resource development and con-
servation program financed by a 1-cent tax on the sale of each pack-
age of cigarettes.' 3 6 Two million of the $50 million were earmarked
for the acquisition of scenic easements, with first priority given to
completing scenic easement acquisitions along the Great River
129 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
130 Id. at 797.
131 1965 Wis. L. REv. 354. Data was provided by the Wisconsin Highway Commission.
The $576.77 per mile figure was obtained by dividing the total cost of $30,569 by
the number of "highway miles" (53). "Highway miles are miles which have ease-
ments protecting at least one side of the highway." Id. at 355 n.14.
132 1965 WIs. L. REV. 354. The $484.32 per mile figure was obtained by dividing the
total payments to land owners of $25,669 by the number of "highway miles" (53).
133 1965 Wis, L. REV. 354.
134 WORKSHOP MANUAL 15.
135 1965 Wis. L. REV. 354. The $16.25 figure was obtained by dividing the total pay-
ments to landowners of $25,669 by the number of acres (1579).
138 This was authorized by the Resource Development and Outdoor Recreation Act
(1961), Wis. STAT. § 15.60 (1965). The program initiated under this act is known
as the "ORAP program."
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Road. 13 7 The total amount budgeted for scenic easement acquisi-
tion along the Great River Road for the period 1961-1965 was
$693,000.11s By November 30, 1966, the Wisconsin highway com-
mission had acquired scenic easements over some 571 parcels cover-
ing 6,189 acres of land and extending for a distance of 122 miles
for the Great River Road. 3 9 A majority of these scenic easements
were acquired with ORAP funds under the 1961 statute. 40 By June
3, 1967, it was estimated that the number of scenic easements along
the Great River Road had increased to 575.41
Although the average cost of scenic easements acquired for the
Great River Road between September 1, 1961, and December 31,
1964, was $40.99 per acre, 142 the average payment to landowners
for scenic easements in this period was only $20.50 per acre, 143 as
compared to $16.25 per acre in the period prior to September 1,
1961.1" The cost figure of $40.99 per acre reflected to a large extent
a change in accounting procedure by which the costs of engineering
surveys and preparation of detailed plats required by the state high-
way commission were included.145 These costs were not included
prior to 1961. In addition, the cost figure of $40.99 per acre included
appraisal fees, negotiation costs, and title examination - all of
which were included prior to 1961 - as well as the amount paid to
the landowner.
1 46
2. Scenic Easements Elsewhere in Wisconsin
Wisconsin's 1961 Resource Development and Outdoor Rec-
reation Act, authorizing expenditure of $50 million for resource
development and conservation over a 10-year period, provided, with
respect to scenic easements, that first priority should be given to
completing scenic easement acquisition along the Great River
Road. 47 It further provided that scenic easements should be acquired
along Lake Michigan and Green Bay, Lake Superior; along the
137WIS. STAT. § 15.60(6)'(i) (1965).
138 $293,000 was budgeted for scenic easement acquisition from 1961 to 1963, and an
additional $400,000 for the period 1963-1965. Disque, supra note 63, at 47.
139 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
140 As of December 31, 1961, 234 scenic easement parcels had been acquired. Sawtelle,
supra note 124, at 51. Prior to September 1, 1961, only 1579 acres along the Great
River Road were subject to scenic easements, and only 53 miles of the highway were
protected by scenic easements. 1965 Ws. L. Rav. 354. The scenic easements acquired
since September 1, 1961, have all been acquired with ORAP funds.
141 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 1.




144 See note 135, supra, and accompanying text.
1 4 5 
WORKSHOP MANUAL 15.
146 Id.
147 WIs. STAT. § 15.60(6)(i) (1965).
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Chippewa, Wisconsin, Fox, Milwaukee and Wolf rivers; in the
lake and forest country of northern Wisconsin; and through the
Menominee Indian reservation and the Kettle Moraine area. 148
Harold Jordahl, writing in November 1963,'4° reported that pur-
suant to this authority state highway commission right-of-way agents
had appraised 13 scenic easement parcels encompassing 163 acres in
a project in southeastern Wisconsin at $7,690 or $46.56 per acre, and
13 scenic easement parcels encompassing 90 acres in northern Wis-
consin, along Lake Superior, at $2,485 or $27.61 per acre. Five
scenic easement parcels encompassing 48 acres in the southeastern
Wisconsin project had actually been acquired for $4,950, or $103.12
per acre.150 The relatively high cost reflected development pressures
on rural and semirural land in this part of the state.15' One scenic
easement parcel in the northern Wisconsin project had been acquired,
encompassing 14.6 acres, at a cost of $75, or about $5 per acre.' 52
A later report indicates that the total cost of scenic easements
acquired for the protection of Wisconsin highways other than the
Great River Road during the period 1961-1964 averaged $214.40
per acre.' This, of course, included all field expenses: appraisal
fees, cost of negotiation, precise engineering surveys, preparation
of detailed plats, and preparation of detailed descriptions. 5 4 On
the average, only $53.50 per acre was paid to the landowners for
the scenic easements. 5 This figure is substantially higher than the
figure for Great River Road scenic easements, however. The higher
price of these easements apparently resulted from the fact that many
of them were acquired in areas where development pressures were
much greater than along the Great River Road.
The percentage of cases where it was necessary to condemn
scenic easements has been about the same in areas outside the Great
River Road project as along the Great River Road - i.e., condemna-
tion has been necessary in only about 10 percent of all acquisitions.' 56
Of all the parcels condemned for scenic easement acquisition
1 8 Id.
149 Jordahl, supra note 124, at 356.
150 Id. The figures quoted are amounts paid to landowners for the easements.
151 Id.
152 Id. This figure is also the amount paid to the owner.





156 This is the figure given by B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra
note 124, at 3. The same author, in Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing,
supra note 124, at 5, gives the figure of 25 percent, but this is apparently erroneous.
In a letter to the author dated November 1, 1967, Mr. Mullen states: "Our best
information is that we are still acquiring approximately 90 percent of our scenic ease-
ment areas by negotiated purchase and that condemnation is necessary in only about
10 percent of the cases."
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throughout Wisconsin, only 12 condemnations (as of June 3, 1967)
had resulted in litigation.' 57
As of February 1, 1967, the Wisconsin Highway Department
estimated that it had acquired approximately 570 scenic easement
parcels in the priority areas listed in the 1961 ORAP legislation
(exclusive of the Great River Road).158 These scenic easement par-
cels encompassed approximately 6,300 acres of land along some 160
miles of highway.' 59
3. The Wisconsin Scenic Easement "Package"
When Wisconsin's scenic easement program along the Great
River Road was started in 1952, the easements acquired by the state
highway commission imposed substantially the same land use restric-
tions as did the scenic easements along the Blue Ridge and Natchez
Trace Parkways. Signs and billboards were prohibited, except for
signs of 8 square feet advertising goods sold on the premises or the
sale, hire or lease of the property; dumping of offensive or unsightly
materials was prohibited; and cutting of trees and shrubs was pro-
hibited, except as incidental to permitted uses. 6 Easement deed
forms used in the 1950's expressly permitted the following principal
uses: (a) single-family residences on tracts of not less than 5 acres;
and (b) general farming, including farm buildings, except fur
farms and farms used for disposal of garbage, rubbish, or sewage.'
6'
In addition, (c) telephone, telegraph or electric lines or pipes, or
pipe lines, or micro-wave radio relay structures, for the purpose of
transmitting messages, heat, light or power were permitted, along
with (d) uses incidental to any of the permitted principal uses.'62
Moreover, the easement deed form provided (e) that "[ajny use
existing on the premises at the time of the execution of" the ease-
ment deed was permitted, and that "[elxisting commercial and
industrial uses of land and buildings" could be "maintained and
repaired," but not expanded or structurally altered. 6 3 It was expressly
stated that the easement did not "grant the public the right to enter
.. for any purpose. '
16 4
157 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 5. The
figure was only nine as of November 30, 1966. See B. Mullen, Scenic Easements:
Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.
158 Letter, supra note 125. Both in that letter and a later letter to the author dated
November 1, 1967, Mr. Mullen indicated by implication that the figure of 700 scenic
easements given in Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 1, is not
correct.
15 9 As of November 30, 1966, the acreage was approximately 6,311, and the mileage
was 160. B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 3.







The 5-acre lot restriction soon proved impractical in most loca-
tions.' 15 The Wisconsin highway commission then changed its policy
so as to permit single family residences in urban fringe areas on lots
with a minimum frontage of 300 feet.' 66 Such spacing not only pre-
vented an excessive number of entrances to the highway, but also
permitted a reasonable return to the servient landowner in areas
ripe for residential development and reduced the cost of acquiring
scenic easements in such areas- without, in the usual case, interfer-
ing unduly with the scenic value of the landscape. More recently,
the highway commission has tried limiting the permitted single
family residences to a stated number per tract, especially where high
land is interspersed with low, marshy land. It is hoped that this will
concentrate residential development into compact subdivisions instead
of encouraging ribbon development, as does the 300 foot frontage
requirement. 
1 7
The Wisconsin scenic easement forms used in the 1950's and
early 1960's provided, 68 in effect, that all existing uses on the
servient land other than agricultural and residential uses were to
be treated like "nonconforming uses" under a zoning ordinance;
they were allowed to continue but could not be expanded, and build-
ings in which such uses were carried on could not be structurally
altered.
In 1961, however, the Wisconsin highway commission changed
its attitude toward existing commercial uses,' 69 for it had become
apparent that rigid enforcement of the prohibition against expansion
or structural alteration prevented modernization of structures and
often resulted in roadside blight. Easements obtained since 1961
have allowed commercial property owners to remodel their buildings
to prevent decay and blight and to provide the quality of services
concurrently desired by highway travelers. In some cases, also, exist-
165 Letter from B. J. Mullen, Director of Right of Way, State Highway Commission of
Wisconsin, to the author, May 9, 1967.
166 Id. See also WORKSHOP MANUAL 13.
167 Letter, supra note 165.
168 Forms used in the early 1960's dropped the express reference to "existing commercial
and industrial uses and buildings," but imposed essentially the same restriction by
including in the list of "permitted uses": "Any use not heretofore specified which
exists upon or within the restricted area as of the time of execution of this easement,
including normal maintenance and repair of existing buildings, structures and appur-
tenances, but such use shall not be expanded nor shall any structures be erected or
structural alterations be made within the restricted area." See scenic easement form
in WORKSHOP MANUAL 81. The same form is given in PROCEEDINGS OF CONSERVA-
TION EASEMENTS AND OPEN SPACE CONFERENCE, Appendix A (Madison, Wis.,
Dec. 13-14, 1961). In this form, "construction, erection, maintenance and repair of
buildings incident to" general crop or livestock farming is specifically permitted.
Residential use is not expressly permitted, but there is a blank space which could be
filled in so as to make residential use a permitted use.
169 The discussion in the text here is based on WORKSHOP MANUAL 13, 22. Permission
to remodel, however, is subject to limitations designed to prevent construction which
would block the scenic view from the highway. Id. at 22.
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ing industrial land uses have been permitted to continue as "conform-
ing uses" by virtue of specially drawn easement deed provisions. For
example, easements acquired from owners of land on which sand
and gravel mining sites or rock quarry sites are located may expressly
allow continuance of mining and quarrying without the limitations
on expansion normally imposed on "nonconforming uses.''170 Other-
wise, scenic easements covering such land would cost as much as the
fee simple title.
The Wisconsin scenic easement forms originally used in the
1950's attempted both to state the restrictions imposed on land use
and to spell out the permitted uses the landowner could make of his
land consistent with the scenic objectives sought to be achieved.
This turned out to be confusing and troublesome. Within a few
years landowners started to besiege the highway agency with ques-
tions as to whether some use not specifically mentioned in the scenic
easement deed would be permissible. Hence the scenic easement deed
form was changed so as to state only the use restrictions to be
imposed on the servient land, without any attempt to specify "per-
mitted uses."
During the 1950's the Wisconsin highway commission generally
considered that it was only necessary to purchase restrictive scenic
easements, without any affirmative or positive rights. 7 ' But this
policy proved inadequate. 7 ' Some of the easements purchased in
the 1950's are in areas which have now produced trees so large as
to block the entire scene sought to be preserved. The highway com-
mission has been helpless to deal with this problem because the
scenic easement form used at the time of purchase did not grant to
the commission the right to enter the easement area to cut and prune
trees selectively to preserve the view. Moreover, the scenic easement
deeds used in the 1950's granted the highway commission no right
to enter the easement area to restore its scenic value when necessary
- e.g., to remove and replace elm trees killed by the Dutch elm dis-
ease. In recent years, therefore, the scenic easement deed forms used
in Wisconsin have been changed to provide expressly that highway
department personnel may enter the easement area to "plant and/or
selectively cut or prune trees and brush to improve the scenic view
and to implement disease prevention measures.'
' 73
170 See Sawtelle, supra note 124, at 49; Whyte supra note 124, at 88.
171 See text accompanying notes 160-64 supra.
172 This discussion is based on B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra
note 124, at 4. Deeds used in the early 1960's, at least, contained the following pro-
vision: "This easement grants to the State of Wisconsin, and its agents, the right to
enter upon the restricted area only for the purpose of inspection and enforcement of
the terms of the easement."
173 See text following note 175 infra, "Specific Rights Conveyed," items (b) and (c).
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In recent years, the Wisconsin highway commission has also
decided that a more flexible approach to the scenic easement restric-
tions to be imposed on servient land is desirable, since each scenic
easement site differs from all others.'74 One site may cover a 40-
acre tract for the purpose of preserving the beauty of a wooded hill-
side. Another site may be acquired for the purpose of cutting a
"window" in a wall of trees to open up a scenic view. And still
another site may require acquisition of the right to plant trees to
enhance scenic beauty. In order to provide the needed flexibility, a
new scenic easement instrument was developed several years ago
which listed all the conceivable scenic restrictions and affirmative
rights which it might be desirable to include in any scenic easement
"package." In particular cases, the restrictions and affirmative rights
not to be included were simply crossed out. But experience with this
form of instrument indicated that it made scenic easement acquisi-
tion unnecessarily difficult because it created apprehension in the
minds of the landowners, who were suspicious of items X-ed out
on the instrument they were subsequently asked to sign.
To deal with this problem, it was recently proposed that scenic
easement forms be standardized in three or four groups - e.g.,
those which protect a view located above the highway level, those
protecting a view on the same level as the highway, and those pro-
tecting a view below the highway level. This proposal was rejected,
however, and it was decided instead to use a simple one-sheet scenic
easement deed form with ample blank space for typing in the restric-
tions and affirmative rights agreed on in each particular case. The
highway commission negotiators now work from the following list:
SPECIFIC RIGHTS CONVEYED
The right of the State of Wisconsin, its agents and contractors,
to enter upon the easement area:
(a) To inspect for violations of the provisions of this ease-
ment and to remove or eliminate advertising displays,
signs and billboards, stored or accumulated junked auto-
mobiles, farm implements or parts thereof, and other sal-
vage materials or debris, and to perform such scenic res-
toration as may be deemed necessary or desirable.
(b) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trees and brush
to improve the scenic view and to implement disease pre-
vention measures.
(c) To plant and/or selectively cut or prune trees and brush
to improve the scenic view and to implement disease
prevention measures. The area excluded from this pro-
vision is described as follows: (Then describe excluded
areas such as the residence, etc.)
174 The discussion in the text here is based on WoRKsHoP MANUAL 20-22; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 6-9; B. Mullen, Scenic





1. The right to erect, display, place or maintain upon or
within the scenic area any signs, billboards, outdoor advertising
structures or advertisement of any kind, except that one (1) on-
premise sign of not more than .......... square feet in size may
be erected and maintained to advertise the sale, hire, or lease of
the property, or the sale and/or manufacture of any goods, products
or services upon the land. Any existing signs, other than the one
on-premise sign, and/or advertisements as described above shall be
terminated and removed on or before .......................
2. The right to dump or maintain a dump of ashes, trash,
rubbish, sawdust, garbage, offal, storage of vehicle bodies or parts,
storage of farm implements or parts, and any other unsightly or
offensive material.
3. The right to cut or remove any trees or shrubs.
4. The right to cut or remove any trees, except marketable
timber and then in accordance with standard forest cropping prac-
tices existent in the area, and at no time will the scenic area be
denuded of trees.
5. The right to park trailer houses, mobile homes, or any port-
able living quarters.
6. The right to quarry, or remove, or store any surface or sub-
surface minerals or materials.
7. All rights except general crop and/or livestock farming
(agricultural) within the first ........ feet of the scenic area as
measured normal to the (center line) (reference line) (nearest edge
of pavement) (right of way line) of the highway.
8. All rights except general crop and/or livestock farming
(agricultural).
9. The right to develop the easement area except for limited
residential development consistent with applicable state and local
regulations. Such limited rights retained by the owner are as follows:
(a) Each single family residential lot fronting on and abutting
(Identify Highway) shall be limited to a minimum width
of .......... feet as measured parallel to the highway;
(b) A total of ........ single family residential lots is the
maximum number authorized for the easement area.
10. The right to change the use of the easement area from
residential to any other use.
11. The right to change the use of the easement area from
commercial to any other use.
175
In drafting a scenic easement deed, the right to enter to inspect
for and eliminate violations, (a) above, will normally be included,
and in most cases either (b) or (c) will also be included. If, in
view of the characteristics of the particular parcel, no right of entry
is desired for any purpose, no provision for a right of entry is
included in the deed. In every case, however, the deed form will
contain two printed paragraphs assuring the landowner that the
175 This list is set out in WORKSHOP MANUAL 20-22; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements:
Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 7-8; B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Techniques
of Conveyancing, supra note 124, in Exhibits 2 and 3.
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public has no right of entry in the easement area and that the state
has no right of entry except for the specific purposes set forth in
the deed. These paragraphs are included to assure the landowner
that the public will not be permitted to use the scenic easement area
as a park, and that the highway commission will not have the right
to use it for highway construction purposes. They make the scenic
easement more "salable" from the state's viewpoint.
The list of restrictions ("specific rights relinquished") is to
be used as a guide by the highway commission's field representatives
in developing the scenic easement package best suited for a partic-
ular location. Any combination of the listed restrictions may be used,
depending on the character of the scenic easement site and the objec-
tive sought to be accomplished. Some of the restrictions are alterna-
tives both of which would not be included in the same scenic ease-
ment deed - e.g., items 3 and 4; items 7, 8, and 9. Item 9, dealing
with residential development, leaves some room for negotiation with
the landowner as to the number of residential lots and the minimum
width of lots to be permitted in the easement area. It is important
to note that the list of restrictions is not intended to be all-inclusive
and that, if the field representative decides that some additional
restriction is desirable, he is authorized to include such restriction in
the proposed scenic easement deed.
The flexible approach embodied in the above listing of "specific
rights conveyed" and "specific rights relinquished" obviously requires
that the highway commission's field representatives shall be capable
of exercising an informed judgment in determining which affirma-
tive rights and restrictions to include in the scenic easement deed.
It also requires the enforcement agent to become familiar with the
varying provisions of each scenic easement deed. To aid the enforce-
ment agent, Mr. B. J. Mullen has suggested that a book of scenic
easement plats be kept for each highway maintenance area, showing
the restrictions on each parcel and the affirmative rights granted to
the highway commission.1
76
During the 1950's scenic easements along the Great River Road
in Wisconsin were generally acquired over strips extending 350 feet
back from the center line of the highway right-of-way. 177 It is now
recognized, however, that a uniform strip running 350 feet back
from the center line of the right-of-way is not necessarily sufficient
to preserve the scenic views most worth preserving. For example,
176 B. Mullen, Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 14.
177 All the sources agree on this point. The discussion in the text of why and how the
original practice was modified is based on WORKSHOP MANUAL 20; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 12.
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there are along the Great River Road many coulees which run back
from the highway far beyond the 350-foot easement line, and many
of these coulees present some of the most beautiful views along the
entire Great River Road: steep bluffs reaching skyward on both
sides of a lush valley and sudden outcroppings of rock bursting out
through heavy cover of trees and brush. Since the 350-foot easements
do not restrict land use beyond the easement line, many of these
lovely vistas may be spoiled by future development. Since 1961,
therefore, the Wisconsin highway commission has adopted a more
flexible approach to the depth of scenic easements, under which the
easement is to be designed to fit the topography.
To date under the ORAP program the commission has concen-
trated on specific locations which, for many projects, include six to
10 parcels in order to preserve one scenic objective such as a view
of a lake from the highway. Currently, the commission is thinking
in terms of complete scenic corridors which will turn scenic highways
into parkways. For example, Interstate 94 between Madison and
Milwaukee is presently under study with a view to development of
the 70-plus miles between the two cities as a scenic parkway.
4. Scenic Easement Site Selection, Appraisal, and
Negotiation
178
As part of the ORAP program, a resource value inventory of
the entire state of Wisconsin has been made on a county by county
basis. When the resource values disclosed by the inventory, including
streams, lakes, forests, and hilly areas, are placed on a map of the
state and then overlaid with a map of the highway transportation
network, natural lineal scenic highway corridors can be recognized.
Delineation of these natural corridors has apparently provided some
aid in scenic easement site selection at times. But in areas where
enough scenic easements to create a complete scenic highway corridor
cannot be acquired, the resource value inventory provides only a very
general guide to scenic easement site selection. The usual practice is
to make site selections on the basis of a careful field viewing by a
committee in each highway district, with all selections subject to
review by the staff of the highway commission.
Before the Wisconsin highway commission acquires a scenic
easement, the right-of-way agent reviews the marketability of the
178 This section of the text is based primarily on the following sources: B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Wisconsin Progress, supra note 124, at 5-10, 12-13; B. Mullen,
Scenic Easements: Techniques of Conveyancing, supra note 124, at 2; R. NETHERTON
& M. MARKHAM, supra note 124, at 71; R. Sawtelle, Experiences in the Acquisition
of Scenic Easements by the State of Wisconsin (unpublished paper presented to the




title by examining the local public land records. Abstracts are not
obtained unless the fee simple title is to be acquired instead of a
scenic easement. After the appraised value of the scenic easement
has been determined, the state highway commission offers the land-
owner this value; there is no dickering over price, although there
may be some give-and-take with respect to the exact content of the
scenic easement package. Condemnation is resorted to only when
the landowner will not sell at the appraised value.
An appraisal of each parcel is made on site, the appraiser con-
ferring with the owner to learn of his immediate plans for any
change in the use of the land and to discover any items that might have
been overlooked. Theoretically, such appraisals should be made on
the basis of the difference between the value of the whole premises
before and after acquisition of the scenic easement. But since experi-
ence has shown that acquisition of a scenic easement often has no
adverse effect on the value of the land lying beyond the restricted
area, the area to be covered by the scenic easement may be considered
as a separate unit. The appraisal process then becomes an effort to
establish the difference between the value of that unit before and
after acquisition of the scenic easement.
Determination of the "before" value of a scenic easement parcel
is not always easy, because of the difficulty in determining what the
"highest and best use" of the land really is. Much of the land is
located in rural areas, and is either devoted to agricultural use or is
substantially unused for anything at all. The development potential
of the land is often uncertain in such cases, and the "highest and best
use" may be quite speculative. Determination of the "after" value
of a scenic easement parcel may be even more difficult because there
are almost no "comparables" to use in fixing "after" values.
Recently, however, the Wisconsin highway commission has been
able to establish some comparable "before" and "after" values in
cases where excess land is purchased and then resold subject to scenic
restrictions. This occurs where a right-of-way acquisition cuts up an
agricultural tract so badly that the owner sells his entire tract to the
highway commission. If the excess is resold subject to scenic restric-
tions, the high bid for the land subject to scenic restrictions can be
compared to the appraised value of the excess land free of scenic
restrictions. Under current Wisconsin practice, the ORAP fund is
charged for the difference, if any.
The Wisconsin experience suggests that there are really two
different problems in the appraisal of scenic easements. First, in
strictly rural areas, where no development is likely in the foreseeable
future, the damage to the landowner resulting from imposition of
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scenic easement restrictions on part of his land is usually quite small.
The landowner loses a few dollars of annual income from billboard
rental payments, and he is inconvenienced by the series of meetings
leading up to final negotiation of the easement purchase. In such
cases, the Wisconsin highway commission has accepted the premise
that scenic easements do have some value, and that payment of at
least a nominal amount is likely to be the determining factor in
persuading the landowner to grant the desired scenic easement.
Hence the highway commission makes an offer of "nominal" pay-
ment, which apparently is usually based on a standard flat rate of
20 cents a front foot. It should be noted, however, that even in
"nominal" damage cases, the highway commission demands a rather
complete appraisal document, with a careful site analysis, good pic-
tures, a sketch, a dissertation on the market data available, and a
logical conclusion as to how the proposed scenic easement affects
the value of the servient land.
The second kind of appraisal problem arises where the land
in question has substantial development potential because of its
proximity to urban centers. In such cases, serious consideration must
be given to probable future uses, such as residential subdivisions,
motels, or other commercial developments. But the appraiser cannot
assume that all properties are potential sites for either residential
or commercial development. It is usually clear, for example, that
there will be insufficient business for total commercial development
along a particular highway for many years to come. Consequently,
the value of the scenic easement is usually established as a percent-
age of the future development value of the land based on the num-
ber of commercial or residential units that foreseeable future demand
will support and the suitability of the particular land for such devel-
opment, keeping in mind that unrestricted development will be per-
mitted beyond the scenic easement strip and that signs are permitted
within the restricted area if they advertise a business on the premises.
Despite the difficulties involved in valuation of scenic ease-
ments, the Wisconsin experience clearly demonstrates that these
difficulties can be overcome. It has also demonstrated that the
appraiser must fully understand what it is that he is supposed to
appraise- i.e., he must be fully informed of the exact provisions
of the scenic easement to be acquired. Because of the rather confus-
ing mixture of "restrictions" and "permitted uses" in the scenic ease-
ment forms used in the 1950's, Wisconsin appraisers sometimes did
not fully understand just what rights were to be relinquished by the
landowner, and consequently had unnecessary difficulty in deter-
mining the effect of the scenic easement on the value of the land.
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It should be noted that the policy of the Wisconsin highway
commission has been to acquire scenic easements mainly in rural and
semirural areas, and never within the limits of cities or villages.
Moreover, the Wisconsin highway commission from the beginning
of its scenic easement program has applied one lesson derived from
the experience of the National Park Service with the Blue Ridge
and Natchez Trace Parkways: that a fee simple title rather than a
scenic easement should be obtained in forest lands having value for
commercial lumbering, since the cost of an easement which prohibits
the harvesting of timber will approximate the cost of fee simple
purchase.
More recently, the Wisconsin highway commission has adopted
the policy of buying a fee simple estate rather than a scenic easement
at those locations where the cost of a scenic easement would approx-
imate the value of the fee simple. Under the current policy in Wis-
consin, about 5 percent of the scenic parcels acquired are purchased
in fee simple.
5. Enforcement of Scenic Easement Restrictions 7 9
During the early years of the scenic easement acquisition pro-
gram for the Great River Road, enforcement problems seem to have
arisen mainly from uncertainty as to just what restrictions were
imposed on the servient land. No doubt the language of the early
easement deeds, with their intermingling of "restrictions" and "per-
mitted uses," was a major cause of this uncertainty. One remedy, in
Wisconsin, has been to have the easement purchasing agent state,
restate, clarify, and reclarify the rights and duties of the parties at
the time of acquisition of the easement. In this connection, all Wis-
consin scenic easement purchasing agents are required to keep a
"negotiator's diary" containing summaries of all conversations with
the landowner, signed by the agent, and stating in detail exactly
what was discussed at each meeting or during each telephone con-
versation with the landowner. This makes it more difficult for the
landowner to say, as landowners have frequently said in the past, "I
know it's not in the deed, but Mr. so-and-so told me that I could do
this," in order to excuse a violation of easement restrictions. Of
course, it is hoped that the new easement deed forms, containing a
clearer statement of the restrictions imposed on the landowner, will
help to eliminate uncertainty which may give rise to unintentional
violations.
179 This section of the text is based primarily on WORKSHOP MANUAL 19-23.
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In general, enforcement of scenic easement restrictions along
Wisconsin's Great River Road has not encountered much difficulty.
Enforcement is the responsibility of highway department personnel
who work closely with field representatives from the district office
of the state highway commission. Periodic inspections are conducted
and easement violations are quickly reported. The servient landowner
is first given a notice requiring him to take corrective action - e.g.,
to remove signs erected or maintained in violation of the easement
restrictions. Failure of the landowner to take corrective action may
result in entry on the servient land by highway department personnel
to abate the violation or in a suit for an injunction. The local courts
have been fully educated with respect to the Wisconsin scenic ease-
ment program, and are much less hostile to state highway commission
agents seeking injunctive relief than were the courts of the southern
states toward federal agents seeking injunctive relief against scenic
easement violations along the Blue Ridge and Natchez Trace Park-
ways.'
0
One recurrent problem in enforcement has arisen from the plac-
ing of house trailers on residential lots which meet the 300-foot
minimum frontage requirement. For the future, at least, this problem
has been resolved by placing in the easement deed form an express
prohibition against house trailers.
6. Plans for Future Use of Scenic Easements
The Wisconsin highway commission plans to complete acquisi-
tion of scenic easements for the Great River Road in the near future.
A proposed statutory amendment which would remove the location
restrictions on scenic easement acquisition imposed by the ORAP
priorities was to have been presented to the 1967 legislative session,
but has been withheld until the ORAP committee can complete its
recommendations for changes in the ORAP legislation. If this amend-
ment is ultimately adopted, making ORAP funds available for acqui-
sition of scenic easements along highways in any part of Wisconsin,
the highway commission plans to use state ORAP funds, as far as
possible, for acquisition of scenic easements and scenic overlook
sites, and to use federal "3 percent funds" for development of scenic
overlook sites, for removal of billboards, and for removal or screen-
ing of junkyards pursuant to the Highway Beautification Act of
180 In a letter to the author dated May 9, 1967, Mr. B.J. Mullen reported as follows:
"We have approximately 6 violations involving signs at the present time. We have
had good results so far with voluntary action of the landowner. We may have to go
to the courts to clear some of the above signs but have not taken this step to date."
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1965.181 For the time being, it would appear that only federal 3 per-
cent funds are available for scenic easement acquisition outside the
Great River Road and the other priority areas listed in the 1961
ORAP legislation.
In response to the Highway Beautification Act of 1965, a new
Scenic Beauty Bill' was introduced in the 1967 legislative session
and is still pending. This bill would expressly authorize acquisition
of "the fee simple or any lesser interest, as determined by the state
highway commission to be reasonably necessary to accomplish the
purposes of" the bill, which are "to promote the safety, convenience
and enjoyment of travel on, and protection of the public investment
in, the state trunk highway system, and to provide for the restoration,
preservation and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent
to such highways." It is doubtful whether such authorization is really
necessary, since the Wisconsin highway commission has for several
years been acquiring scenic easements in the priority areas listed in
the ORAP legislation under an earlier statute.1 3 However, another
provision of the proposed Scenic Beauty Bill is designed to meet a
clearly demonstrated need of the state highway commission for
variance-granting power.
No scenic easement instrument, however well drafted, can antic-
ipate all the changes that may take place in the future. Conditions
affecting the scenic easement site may change radically in a period
of 10 or 20 years. Yet the scenic easement normally imposes restric-
tions that will operate in perpetuity. Wisconsin has already had
substantial experience with requests from landowners for a release
of or variance from the restrictions imposed on their lands by scenic
easements. Under present Wisconsin law,'8 4 if the highway commis-
sion decides to grant a landowner's request and release or modify
some scenic easement right previously acquired, it must classify such
right as "excess," have it appraised, and obtain the approval of the
Governor in order to dispose of the "excess right" in question. This
statutory procedure presents no particular problem in disposing of
excess realty when the highway commission initially acquired a fee
simple estate. Indeed, the procedure is probably desirable, since the
transaction is open for all to see. But the procedure is time-consuming,
181 Letters from B.J. Mullen to the author, May 9, June 19, and Nov. 1, 1967.
1
8This is Assembly Bill 323, introduced on March 7, 1967. If enacted, it will create a
new Chapter 85 of the Wisconsin Statutes, "relating to the restoration, preservation
and enhancement of scenic beauty within and adjacent to the state trunk highway
system."
1 83 WIs. STAT. § 84.09 (1965). See quotation in note 128 supra.
1
8 4 Id. § 84.09 (5).
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cumbersome, and unnecessary when applied to the release of or
variance from scenic easement restrictions.
The proposed Scenic Beauty Bill contains a provision which
would authorize the state highway commission "to grant variances
or releases of conditions, terms or restrictions contained in easements
secured for highway beautifcation or in conveyances containing any
reservations or restrictions regarding the use or occupation of prop-
erty conveyed by the commission" whenever this "shall be determined
by the commission to be in the public interest." It has been further
suggested that the highway commission should be required to deter-
mine whether the right to be released has a significant market value
and if so to require the landowner requesting the release to pay such
market value to the commission.
B. California
Since 1933 the California Department of Parks and Recreation
or a predecessor agency has from time to time acquired scenic ease-
ments over land in or immediately adjacent to state parks. The first
scenic easement, acquired in 1933, covered lands adjacent to Point
Lobos State Reserve. By its terms, the grantors agreed as follows:
That, other than farm buildings, they will not [without the
permission of the State Park Commission first obtained] allow any
new structures upon said described property for strictly business or
commercial purposes, and that any new buildings other than farm
buildings shall not be constructed upon said premises nearer than
250 feet from the west line of the State Highway and that so far as
reasonably feasible the natural growth of trees and forest thereon
will not be destroyed or materially altered.
The second scenic easement, covering lands adjacent to Pfeiffer-
Big Sur State Park, was acquired in 1934. It imposed significantly
greater restrictions on the servient land than did the Point Lobos
scenic easement of 1933."85 The Pfeiffer-Big Sur restrictions were
essentially a prototype of the restrictions included in a 1946 scenic
easement deed form approved by the California Attorney General
for general use in scenic easement acquisition.'8 6
The 1946 scenic easement deed form was used in the acquisition
18 5 Copies of the 1933 and 1934 scenic easement deeds were furnished by Mr. F. C.
Buchter, Departmental Counsel, Department of Parks and Recreation.
186 Copies of this 1946 scenic easement deed were furnished by Mr. F. C. Buchter, supra
note 185, and by Mr. Earl P. Hanson, Chief, Division of Beaches and Parks, Depart-
ment of Parks and Recreation. The same scenic easement deed is reprinted in W.
WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS
60-61 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959). Presumably the Department
would use this form at the present time in acquiring additional scenic easements in
or adjacent to state parks.
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of nine scenic easements at Columbia State Historic Park.' 8 7 At
Columbia, the aim of the park is to preserve and interpret the looks
and life of a California gold rush town as authentically as possible.
The acquisition program has proceeded on a piecemeal basis, and
scenic easements have been acquired to preserve the original character
of the buildings and their surroundings until funds are available for
fee simple purchase. Subsequently, about one-half of these scenic
easement areas (including buildings) have been acquired in fee
simple.
The State of California also has what might be considered a
scenic easement in the area adjacent to the Monterey Custom
House.' 88 The scenic easement was contained in a stipulated judg-
ment defining the interests of the state and the city in a described
area adjacent to the Custom House building and stating that the
state should have an easement for light and air.
Scenic easement acquisitions by the California Department of
Parks and Recreation (or its predecessor agency) have been carried
18 The restrictions contained in the scenic easement deeds at Columbia Historic Park
are as follows:
1. That no structures of any kind will be placed or erected upon said
described premises until application therefor, with plans and specifications
of such structures, together with a statement of the purpose for which the
structure will be used, has been filed with and written approval obtained
from the said State Park Commission;
2. That no advertising of any kind or nature shall be located on or
within said property without written approval being first obtained from
the State Park Commission;
3. That no painting or exterior surfacing which, in the opinion and
judgment of the said State Park Commission, are inharmonious with the
landscape and general surroundings, shall be used on the exterior of any
structure now located on such property, or which may, as hereinbefore
provided be constructed thereon;
4. That all new plantings by the Grantors shall be confined to native
plants characteristic of the State Park region, except flowers, vegetables,
berries, fruit trees and farm crops;
5. That the general topography of the landscape shall be maintained
in its present condition and that no excavation or topographic changes shall
be made without the written approval of the State Park Commission;
6. That no use of said described property, which in the opinion and
judgment of said State Park Commission, will or does materially alter the
landscape or other attractive scenic features of said land, or will be incon-
sistent with State Park rules and regulations, or with the proper operation
of a State Park, other than those specified above shall be done or suffered
without the written consent of the said State Park Commission.
There is a further provision excepting and reserving to the grantor, inter alia,
The right to maintain all of the buildings now existing and if all or
any of them shall be destroyed or damaged by fire, storm, or other casualty,
to restore the same in conformity with the design and type of building of
the historic period which the State Park has been established to commem-
orate; the plans to be submitted and approved by the State Park Commission
as provided in Paragraph I hereof.
Information about the Columbia State Historic Park and the scenic easements
obtained in connection therewith was furnished by letters to the author from Earl P.
Hanson, Chief, Division of Beaches and Parks, Aug. 10, 1967; from Ed V. Dwyer,
Recreational Planner, Division of Beaches and Parks, Aug. 16, 1967; and from F. C.
Buchter, Departmental Counsel, Department of Parks and Recreation, Sept. 8, 1967.
188 Information about the Monterey Custom House easement was furnished by letter
from F.C. Buchter, supra note 187.
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out under authority of a 1927 statute which, in its present form,
provides as follows:
The department, with the consent of the Department of
Finance, may acquire by purchase or by condemnation proceedings
brought in the name of the people of the State of California title to
or any interest in real and personal property which the department
deems necessary or proper for the extension, improvement, or devel-
opment of the state park system. The department shall attempt to
purchase property by negotiation with the owner before it com-
mences condemnation proceedings.' 8 9
Since 1963 the California Department of General Services has been
responsible for the acquisition program for the Department of Parks
and Recreation, operating under authority of the Property Acquisition
Law. 9 ' However, no scenic easements have been acquired since 1963.
Most of the scenic easements now administered by the Cali-
fornia Department of Parks and Recreation were gifts to the state." 1
As one official of the Department puts it, "We have not had any
particular problems of policing the scenic easements acquired by
gifts since in each case the donations were made by persons who
were sympathetic with the program undertaken. Whether problems
will be encountered when the principals involved are no longer in
active ownership of the properties is hard to imagine."'192 It should
be noted, however, that each park has a resident ranger "who is in
constant observation of the easement."' 9'
The only enforcement problem to arise so far has involved the
Monterey Custom House easement. The City of Monterey wants to
construct a marina which arguably will encroach on the defined ease-
ment area. The issue is whether a seawall, which is invisible from
the plaza of the Custom House, will violate the easement restrictions.
There has been no litigation to date, and it appears that administra-
tive negotiations will preserve the state's rights in the easement
area.1
9 4
In general, it would appear that substantial further acquisitions
of scenic easements adjacent to state parks in California are unlikely.
One official of the Department of Parks and Recreation says, "We
1 8 9 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 5006 (West Supp. 1967).
1
9
0 CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15850-66 (West 1963).
191 There is some conflict on this point. Both Mr. Earl P. Hanson and Mr. Ed V. Dwyer,
in their letters, supra note 187, state that all the department's scenic easements were
acquired by gift, without any cost to the state. On the other hand, Mr. F.C. Buchter,
in his letter, supra note 187, states, "As a general rule, the property owners [at
Columbia State Historic Park] required payment for the easements, although the
prices were not excessive. A few were gift deeded to us."
12 Letter from Earl P. Hanson, rupra note 187. This is confirmed in letter from Ed V.
Dwyer, supra note 187.
193 Letter from Ed V. Dwyer, supra note 187.
' Information on this point was furnished by letters from F.C. Buchter to the author,
Sept. 8 & Dec. 13, 1967.
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have never used condemnation in acquiring scenic easements nor
have we contemplated doing so. We have looked at the possibility
of attempting to buy scenic easements and have found that the
problems of valuation are so great as to be unworkable."'9 5 Another
official has expressed the following opinion:
The difficulty of determining how much control a scenic ease-
ment gives reduces their value to the Department. Another aspect
which has toned down our interest in scenic easements is that there
is not a satisfactory method for the appraisal of the value, and unless
the landowner is cooperative in accepting a nominal consideration,
the cost of the easement is so high where land is restricted for park
compatible uses that acquisition [in fee] is more practicable, since
this will insure the public the use of the land as well as the scenic
attraction. Land value in California is so high and the desirability
of land for subdivision near State Parks makes it unlikely that scenic
easements will be acquired for nominal consideration.19 6
Although the Department of Parks and Recreation is given
broad new authority to acquire scenic easements under the California
Parkway Act of 1965,1°" at present the implementation of that act
is still in the early planning stage.
Prior to 1963, California had both a constitutional provision
and some legislation under which the state highway agency had the
power to acquire excess land adjacent to state highways and to resell
it subject to scenic restrictions,' 9 8 but it appears that no use was
ever made of this power. In 1963, the Westside Freeway Park and
Development Act "' authorized the Departments of Water Resources,
Parks and Recreation, Fish and Game, Finance, and Public Works
to acquire the fee simple or any lesser interest in certain scenic areas
in conjunction with construction of the new Interstate Route 5. The
Department of Public Works was expressly empowered to acquire
scenic easements along the new highway, provided the cost of such
scenic easements would be reimbursed by the federal government. 00
To date, however, no scenic easements have been acquired under the
1963 Westside Park and Freeway Development Act.
The year 1963 also saw the enactment of legislation establishing
195 Letter from Mr. Earl P. Hanson, supra note 198.
16 Letter from F.C. Buchter, supra note 187.
197 CAL. STs. & H'wAYS CODE §§ 885-87.5 (West Supp. 1967).
198 The constitutional provision is CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 141/. Implementing legislation
is CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 104.3 (West 1956).
199 CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 7000-01 (West 1966).
O0 Id. § 7000. The limitation to expenditure of federal-aid funds for acquisition of
scenic easements by the Department of Public Works is apparently controlling,
despite the broader authorization in § 7001 for expenditure of public funds for"acquisition of interests or rights in real property." But the specific authorization in
§ 7000 for the Department of Public Works to acquire scenic easements apparently
does not limit the broader power conferred by § 7001 on "any of the state depart-
ments specified in this chapter" to acquire "the fee or any lesser interest, develop-
ment right, easement, covenant or other contractual right necessary to achieve the
purposes of this chapter."
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a Master Plan for State Scenic Highways in California.2"' While the
state's role as planner, catalyst, and active participant should not be
minimized, it is apparent that the statute gives local governmental
agencies the primary responsibility for controlling land use outside
the highway right-of-way and within the scenic highway corridor.
Consequently, the major efforts of the Advisory Committee on a
Master Plan for Scenic Highways and other state agencies involved
in the scenic highway program were initially devoted to development
of planning and design standards for scenic corridor protection.
These efforts resulted in a publication entitled The Scenic Route: A
Guide for the Designation of an Official Scenic Highway.2 °2 The
Advisory Committee reviewed it and recommended its adoption on
an interim basis, subject to further review by other public agencies
and conccrned citizens. The Director of Public Works adopted the
Guide on this interim basis, and it is currently being followed in
designating official scenic highways in California.
Highways designated by the state legislature to be within the
Master Plan for Scenic Highways are eligible to become Official
Scenic Highways when (1) the roadway and right-of-way meet scenic
highway standards set forth in the Guide, or the state has developed
a plan and program to bring a specific road and right-of-way into
conformity with such standards; and (2) protection of the scenic
corridor has been assured by the local jurisdictions through which
the highway runs and by public agencies owning land within the
corridor.
The Guide broadly states that "land use controls consistent with
the general plan should be in effect over the entire corridor, ' 20 3 and
includes a rather detailed set of guidelines in regard to urban develop-
ment in both rural and urban areas, building heights and setbacks,
signs and outdoor advertising, placement of utility lines, cover and
screening of earthwork operations, erosion control, preservation of
the natural condition of edges of lakes, rivers, and creeks, preserva-
tion and restoration of plant material, clearing for views, site plan-
ning and architectural and landscape design in private developments,
property maintenance on private properties, and public uses within
the highway corridor. The particular land use controls to be employed
by local governmental agencies for protection of the scenic highway
corridor include zoning ordinances, subdivision regulations, building
201 CAL. STs. & HWAYS CODE §§ 227-29.1, 260-63.9 (West 1967).
202 This publication (hereinafter referred to as the Guide] was prepared by the Inter-
departmental Committee on Scenic Highways, composed of representatives from the
Departments of Public Works, Parks and Recreation, and Water Resources, and the
State Office of Planning, and was based on policy directions from the Advisory




codes, housing codes, fire protection codes, anti-litter ordinances,
weed and insect controls, water quality controls and forestry regula-
tions- all based on the police power delegated to local govern-
mental agencies.
The Guide also states that "every opportunity for acquisition
of corridor land in fee should be thoroughly explored by public
agencies" to provide for "such public uses as information centers,
roadside rests, vista stations, parks, playgrounds, wild areas, wildlife
refuges, schools, colleges, cultural centers, administrative centers,
fairgrounds, even airports" ;204 and that, "when public uses are not
contemplated, the acquisition of development rights or scenic ease-
ments should be actively pursued by public agencies.'"'25 With
respect to "these lesser property rights," it is asserted that they
"retain the land on the tax rolls - if at a lower rate, leave responsi-
bility for maintenance with the private owner, allow private uses
compatible with the scenic highway program, and are acquired at
a lower cost than outright purchase."2 °
It is not clear whether the Guide contemplates acquisition of
"development rights or scenic easements" by state agencies, by local
governmental agencies, or by both. It would appear, however, that
acquisition by local governmental agencies is contemplated, since at
the time of the Guide's publication the power of the Department of
Public Works to acquire scenic easements adjacent to state highways
was very limited.
Although acquisition of scenic easements is one of the methods
suggested for implementing the Master Plan for Scenic Highways,
it is rather clear that this was not initially viewed as one of the
major features of the California scenic highway program. But
passage of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965 stimulated
interest in acquisition of scenic interests, and in 1966 the California
legislature adopted a Scenic Areas Act207 authorizing the Depart-
ment of Public Works,
if federal funds are available for reimbursement therefor, [to]
acquire, either in fee or in any lesser estate or interest, real property
adjacent to any highway included in the national system of inter-
state and defense highways or the federal-aid primary highway
system, which the department considers necessary for the preserva-
tion, maintenance or conservation of scenic lands or areas adjacent
to such highways or which it considers necessary to preserve,
improve or enhance the scenic beauty of or points of interest in the
lands or areas traversed by such highways. 208
2




2CAL. SmS. & H'WAYS CODE §§ 895-97 (West Supp. 1967).
208 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 895 (West Supp. 1967).
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Currently, the Department of Public Works is engaged in plan-
ning for scenic area acquisition, both in connection with the State
Scenic Highway system and in connection with other state highways
which are eligible for federal 3 percent funds under Title III of the
Highway Beautification Act.
Pursuant to a legislative mandate appended to the 1966 Scenic
Areas Act, the California Department of Public Works recently
reported to the legislature on the progress made and the program
developed for the acquisition of scenic areas adjacent to highways
under the 1966 act.209 Since only federal-aid funds are to be used
for acquisition of scenic areas under the 1966 act, it was decided
that federal policies and procedures would be the basic controls in
the acquisition program. The policies and procedures are set out in
Bureau of Public Roads Policy and Procedure Memorandum No.
21-4.6, dated January 24, 1966.
Pursuant to this memorandum, and to the directive contained in
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act with respect to the
making of a detailed estimate of the cost of carrying out the pro-
visions of the Act, preparations for making the required estimate
were started in California in late May 1966. The completed estimate
encompassed several facets of the Beautification Program, including
junkyard and billboard control, costs of landscaping, rest area and
scenic overlook construction, in addition to the costs of scenic area
acquisition. A part of the estimate is an inventory of scenic areas
which have an "intrinsic scenic beauty" and which are desirable to
preserve against future alteration or destruction. Selection teams
chose a total of 136 scenic areas adjacent to the Interstate system,
and 658 areas adjacent to the primary system. Interstate scenic
areas totaled approximately 27,300 acres to be protected at an ap-
proximate cost of $7,644,000; and the primary areas covered 94,400
acres to be protected at an estimated cost of $55,826,000.210
The teams were guided in scenic area selection by the following
criteria, in addition to those formulated by the Bureau of Public
Roads:
1. The area should contain features which would attract the eye of
a passing motorist, such as:
a. typical pastoral scenes containing an expanse of open land
and interesting cultural elements;
209 DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, CALIFORNIA DEP'T OF PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON ACQuI-
SITION OF SCENIC AREAS ADJACENT TO STATE HIGHWAYS (Dec. 1966), prepared
pursuant to Ch. 125, § 3, [19661 Cal. Stats., (1st Ex. Sess.).210 Id. at 8-9. Bureau of Public Roads estimate requirements included the establishment
of a class of area designated as "Top Quality," generally defined as including the
most desirable areas from a scenic viewpoint. The California totals of the "Top
Quality" scenic areas showed 63 areas aggregating 9,238 acres at an estimated acqui-
sition cost of $5,262,000 for the Interstate System and 273 areas aggregating 38,531




b. attractive or interesting growth of natural shrubs, vines,
trees, or timber stands;
c. views of water or wetlands, such as lakes, stream beds or
ocean shores;
d. interesting rock outcroppings or other geologic formations,
such as bluffs or cliff faces;
e. mountain or alpine valley views;
f. selected desert views;
g. attractive urban landscape views; and
h. historically interesting and appealing sites.
2. The area should be outlined, if possible, by natural features.
a. In the absence of natural boundaries, the area should be long
enough to hold the attention of a motorist traveling 50 miles
per hour, or approximately 73 feet per second, for at least
thirty seconds - or roughly 2200 feet.
b. The maximum width of the area should generally be limited
to that in which billboard controls may be exercised, although
it may be narrower or wider in special circumstances.
3. The areas should be spaced so as to make a trip interesting and
pleasant, assuming that the features of intervening spaces may
be altered considerably.
a. Along highways having heavy traffic volumes, areas may be
closer together than along highways having a lighter traffic
volume.
b. In continuous forest, areas may be spaced at fairly long inter-
vals and selection should be governed by interesting terrain
points.
c. In open country, areas may be infrequent.
d. In any long mileage of similar terrain, selection should be
dictated by points of interest.
4. Consideration should be given to areas having possible sites for
scenic overlooks and rest areas.
5. Areas which will involve heavy and continuous maintenance
expenditures for brush control, erosion control or tree trim-
ming should be avoided.
6. Areas containing cultivated trees and vines should be avoided
because of the impossibility of enforcing a continuation of the
same usage.
7. Sites otherwise qualified and in danger of imminent adverse
development should receive highest priority.
8. Prior to the acquisition of scenic areas, each proposed location
will be reviewed by the Division of Highways' Landscape Archi-
tect for general conformance to these criteria. The Landscape
Architect will also establish a statewide priority list within the
framework and these criteria and Federal Standards. 21'
In California, the following general criteria have been estab-
lished for determining the property interest to be acquired in "scenic
lands or areas adjacent to" highways with federal 3 percent funds:
This interest may range from an easement for one specific pur-
pose which will not interfere at all with the owner's use of the land
to the complete fee title which will transfer all the owner's rights to
211 Id. at 11-13.
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the State. The present or potential use of the land and its natural
features will dictate the interest to be acquired.
The property interest to be acquired can range from a fee
simple interest to minimal controls on scenic lands adjacent to the
highway. In any event only the minimum property interest necessary
to preserve the scenic attributes of the highway will be acquired.
An example of fee acquisition might be where the value of the
land depends upon its timber resource potential, and the owner will
be prevented from harvesting any trees.
Essentially, remaining value to the owner determines whether
or not fee title should be taken. When the acquisition of lesser inter-
est is indicated, consideration will be given to the taking of only
negative rights or to both negative and positive rights.
In the instance of an acquisition to preserve a view of open
farmland, only a negative right may be necessary, e.g., to prevent the
farmer from developing an unsightly materials pit, or prevent the
cutting of trees or other natural growth, or erecting signs.
In the instance of an acquisition of a site which is necessary
to preserve an alpine valley view, it may be necessary to acquire
negative rights to prevent the owner from taking the above-
mentioned actions, and a positive right to allow the State to trim
trees and brush to open up the view. 212
It should be noted that the scenic area acquisition program
under the 1966 Scenic Areas Act, which is to be entirely funded by
federal 3 percent funds under the Highway Beautification Act, is
not designed to supplant, or conflict with, California's scenic high-
way program under the 1963 Scenic Highways Act. 213 At the present
time these are separate programs, but in the future as more funds
become available they are likely to become more integrated. -1 4
Several hundred miles of the proposed scenic highway system
are now included in the Interstate system, so that federal 3 percent
funds can be used for scenic interest acquisition along this part of
the scenic highway system pursuant to the Bureau of Public Roads
Memorandum of January 24, 1966, which sets the highest priority
on "the acquisition of interests in strips of land necessary for the
... purposes [stated in the Highway Beautification Act] that are
adjacent to Interstate System highways." Since all or most of the
remaining mileage of the proposed scenic highway system con-
sists of primary highways, federal 3 percent funds can ultimately
also be used for scenic interest acquisition along these primary
highways, which constitute the second highest priority under the
Bureau of Public Roads Memorandum.
For the 1966-1967 fiscal year, the Bureau of Public Roads
made an exception to its general priorities for the use of federal
212 Id. at 14-15.
213 Id. at 17.
214 Letter from John B. Matheny, Assistant Chief Counsel, Division of Contracts and
Rights of Way (Legal), Department of Public Works, State of California Transporta-
tion Agency, to the author, June 22, 1967.
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3 percent funds and approved a "balanced program" for the use
of some $5 million appropriated for use in California. This balanced
program includes roadside planting and acquisition of rest areas,
vista points, and scenic areas.215
As previously indicated, the Department of Parks and Recre-
ation has broad authority to acquire scenic easements under the
California Parkway Act of 1965.16 Preliminary plans for develop-
ment of a state parkway system include the following policy
statement:
Scenic easements must be obtained along the corridor to retain
the present character of the land or assure the scenic quality of future
development through set-back, height, lot size, landscaped buffers,
use of land, tree cutting and other types of restrictions. No arbitrary
acreage is recommended to be included in easements (the national
parkway standards call for an average of 25 acres per mile). 21
However, the California Parkway Act of 1965 expressly provides:
The cost of parkway construction shall be expended from funds
other than those available for state highway construction. The
Department of Parks and Recreation may also accept grants on
behalf of the state and may accept financial or other assistance for,
or in aid of, the state parkway system.218
Under this limitation, it is not clear whether federal 3 percent funds
could be used for scenic easement acquisition in connection with the
development of the proposed parkway system. Of course, such funds
could not be used unless the parkway roads were part of the federal-
aid primary or secondary system, which is unlikely to be the case
except where parkways are established along existing state high-
ways superseded by freeways or along existing county highways.
C. Experience and Current Plans With Regard to Scenic Easements
in Other States
As previously indicated,2"9 the Bureau of Public Roads had
obligated a total of $59.5 million, as of June 30, 1966, for land-
scaping and scenic enhancement pursuant to Title III of the High-
way Beautification Act. Under the stimulus of this federal funding,
it appears that all or most of the states have begun to develop pro-
grams for the "restoration, preservation, and enhancement of scenic
beauty adjacent to" their federal-aid highways. In most of the states
215 The "balanced program" is set out in DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS REPORT, supra note
209, at 20. Confirmation of federal approval of this balanced program is contained
in letter, supra note 214.
216 CAL. STS. & H'wAYs CODE §§ 885-87.5 (West Supp. 1967).
217 CALIFORNIA REsOURCES AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION, CALI-
FORNIA PARKWAYS: PRELIMINARY REPORT 30 (Dec. 1966) (prepared pursuant to
CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 886 (West. Supp. (1967)).
218 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 887.5 (West Supp. 1967).
219 Text accompanying notes 1-2 supra.
VOL. 45
SCENIC EASEMENTS
where there is adequate enabling legislation,22 ° these programs
include acquisition of scenic easements, and a few states (in addition
to those with pre-Beautification Act scenic easement programs) have
already started the acquisition of scenic easements.
A questionnaire sent to all of the states known to have scenic
easement enabling legislation brought answers from 19 state highway
agencies (in addition to California and Wisconsin). In eight
22 ' of
these 19 states, scenic easement acquisition has already begun; in
nine,222 planning is under way but no scenic easements have yet
been acquired. Montana plans to acquire all scenic strips in fee
simple and to resell the land subject to scenic restrictions at a later
date. And Oregon plans to acquire and retain title to all scenic
strips in fee simple. Of the eight states where scenic easement
acquisition is already under way, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, and
Minnesota appear to have the most vigorous programs.
In Illinois,2 3 approximately $6 million of federal funds have
been obligated for scenic enhancement pursuant to Title III of
the Highway Beautification Act. Of this amount, about $750,000
has been allocated for scenic easement acquisition. At the inception
of the Illinois scenic acquisition program, each of the highway
districts selected a number of widely dispersed sites for scenic ease-
ment acquisition. Currently, however, the question of location is
under reconsideration. Present thinking is that the highway agency
should acquire scenic easements along both sides of the highway
for substantial distances in the most scenic areas of Illinois. If
this approach is adopted, it may result in acquisition of scenic
easements along highway stretches of 15 miles or more adjacent
to rivers or extending through rolling and hilly areas offering
a panoramic view. To date, the Illinois highway agency has acquired
three scenic easements, none of which exceeds one-fourth mile in
length. The total amount expended for these scenic easements, all
acquired by negotiated purchase, is about $61,000.
In Iowa,12 4 the highway commission has already acquired scenic
easements covering more than 500 acres, as well as almost 100 acres
in fee simple, at a total cost of $44,000 exclusive of engineering
and negotiation costs. The Iowa highway commission is planning
220 See section III of text supra. At least 40 states now appear to have adequate enabling
legislation.
221 Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, North Dakota, Ohio, and Texas.
222 Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, and West Virginia.
22 Letter from Allen R. Austin, Engineer of Right of Way, Division of Highways, Illi-
nois Department of Public Works and Buildings, to the author, Nov. 29, 1967.
22 Letter from Robert W. Pratt, Assistant Right of Way Planner, Iowa State Highway
Commission, to the author, Nov. 7, 1967.
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for ultimate acquisition of 377 scenic parcels - 58 on the Interstate
system and 319 on the primary system. In a majority of these parcels,
a scenic easement rather than a fee simple estate will be acquired.
Out of the total of $1,810,216 in federal funds obligated to Iowa
for 1966-1967, $380,270 will be used to acquire scenic easements,
and the remainder will be used to acquire highway rest areas. To date,
all scenic easements have been acquired by negotiated purchase,
and the Iowa highway commission plans to avoid use of its power
to condemn during the first five years or so of the acquisition program.
In Michigan,22 5 although no accurate figures on actual acqui-
sitions are available, it is clear that the program now under way is
very substantial. A total of some 223 scenic acquisitions, involving
sites averaging five acres, has been programmed. For 1968, $760,000
has been budgeted for acquisition of scenic strips - 175 strips on
the Interstate system and 12 on the primary system - and 75 sites
have already been selected on the Interstate system. Acquisition of
scenic strips in southern Michigan has been given priority since
that is where most of the state's population is located. In general,
wooded areas (especially along lakes and streams) have been
selected. To date, it would appear that most scenic strips adjacent
to limited-access highways have been acquired in fee simple. In the
future, as acquisition along free-access highways begins, more exten-
sive use of scenic easements is planned. Initial acquisitions in
northern Michigan will be in fee simple, for scenic overlooks or
turnouts, but it is hoped that the scenic easement device can be
used in later acquisitions there. To date, most scenic strip acquisitions
in Michigan have been by negotiated purchase.
In Minnesota,"' since 1965, the highway department has con-
ducted a statewide inventory of scenic areas adjacent to Interstate
and trunk highways in connection with the allocation of federal
highway beautification funds for the fiscal years 1966 and 1967.
Some priority was given to scenic areas along the Great River Road.
The total amount of federal funds obligated to date for scenic
enhancement in Minnesota pursuant to Title III is $1,204,047, of
which $1,042,866 is to be used for scenic easement acquisition and
the remainder for acquisition of highway rest areas. The total planned
program of scenic easement acquisition in Minnesota calls for acqui-
sition of easements covering approximately 8,872 acres and protect-
ing about 218 miles adjacent to the Interstate and trunk highway
2 Interview with J.E. Burton and personnel of the Michigan Department of State High-
ways, Sept. 19, 1967.
220 Letters from Leo A. Korth, Director of Right of Way Operations, Minnesota Depart-
ment of Highways, to the author, May 5 & Oct. 25, 1967.
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systems. At present, a total of six scenic easement parcels has been
purchased (two on the Interstate and four on the trunk highway
system). Offers to purchase have been made on 34 parcels (six on
the Interstate and 28 on the trunk highway system). One hundred
fifty-seven parcels are in the appraisal stage (71 on the Interstate
and 86 on the trunk highway system), and title information has been
ordered on 385 parcels (52 on the Interstate and 333 on the trunk
highway system).
Of the states where planning for scenic easement acquisition
is currently in progress, only Maryland and New York have really
had prior experience with highway scenic easements.
In Maryland,"7 scenic easements - under the name of "high-
way protective easement areas" -were acquired along the Baltimore-
Washington Parkway during the early stages of construction. It was
found, however, that the prohibition against billboards, auto junk-
yards, et cetera, was so restrictive that it was necessary to pay practi-
cally the full fee simple value of the land for the "highway protec-
tive easement area." Consequently, the scenic easement approach
was soon abandoned and the right-of-way was widened to include
the desired scenic areas 8.2 2 But in 1966 Maryland adopted new legis-
lation which is broad enough to permit the highway agency to
acquire scenic easements. The Maryland highway beautification
program is still in the planning stage, and it is not clear whether
or not the scenic easement device will be used to a substantial extent.
The chairman of the State Roads Commission has indicated the Com-
mission believes that, "with the exception of large areas such as wet-
lands and hill side or mountain areas, the cost of acquiring an ease-
ment will very nearly approach the cost of securing the land in fee
simple."22 His conclusion is that,
if the State, in acquiring easements, has to pay a price approximat-
ing that of its fee simple value, then the most reasonable approach
for the State to take is to acquire such land in fee simple, thus shed-
ding itself of the necessity for perpetual policing of land retained
in private ownership, the cost of which could well exceed the value
of the land secured. 280
In New York, 28' the State Thruway Authority originally sought
to protect its right-of-way through a combination of the police power
22 Letter from Jerome B. Wolff, Chairman of the Maryland Roads Commission and
Director of Highways, to the author, Nov. 13, 1967.
See Moser, Methods Used to Protect or Preserve and Acquire Rights of Way for
Future Use in Maryland, in HIGHWAY RESEARcH BOARD BULL. No. 77, at 52
(1953).
29 Letter, supra, note 227.
2o Id.
31 Letter from Saul J. Corwin, General Counsel, New York Department of Public
Works, to the author, May 22, 1967.
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and easements. Signs have been prohibited by the state's police power
up to a distance of 500 feet from the edge of the roadway. Beyond
this point the Thruway Authority purchased 1,000-foot easements in
scattered areas to prohibit billboards. These easements were acquired
at the same time as the rights-of-way.3 2 But extension of the scenic
(anti-billboard) easement approach to other state highways was
halted by the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Schul-
man v. People,2" 3 holding that the New York Department of Public
Works had no statutory authority to condemn negative easements
to prohibit billboards adjacent to state highways. Since the Depart-
ment construed the Schulman holding as precluding acquisition of
scenic (anti-billboard) easements "by grant or purchase" as well as
by condemnation, the net result was to halt acquisition of such ease-
ments entirely in 1961. However, in response to the Highway Beauti-
fication Act of 1965, the New York legislature in 1966 enacted a
statute234 authorizing the superintendent of public works "to acquire
property for the restoration, preservation and enhancement of natural
or scenic beauty of areas traversed by state highways." The term
"property" as used in the statute is defined very broadly and clearly
includes scenic easements. But the New York scenic easement pro-
gram appears still to be in the planning stage. Extensive studies have
been undertaken, and a total of $3,030,484 in federal funds was
obligated to New York for highway landscaping and scenic enhance-
ment as of June 30, 1966.285
In Montana,2 a6 the decision has been made to proceed along
quite different lines than in most other states. Because the highway
commission is uncertain about the restrictions that will be required
to maintain adequate control of scenic strips, a fee simple title in
such strips will be acquired initially, and the highway commission
will "live with them for a period of about two years."2 7 At the
end of that period the highway commission will attempt to resell
the scenic strips subject to whatever restrictions it then believes to
be necessary. The grantor will be permitted to use the land for agri-
cultural or grazing purposes for a nominal fee during the period of
fee simple ownership by the state, if he so desires, and he will have
232See W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS 14 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959).
10 N.Y.2d 249, 176 N.E.2d 817 (1961).
34 N.Y. H'WAY LAW § 21 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON 1967 HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION PROGRAM,
S. Doc. No. 6, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (Comm. Print 1967).
23- Letter from Robert E. Crampton, Chief Right of Way Agent, Montana Highway
Commission, to the author, Oct. 27, 1967. It should be noted that the Montana






the right to match the high bid when the land is resold unless he
voluntarily relinquishes this right in advance.288
In Oregon,2 39 although the highway commission acquired in
1946 an interest somewhat like a scenic easement2 40 for the purpose
of preserving a grove of myrtle trees along the Oregon Coast High-
way, it does not propose to use any federal funds received under
Title III of the Highway Beautification Act for acquisition of scenic
easements. This is because most scenic areas are located in forested
areas, and the highway commission would have to pay the value of
the standing timber whether it acquired a fee simple or only a scenic
easement. Moreover, the problems of managing the standing timber
under a scenic easement arrangement would be extremely difficult.
On the other hand, acquisition of scenic forest land in fee simple will
allow the highway commission to develop the land for public rec-
reational use.
The scenic easement deed forms developed for use in Iowa,
Michigan, and Minnesota resemble, in general, the forms used in
Wisconsin in the late 1950's and early 1960's.41 The land-use restric-
tions in the Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota deed forms are practi-
cally identical.24 2 The Iowa form contains a list of "permitted
238 The advantages of the purchase and resale technique are as follows:
(a) the appraisal problem will be minimized; (b) there is less likelihood of
disagreement as to value; (c) the chance for successful negotiation of a
purchase is increased by permitting the owner a low-cost use of the land
during the period of fee simple ownership by the state, with a probable
opportunity to repurchase a substantial interest in the land at a reasonable
price later on; (d) the danger of acquiring an inadequate property interest
at the outset is avoided; (e) the highway department will have adequate
time to determine what restrictions will be necessary for proper control of
each individual site; (f) a public resale of the "excess" property rights
should result in the lowest net cost of the scenic interest to be retained by
the state. The former owner will have the right to match the high bid in the
public sale unless he voluntarily relinquishes this right in advance.Id.
239 Letter from D.H. Moehring, Right of Way Engineer, Oregon State Highway Depart-
ment, to the author, Oct. 23, 1967.
240 For the text of the easement see Lindas, Western Experience with Scenic View and
Protection Easements, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH CIRCULAR No. 23, at 10 (Apr. 1966).
241 See text accompanying notes 160-73 supra.
242 In the Iowa form, e.g., the restrictions are as follows:
(1 ) No use or occupation other than the aforementioned uses shall be estab-
lished or maintained within the boundaries of this easement area. (2) No
dumps for the disposal of ashes, trash, rubbish, sawdust, garbage, offal or
any unsightly and offensive material shall exist. Storage of accumulated
junked automobiles, farm implements or parts thereof and other salvaged
material now existing shall be terminated upon the date of this instrument.
(3) No overhead pipes, conduits or wires for the purpose of transmitting
message, heat, light or power shall be erected. (4) No trees or shrubs shall
be planted, destroyed, cut or removed from this area except as are incidental
to a permitted occupation or use of the property or required for reasons of
sanitation or disease control, and except for selective cutting of timber or
other soil and game conservation practices as permitted in writing by the
grantee. (5) No rights are to be granted to the general public to enter upon
this area for any purpose.
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uses"24 like that in the early Wisconsin forms. The Minnesota form
expressly authorizes continuance of "the present use of the scenic
area, including any present use not herein specifically set forth, in a
manner not inconsistent with the above described terms and condi-
tions" (i.e., restrictions). The Michigan form does not expressly
authorize continuance of present uses, and provides that "no new or
additional structures shall be constructed upon the scenic area with-
out a written permit from the Michigan State Highway Commis-
sion." The Minnesota form contains a similar provision, requiring a
written permit to construct any new or additional structure "within
one hundred (100) feet of the trunk highway right of way as now
established." Although new utility lines are a "permitted use" in the
Iowa form, the Michigan and Iowa forms require a written permit
from the state highway agency before new utility lines can be in-
stalled within the scenic easement area.
The Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota easement forms all provide
that the general public shall have no right to enter upon the scenic
easement area for any purpose. All three also provide that the state
and its agents shall have the right to enter upon the scenic easement
area to inspect, to enforce the scenic restrictions, to remove from the
easement area any unauthorized advertising devices or other materi-
als, to cut and remove brush, undergrowth, dead or diseased trees,
and to perform selective tree cutting and trimming in the easement
area. The Iowa form also authorizes the state or its agents to revege-
tate the area with grass or trees for conservation purposes.
In Illinois, different forms of scenic easement deeds have been
prepared to deal with different situations, e.g., a "woodland scenic
easement," a "cropland scenic easement," and a "grazing land scenic
easement." The restrictions in all these Illinois forms are somewhat
more extensive than those in the Iowa, Michigan, and Minnesota
forms.
2 4 4
D (1) General crop or livestock farming, including construction, erection,
maintenance, and repair of buildings incidental to such use, also the estab-
lishment of recommended conservation practices. (2) Any other use specified
as existing upon or within the restricted area at the time of execution of
this contract may continue but shall not be expanded, nor shall any struc-
tures be erected or structural alterations be permitted within the boundaries
of this easement. (3) Underground telephone, telegraph, electric or pipe
lines for the purpose of transmitting any message, heat, light or power.
(4) Signs of not more than square feet in size may be erected, under
rules and regulations promulgated from time to time by the Iowa State
Highway Commission, to advertise the sale or rental of personal property
and real property and to advertise activities being conducted on the property
where the signs are located.
The Illinois restrictions are too extensive to set forth here. The "cropland scenic ease-




V. SOME CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS
A. "Public Purpose" and "Public Use" Requirements for Use of
Eminent Domain and Expenditure of Public Funds
Although Title III of the Highway Beautification Act 245 pro-
vides for allocation to each state of federal funds equivalent to 3 per-
cent of the funds apportioned to that state for federal-aid highways
for any fiscal year, to be "used for landscape and roadside develop-
ment within the highway right-of-way and for acquisition of interests
in and improvement of strips of land necessary for the restoration,
preservation, and enhancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such
highways,... without being matched by the State," many states pre-
sumably will want to supplement the federal funds available under
Title III with additional funds of their own. But expenditure of
state funds for other than a "public purpose" is generally prohibited
by the state constitutions.2 46 Hence it will be important in many
states to determine whether acquisition of scenic easements in con-
nection with the highway beautification program involves a public
purpose.
Moreover, although most scenic easements will undoubtedly be
acquired by negotiated purchase, ability of the state highway agency
to exercise the power of eminent domain will be absolutely neces-
sary to the success of any scenic easement acquisition program. With-
out that ability, it may prove impossible to persuade many landown-
ers to sell at a reasonable price, and in any case it will be impossible
to deal with the inevitable few hold-outs. But almost all state con-
stitutions allow the taking of private property by eminent domain
245 78 Stat. 1028, § 301(a), amending 23 U.S.C. § 319 (Supp. I, 1966).
246 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. IX, § 6; HAwAu CONST. art. VI, § 6; LA. CONST. art.
art. IV, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. X, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. Other state con-
stitutions prohibit either a grant of public money or a loan of the state's credit to
private individuals, associations, or corporations. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV, § 94;
ARiz. CONST. art. IX, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 31; COLO. CONST. art. XI, §§ 1
& 2; DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. IX, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. VII,
§ 8. See also NEv. CONST. art. 8, § 9; N.J. CoNsT. art. VIII, § III, para. 3. And a
great many of the state constitutions simply prohibit the giving or lending of the
state's credit to private individuals, associations, or corporations. See, e.g., ARK.
CONST. art. XVI, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 10; GA. CONST. art. VII, § III, para.
IV; IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 2; IOWA CONST. art. VII, § 1; Ky. CONST. § 177;
MD. CONST. art. III, § 34; MINN. CONST. art. IX, § 10; MIss. CONST. art. 14, § 258;
OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. X, § 15; PA. CONST. art. IX, § 6;
S.C. CONST. art. X, § 6; TENN. CONST. art II, § 31; TEx. CONST. art. III, § 50;
UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 31; VA. CONST. art. XIII, § 185; WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 5; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6; Wis. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
Provisions which merely prohibit the giving or lending of the state's credit to
private persons have generally been construed to prohibit expenditure of public
funds for any purpose which is not "public" in nature.
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only for "public use, ''247 and a statute authorizing the taking of pri-
vate property for other than "public use" will violate the fourteenth
amendment's prohibition against deprivation of property without due
process of law.248 Hence it becomes important to determine whether
the taking of a scenic easement by eminent domain is a taking for
public use as that term is judicially defined.
It should be clear, of course, that if the taking of a scenic ease-
ment by eminent domain meets the public use test, the expenditure
of public funds to pay the landowner for the easement acquired will
necessarily satisfy the "public purpose" test. On the other hand, a
determination that the taking serves a "public purpose" does not
self-evidently mean that the taking is for "public use." The major
difficulty in this regard arises from the fact that a scenic easement
is essentially a set of land-use restrictions imposed on private prop-
erty, and that the public does not acquire any affirmative "use"
privileges in the conventional sense.
For present purposes the two most important cases on the public
purpose and public use requirements are Berman v. Parker249 and
Kamrowski v. State.25° In the Berman case, the United States Supreme
Court sustained a congressional act authorizing urban redevelopment
in the District of Columbia against constitutional attack even though
the statute authorized the taking by eminent domain of private
property and the sale or lease thereof to other private persons for
private rather than public uses. The court explained its decision in the
following terms:
The power of Congress over the District of Columbia includes
all the legislative powers which a state may exercise over its affairs.
... We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known
as the police power. An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer
24 The Federal Constitution and all but three of the state constitutions contain provisions
which have been construed to protect the owner of private property from an exercise
of the power of eminent domain for purposes which do not involve a "public use."
Some state constitutions expressly forbid the taking of private property in invitum
for private uses. In a majority of states the negative implication of the conventional
condemnation clause - that private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out payment of just compensation -is used to protect a property owner from a
taking for private uses. Even in the three states which have no express constitutional
provision as to eminent domain, it has been held that other constitutional provisions
preclude the taking of private property for private use or without payment of just
compensation. Moreover, most state constitutions contain a clause prohibiting the
taking of property without due process of law, or some equivalent provision, and in
some instances the state courts have relied upon the state due process clause in hold-
ing a taking for private use unconstitutional, either because the eminent domain clause
had not then been adopted in the state in question or because the court was not satis-
fied with the implied prohibition contained in that clause.
For a more extended discussion, with citation of authorities, see 2 P. NICHOLS,
THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.1 (3d rev. ed. 1963).
4
8 Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry, 208 U.S. 598 (1908) ; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill 140,
40 Am. Dec. 274 (N.Y. 1843). For a discussion see 1 P. NICHOLS, supra note 247,
§ 4.7.
249 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
250 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
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limits is fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The
definition is essentially the product of legislative determinations
addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither abstractly
nor historically capable of complete definition. Subject to specific
constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public
interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the
public needs to be served by social legislation .... This principle
admits of no exception merely because the power of eminent domain
is involved. The role of the judiciary in determining whether that
power is being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow
one....
Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and
order - these are some of the more conspicuous examples of the
traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet
they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit
it ....
... The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive.
... The values it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic
as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to deter-
mine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.
In the present case, the Congress and its authorized agencies have
made determinations that take into account a wide variety of values.
It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District
of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as
well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands
in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right
to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the
power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end.
251
Although it is obvious that the Supreme Court in Berman used
the term "police power" in its broadest sense, as constituting the
totality of legislative power - including the power of eminent
domain - rather than simply the power to regulate, many state
courts have relied on the Berman dictum as to aesthetic values in
sustaining aesthetic zoning under the police power.25 2 Whether the
Berman case really supports "aesthetic regulation" or not, it seems
clear that the case does support both the use of public funds and the
use of eminent domain to acquire scenic easements, which are
designed to forward aesthetic values and to make the community
beautiful.
Although the Berman case did not - and could not - decide
that the fourteenth amendment permits the exercise of state eminent
domain powers for purposes which do not involve any "use by the
public" in the narrow sense, or primarily for aesthetic purposes, the
case did decide that the fifth amendment permits this when the
251 348 U.S. at 31-33.
252 See, e.g., State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 271-
72, 69 N.W.2d 217, 222 (1955).
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power of Congress is challenged.258 And it is improbable that the
Supreme Court will apply different standards in dealing with an
attack on state scenic easement enabling legislation based on the
fourteenth amendment. It thus seems clear that the Supreme Court
will sustain state scenic easement enabling legislation as against any
fourteenth amendment attack based on the arguments that land made
subject to scenic easement restrictions will not be available for use
by the public or that aesthetic purposes are not public purposes.
Moreover, the Berman opinion is likely to be viewed as a persuasive
precedent by state courts in dealing with attacks on scenic easement
enabling legislation grounded upon state constitutional provisions
as to public use and public purpose.
More significant even than Berman v. Parker, in all probability,
is the recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Kamrowski
v. State, specifically upholding the acquisition of scenic easements
under the power of eminent domain, as against the contention that
"public enjoyment of scenic beauty of certain land is not a public use
of such land." The Wisconsin court pointed out:
It is... clear that the legislature has determined that the protection
of scenic resources along highways is a public purpose, has set the
policy of acquiring scenic easements along particular routes, in
order to protect such resources, and has delegated to the state high-
way commission the function of deciding the exact terms of the ease-
ments to be acquired, and of exercising the power of eminent domain
to acquire them.
The concept of the scenic easement springs from the idea that
there is enjoyment and recreation for the travelling public in viewing
a relatively unspoiled natural landscape, and involves the judgment
that in preserving existing scenic beauty as inexpensively as pos-
sible a line can reasonably be drawn between existing, or agricul-
tural (and in these cases very limited residential) uses, and uses
which have not yet commenced but involve more jarring human
interference with a state of nature. We think both views can reason-
ably be held.
The learned trial judge succinctly answered plaintiffs' claim
that occupancy by the public is essential in order to have public use
by saying that in the instant case, "the 'occupancy' is visual." The
enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public which passes along the
highway seems to us to be a direct use by the public of the rights in
land which have been taken in the form of a scenic easement, and
not a mere incidental benefit from the owner's private use of the
land.
Whatever may be the law with respect to zoning restrictions
based upon aesthetic considerations, a stronger argument can be
made in support of the power to take property, in return for just
compensation, in order to fulfill aesthetic concepts, than for the
2"The Berman case clearly held that use by the public is not required, and the dictum
in favor of aesthetic purposes is an extremely strong one.
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imposition of police power restrictions for such purposes. More
importantly, however, we consider that the concept of preserving a
scenic corridor along a parkway, with its emphasis upon maintaining
a rural scene and preventing unsightly uses is sufficiently definite so
that the legislature may be said to have made a meaningful decision
in terms of public purpose, and to have fixed a standard which
sufficiently guides the commission in performing its task.
2 5 4
There are two possible lines of attack on the public use issue.
First, following the Wisconsin court in Kamrowski, the courts could
simply hold that the "enjoyment of the scenic beauty by the public
which passes along the highway" is "a direct use by the public of the
rights in land which have been taken in the form of a scenic ease-
ment." Second, the courts might rely on cases holding "public use"
to mean simply public purpose, public benefit, or public welfare. In
substance, the Supreme Court did this in Berman v. Parker. And even
before the recent spate of cases dealing with the public use issue in
the urban renewal context, many courts tended to accept the broad
view that public use means only "public advantage, benefit, or wel-
fare," rather than the narrow view that public use requires the
property taken by condemnation to be available for use by the pub-
lic.215 5 Indeed, one scholarly comment published in 1949 was entitled,
The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem.256 The commentator concluded his discussion of the public
use doctrine in the state courts as follows:
The expanding social philosophy of the present century has
brought in the state courts an almost complete abandonment of the"use by the public" test. Symptomatic are the housing and slum
clearance cases of the last decade. In 1937, Congress enacted a hous-
ing statute which granted federal subsidies to states which would
condemn slum areas and construct homes for the use of families
which could not otherwise afford them. Eminent domain was, of
course, necessary to execute this program. Since, however, the dwell-
ings for which the eminent domain power was to be employed were
for the use of only those individuals who would lease them, such
acquisitions could well have run afoul of the "use by the public"
test. But twenty-two state courts of last resort have endorsed the
takings as being constitutionally unobjectionable ....
Although the "use by the public" test continues to be raised
occasionally by counsel litigating state takings, its effect is virtually
nil. Emptied of its only tangible content, the doctrine of "public
use" itself loses all practical significance. True, even a broad con-
cept of "public use" implies a limitation, and many state courts still
accord vocal acknowledgment to the concept. But they invariably
24 31 Wis. 2d at 263-66, 142 N.W.2d at 796-97.
255 See 2 P. NICHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.2 [2] and cases cited therein. Under this view
of "public use" it has been held that the scope of eminent domain has been made as
broad as the powers under the police and tax provisions of the constitution. Id. That,
in substance, was the holding in Berman v. Parker. For a state urban renewal case
which relied on prior decisions adopting the "broad view" see Gohld Realty Co. v.
City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
25
6 58 YALE L.J. 599 (1949).
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find that the particular project under consideration is satisfactorily
public in nature.
25 7
Since 1949, many urban renewal cases have even more conclu-
sively established, in a majority of the states, that a public use suffi-
cient to justify the exercise of the eminent domain power can be
found whenever a substantial public purpose is involved in the gov-
ernmental action in question, viewed in its entirety.258
Six states259 avoided the "public use" issue by adopting consti-
tutional provisions specifically authorizing urban renewal programs
in which the resale of urban renewal land to private redevelopers is
a characteristic feature. In at least 28 states, 260 however, the courts,
without the aid of special constitutional provisions, have sustained
urban renewal statutes which authorize the use of eminent domain
to acquire land for urban renewal, and the resale of such land to
private agencies for redevelopment in accordance with a publicly
approved plan and subject to land-use restrictions designed to assure
continued compliance with that plan. The courts of these 28 states
have, in effect though not always in express terms, equated public
use with substantial public purpose.
Although most of the cases emphasize the public purpose and
public use (the terms are used interchangeably) involved in clear-
ance of slum and blighted areas, 6 ' some cases also recognize that
resale of urban renewal project land subject to restrictions which
limit its future use to publicly authorized purposes creates a kind of
continuing public use of the land.26 2 The parallel with a scenic ease-
ment program is clear, since the essence of a scenic easement is
restriction of the use of privately owned land to achieve a purpose
declared by the legislature to be a public purpose. Moreover, the
argument in support of scenic easements is enhanced since the resale
27 Id. at 607-08 (footnotes omitted).
258P. NICHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.51561 n.1 and 1967 supp., citing cases from
34 states upholding urban renewal enabling acts. For a similar list of 30 states,
with a useful classification of the cases, see Miller v. City of Tacoma, 61 Wash. 2d
374, 378 P.2d 464, 475-77 (1963) (appendix).
259 California, Georgia, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey, and New York. See Miller v.
City of Tacoma, supra note 258. The Georgia constitutional amendment was a
response to Housing Authority v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953),
holding the urban renewal program unconstitutional.
260 Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana,
Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Only South Carolina
is still clearly contra. See 2 P. NicHOLS, supra note 247, § 7.51561 n.1.
26 The opinion in Zurn v. City of Chicago, 389 111. 114, 128-29, 59 N.E.2d 18, 25
(1945) is typical. State court decisions on the constitutionality of urban renewal acts
authorizing the exercise of the eminent domain power have been significantly influ-
enced by the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Berman v. Parker, discussed
in text between notes 249 and 253 supra.
262 See, e.g., Gohld Realty Co. v. City of Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954).
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to private users feature of urban renewal programs is completely
absent from the proposed scenic easement program.
Assuming that acquisition of scenic easements can be deemed
for a public use if it is for a public purpose, the next question is
whether a public purpose can be found where, admittedly, aesthetic
considerations form the principal basis for scenic easement acqui-
sition.
In the writer's opinion, there can be little doubt that in all, or
almost all states, if judicial determination is sought, acquisition of
scenic easements in connection with the highway beautification pro-
gram will be held to constitute a "public purpose."
In the first place, the adoption of Title III of the Highway
Beautification Act26 clearly expresses the judgment of the Congress
that expenditure of federal funds for acquisition of scenic easements
involves expenditure for a public purpose, and the action of some 38
state legislatures in adopting enabling legislation for acquisition of
scenic easements clearly expresses a similar judgment by these state
legislatures. As William H. Whyte has pointed out,264 something
serves a public purpose if the public thinks so, and this, in practice,
means what the legislative body thinks the public wants and what it
designates as a public purpose. Although courts do not always agree
with the legislative determination, they tend to accept it if other
constitutional requirements are met.2 5 This is graphically illustrated
by the decisions in Berman v. Parker26" and Kamrowski v. State,267
which were previously discussed. Kamrowski, of course, is directly
in point and holds that promotion of aesthetic values through acqui-
sition of scenic easements satisfies the public purpose requirement.
In the second place, the increasing judicial acceptance of aes-
thetic considerations - at least in combination with other factors -
as a proper basis for regulation of land use under the police power
23 78 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 319 (Supp. I, 1966).
24 W. WHYTE, supra note 232, at 16.
265 As Netherton and Markham have pointed out.
Within the memory of many of us the scope of "public purpose" has
increased beyond all expectation. Legislative trends in this respect have
broadened to include many areas, and where the authority has been ques-
tioned, the courts have by and large upheld the constitutionality of the tak-
ings authorized by the legislatures.
R. NETHERTON & M. MARKHAM, ROADSIDE DEVELOPMENT AND BEAUTIFICATION:
LEGAL AUTHORITY AND METHODS, PART I, 20 (Highway Research Board, 1965).
For further discussion of the changing concept of public purpose with respect
to transportation, see R. NETHERTON, CONTROL OF HIGHWAY ACCESS 210-12 (1963).
266 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
218 31 Wis. 2d 256, 142 N.W.2d 793 (1966).
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indicates the likelihood of general judicial acceptance of the preserva-
tion of scenic beauty as a public purpose.
There has been a truly prodigious amount of discussion as to
whether aesthetics is a proper goal of police power regulation.
26 8
The original strict doctrine that property rights cannot be regulated
for aesthetic purposes soon ran strongly against the felt necessities
of the times, and the strict doctrine gave way to the rule that aesthetic
considerations may be taken into account in drafting police power
regulations, so long as other, non-aesthetic considerations also pro-
vide some support for the regulations involved. As Norman Wil-
liams, Jr., has pointed out,
260
Once this door was open, all sorts of things went right through;
elaborate legal fiction began to luxuriate, as courts attempted to
uphold regulations which are really aesthetic. The classic example
is of course the argument in favor of regulating billboards, because
after all they might blow over and hit somebody, or because immoral
and terrible things might go on behind them. [Citing Thomas Cusack
Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); St. Louis Gunning Advertis-
ing Co. v. St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911), appealdis-
missed 231 U.S. 761 (1913) .... I
In more recent case law, a strong trend is apparent towards
increasing recognition of the aesthetic factor.
270
The formula that aesthetic considerations may be recognized as
a basis for police power restrictions on land use, so long as other
factors are also present, is still repeated in many judicial opinions,
but a number of recent cases have given direct recognition to the
268 See, e.g., Agnor, Beauty Begins a Comeback: Aesthetic Considerations in Zoning,
11 J. PUB. L. 260 (1962); Anderson, Regulation of Land Use for Aesthetic Pur-
poses: An Appraisal of People v. Stover, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 33 (1963); Anderson,
Architectural Controls, 12 SYRACUsE L. REV. 26 (1960) ; Dukeminier, Zoning for
Aesthetic Objectives: A Reappraisal, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 218 (1955);
Rodda, Accomplishment of Aesthetic Purposes Under the Police Power, 27 S. CAL.
L. REV. 149 (1954) ; Sayre, Aesthetics and Property Values: Does Zoning Promote
the Public Welfare?, 35 A.B.A.J. 471 (1949). Examples of student writing on
aesthetics include the following Comments: 64 COLUM. L. REV. 81 (1964) ; 14 DE-
PAUL L. REV. 104 (1964); 29 FORDHAM L. REV. 729 (1961); 32 U. QN. L. REV.
367 (1963) ; 2 WILLAMETTE L.J. 420 (1963).
269 Williams, Legal Techniques to Protect and to Promote Aesthetics Along Transporia-
tion Corridors, in HIGHWAY RESEARCH REcoRD No. 182, HIGHWAYS AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL QUALITY (Highway Research Board, 1967). The text discussion of police




0 Id. at 28-29. See, e.g., Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481, 202 A.2d 232 (1964);
People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.2d 462, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, 191 N.E.2d 272 (1963);
Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, 122 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 1960) ; Opinion of the Justices,
333 Mass. 773, 128 N.E.2d 557 (1955); Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point
Pleasant Pavilion, Inc., 3 N.J. Super. 222, 66 A.2d 40 (App. Div. 1949) ; Murphy
v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944) ; City of Miami Beach
v. Ocean & Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941) ; General Outdoor Adver-
tising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149, 193 N.E. 799 (1935). See also
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964);
Town of Lexington v. Govenar, 295 Mass. 31, 3 N.E.2d 19 (1936).
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aesthetic factor alone as a valid basis for police power regulations. 271
Of course, the case for aesthetic regulations is much stronger in situa-
tions where preservation of beauty plays a substantial part in the
local economy, e.g., by promoting tourism .
72
The aesthetic regulations restricting land use sustained by the
courts have generally involved signs and architectural controls. The
exclusion of advertising signs from commercial as well as residential
districts has been widely upheld,273 as have restrictions on signs along
both our older highways274 and our new interstate highways, 27 5 and
retroactive provisions requiring removal of signs after a fairly short
period of amortization. 76 Moreover, the protection of historic areas
by police power regulations establishing architectural controls over
changes in the exterior appearance of buildings is now well estab-
lished.2 77 Indeed, courts have even sustained some rather dubious
ordinances imposing architectural controls on new houses in areas
with no historic character whatever.278
All the cases supporting aesthetic zoning are based upon judicial
recognition of the fact that preservation or enhancement of aesthetic
271 See State ex. rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 841 (1955); People v. Stover, Sunad, Inc. v. City
of Sarasota, Borough of Point Pleasant Beach v. Point Pleasant Pavilion, Inc., City of
Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Dep't of
Public Works, cited note 270 supra. See also the dissenting opinion of Hall, J., in
United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 198 A.2d at 450. In many of
these cases, of course, the courts found other factors which justified the imposition of
aesthetic zoning - usually economic factors, e.g., State ex rel. Civello v. City of
New Orleans, 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440, 33 A.L.R. 260 (1923).
272 See, e.g., Sunad, Inc. v. City of Sarasota, Opinion of the Justices, Murphy v. Town
of Westport, City of Miami Beach v. Ocean & Inland Co., cited note 270 supra.
2
73 See, e.g., United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, Murphy v. Town of
Westport, cited note 270 supra.
274 E.g., Kelbro, Inc. v. Myrick, 113 Vt. 64, 30 A.2d 527 (1943); General Outdoor
Advertising Co. v. Dep't of Public Works, supra note 270.
275 E.g., Ghaster Properties, Inc. v. Preston, 176 Ohio St. 425, 200 N.E.2d 328 (1964);
Moore v. Ward, 377 S.W.2d 881 (Ky. 1964); New York State Thruway Authority
v. Ashley Motor Court, 10 N.Y.2d 151, 176 N.E.2d 566 (1961); Opinion of the
Justices, 103 N.H. 268, 169 A.2d 762 (1962).
276 See, e.g., Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363
(1957). But see Stoner McCray System v. Des Moines, 247 Iowa 1313, 78 N.W.2d
843, 58 A.L.R.2d 1304 (1956). Compare City of Santa Barbara v. Modern Neon Sign
Co., 189 Cal. App. 2d 188, 11 Cal. Rptr. 57 (1961) with National Advertising Co.
v. Monterey County, 211 Cal. App. 2d 375, 27 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1962).
277 See, e.g., Vieux Carre Property Owners & Associates, Inc. v. City of New Orleans,
246 La. 788, 167 So. 2d 367 (1964) (Vieux Carre) ; City of New Orleans v. Levy,
223 La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1953) (same) ; City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198
La. 852, 5 So.2d 129 (1941) (same) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass. 773, 128
N.E.2d 557 (1955) (Nantucket and Siasconset) ; Opinion of the Justices, 333 Mass.
783, 128 N.E.2d 563 (1955) (Beacon Hill) ; Bittenbender v. Tibbetts, 105 N.H. 481,
202 A.2d 232 (1964); City of Santa Fe v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 73 N.M. 410, 389
P.2d 13 (1964) (Old Santa Fe) ; Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Com-
mission, 51 Misc. 2d 556, 273 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (Jerome House). Cf.
Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (1959) ; Hayes
v. Smith, 92 R.I. 173, 167 A.2d 546 (1961).
278 See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 69 N.W.2d
217 (1955); Reid v. Architectural Bd. of Review, 119 Ohio App. 67, 192 N.E.2d
74 (1963). Compare City of West Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863,
30 So. 2d 491 (1947).
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values is an appropriate goal of governmental action and that the
use of the police power is an appropriate means for achieving the
goal. Thus it seems clear that preservation or enhancement of scenic
beauty through acquisition of scenic easements will be held to be a
public purpose in any state where the courts have accepted aesthetic
zoning as a valid exercise of the police power. And if police power
regulation is an appropriate means for achieving the governmental
objective, then a fortiori the expenditure of public funds to acquire
scenic easements is an appropriate method in cases where compensa-
tion must, or should, be paid to the landowners whose property is
subjected to scenic restrictions.
Moreover, it is likely that acquisition of scenic easements will
be held to involve a public purpose in many states where aesthetic
zoning has not yet been tested or upheld. The real problem with
aesthetic zoning is not whether aesthetic values should be recognized
as a basis for land-use regulation, but rather, how to define standards
for aesthetic regulation so as to avoid giving too much discretion to
an administrative agency.
279
Everyone will admit that there are real difficulties in defining
objectively what is beautiful. Indeed, the New Jersey court recently
gave up the attempt and adopted a lowest common denominator
approach-i.e., whatever the difficulty in defining "beauty," the
police power may be used to exclude those land uses which by univer-
sal consensus are recognized as "ugly. ' 280 But when we shift from un-
compensated regulation of land use under the police power to
expenditure of public funds for acquisition of scenic easements, the
problem of defining beauty becomes much less important; or, more
accurately, it becomes much less important for the courts to oversee
the legislative or administrative definition of "beauty" because the
landowner will receive either satisfactory compensation through a
negotiated purchase or just compensation in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. Hence the courts are more likely to sustain a scenic ease-
ment acquisition program than a scenic zoning program.
28
1
The cases directly upholding control of advertising along our
highways282 appear to provide strong support for the proposition
that acquisition of scenic easements adjacent to highways is for a
public purpose and designed to produce a public benefit. In some
of the billboard cases aesthetic considerations are expressly recog-
nized as a sufficient basis for regulation of billboards under the
2 See Williams, supra note 269, at 28.
280 United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Metuchen, 42 N.J. 1, 198 A.2d 447 (1964).
281 See the last paragraph of the quote from Kamrowski in the text at note 254, supra.
282 Cases cited notes 274-75 supra.
VOL. 45
SCENIC EASEMENTS
police power. In General Outdoor Advertising Co v. Department of
Public Works, for example, the Massachusetts court said:
In so far as the granting or denial of permits for the location of bill-
boards in the cases at bar has been governed by considerations of
taste and fitness, the purpose has been to preserve places of natural
scenic beauty and historical interest from incongruous intrusion. It
is in substance exclusion of billboards and advertising devices by
zoning. It is an attempt to segregate them to a certain extent in places
where from the scenic or historical point of view the dominant use
of land is indifferent or is the transaction of business, and to shut
them out from regions where nature has afforded landscape of
unusual attractiveness and where historic and other factors have
created patriotic places hallowed by literary and humanitarian asso-
ciations.... [W]e think an administration of the rules and regula-
tions to the end that the scenic beauty of the commonwealth may be
protected and preserved violates no constitutional right of the plain-
tiffs. It is, in our opinion, within the reasonable scope of the police
power to preserve from destruction the scenic beauties bestowed on
the commonwealth by nature in conjunction with the promotion of
safety of travel on the public ways and the protection of travellers
from the intrusion of unwelcome advertising....
Even if the rules and regulations of billboards and other adver-
tising devices did not rest upon the safety of public travel and the
promotion of the comfort of travellers by exclusion of undesired
intrusion, we think that the preservation of scenic beauty and places
of historical interest would be a sufficient support for them.
2 8 8
More broadly, scenic easement acquisition can be viewed as ful-
filling important public purposes with respect to safety, recreation,
conservation, and the promotion of tourism.
Prohibition of billboards by means of the police power has
sometimes been upheld, at least in part, on the theory that it protects
the safety of the traveling public on the highways. 2 4 Where this
theory is accepted, it is clear that acquisition of scenic easements
which include a prohibition of billboards on the land adjacent to the
highway can be viewed, in part, as a public safety measure.
Scenic easement acquisition can also be viewed as a significant
means of providing for public recreation, a public purpose recog-
nized by the courts in many cases upholding land acquisition for
public parks.2 85 Driving for pleasure is America's most important
outdoor recreational activity. 286 More Americans engage in it more
283 193 N.E. at 816.
28 See the discussion id. at 813-14.
285E.g., Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700, 707-08 (1923) ; Attorney
General v. Williams, 174 Mass. 476, 479, 55 N.E. 77, 78 (1899), aff'd sub nom.
Williams v. Parker, 188 U.S. 491 (1903); Higginson v. Slattery, 212 Mass. 583,
590, 99 N.E. 523, 527 (1912); Brunn v. Kansas City, 216 Mo. 108, 116, 115 S.W.
446, 449 (1908) ; City of Lexington v. Kentucky Chautauqua Assembly, 114 Ky. 781,
785, 71 S.W. 943, 944 (1903) ; In re Mayor of New York, 99 N.Y. 570, 585, 2 N.E.
642, 648-49 (1885) ; In re Commissioners of Central Park, 63 Barb. 282 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1872).




often than in swimming, boating, hunting, fishing, or any of the
other sports, and it accounts for 42 percent of all outdoor recrea-
tion.28 ' Moreover, about one-third of all highway travel in the United
States is for recreational, vacation, and social purposes.288
Public Health Service scientists who have studied the relation-
ship between recreational travel and mental health believe that such
travel contributes to mental health in at least two significant ways:
(a) it brings release from tensions generated by job pressures and
general urban living stresses; and (b) it confers positive benefits
through enjoyment of the natural beauty of streams, lakes, forests,
mountains, and other scenic resources.2 " Hence it seems clear that
enhancement of the recreational benefits of highway travel through
a program of scenic easement acquisition constitutes a public purpose.
The cases upholding land acquisition for public park purposes
often emphasize the public health benefits arising from the creation
of parks,29 ° but in many of these cases the courts have also explicitly
recognized the public benefits flowing from aesthetic considerations.
For example, in Attorney General v. Williams, the Massachusetts
court said:
The grounds on which public parks are desired are various. They are
to be enjoyed by the people who use them. They are expected to
minister, not only to the grosser senses, but also to the love of the
beautiful in nature, in the varied forms which the change of seasons
brings. Their value is enhanced by such touches of art as help to
produce pleasing and satisfactory effects on the emotional and spir-
itual side of our nature. Their influence should be uplifting, and,
in the highest sense, educational. If wisely planned and properly
cared for, they promote the mental as well as the physical health of
the people. For this reason it has always been deemed proper to
expend money in the care and adornment of them, to make them
beautiful and enjoyable. Their aesthetic effect never has been
thought unworthy of careful consideration by those best qualified to
appreciate it. It hardly would be contended that the same reasons
which justify the taking of land for a public park do not always
justify the expenditure of money to make the park attractive and
educational to those whose tastes are being formed, and whose love
of beauty is being cultivated. 291
And in Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles, the United States Supreme
Court sustained a taking for highway purposes with the following
significant statement:
[T]hese roads, especially the main road, through its connection with




289 Id. at 37.
2 See, e.g., Owensboro v. Commonwealth ex. rel. Stone, 105 Ky. 344, 348-49, 49 S.W.
320, 321 (1899); Kansas City v. Ward, 134 Mo. 172, 177, 35 S.W. 600, 601
(1896) ; Village of Lloyd Harbor v. Huntingdon, 4 N.Y.2d 182, 190-91, 149 N.E.2d
851, 854 (1958) (holding that a village could not exclude a town beach by zoning).
29 55 N.E. at 78.
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afford a highway for persons desiring to travel along the shore to
the county line, with a view of the ocean on the one side, and of
the mountain range on the other, constituting, as stated by the trial
judge, a scenic highway of great beauty. Public uses are not limited,
in the modem view, to matters of mere business necessity and ordi-
nary convenience, but may extend to matters of public health, rec-
reation and enjoyment. Thus, the condemnation of lands for public
parks is now universally recognized as a taking for public use.... A
road need not be for a purpose of business to create a public exig-
ency; air, exercise and recreation are important to the general health
and welfare; pleasure travel may be accommodated as well as busi-
ness travel; and highways may be condemned to places of pleasing
natural scenery.... And manifestly, in these days of general public
travel in motor cars for health and recreation, such a highway as this,
extending for more than twenty miles along the shores of the Pacific
at the base of a range of mountains, must be regarded as a public
use.
2 9 2
Conservation, as an objective of the scenic easement program,
obviously overlaps recreational and aesthetic objectives. Yet it can
be viewed, to some extent at least, as a separate though related objec-
tive. As the recent report by the U.S. Department of Commerce to the
President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty points out,
Each scenic corridor could become a model of resource con-
servation. Appropriate exhibits, signs, and other informational de-
vices can advance conservation education and arouse deeper public
awareness of natural and aesthetic values. Highway builders and con-
servationists have a common ground .... 293
Although this was said in connection with a proposal for a
national system of "scenic roads and parkways," it is almost equally
applicable to the existing program of scenic enhancement of federal-
aid highways under the Highway Beautification Act, especially where
the federal-aid system includes primary and secondary roads which
can be converted into "scenic roads" of the type envisioned in the
proposal of the President's Council. There is, of course, no doubt
that conservation serves a significant public purpose.294
292 262 U.S. at 707-08.
293 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 39.
2" Whyte discusses the public purposes involved in a program of conservation easement
acquisition in the following terms:
In practice, a great proportion of the key areas that most people would agree
should be conserved are likely to be stream valleys. Many people would not
be thinking of the drainage and flood control aspect-but of the fishing
and the swimming in the streams, or the beauty of the meadows, or the
excellence of the farming, the contoured slopes that seem to go so well with
the stream valleys.
Yet for the reasons these valleys are beautiful, they are tremendously
useful. Like a great sponge, their flood plains temper the flow of the water
downstream; the good soil practices of the farmers help keep down the silt
that can be such a problem for communities and industries further down-
stream; because they have not been covered with asphalt, their runoff is
much less; and when there is a heavy rainfall, the streams and the creeks
that flow into a natural storm sewer system are far better than anything
constructed by man.
W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EAsE-
MENTS 16-17 (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959).
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Finally, it should be recognized that tourism is big business in
the United States today, and that promotion of tourism through
scenic enhancement of federal-aid highways will produce tangible
economic benefits for the public at large. As the just-mentioned
report to the President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty
indicates,
Florida, Nevada, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia rate
tourism as their most important industry. More than half of the
States consider it one of their three major sources of revenue. The
magnitude of the recreation travel business is indicated by the fact
that the combined annual payrolls of 12 of the Nation's largest
companies are equal to only one-half of annual tourist expenditures.
Travelers and tourists in the United States spend about $30
billion yearly. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce estimates that cash
returns from 24 tourists per day benefit a community as much as a
factory with an annual payroll of $100,000.
Tourism forecasts indicate even greater economic stimulus from
a national program of scenic roads and parkways. Studies by the
Federal Government, States, universities, and others indicate that
improved highways, and especially scenic roads and parkways, can
benefit the development of many more existing and potential resort
and recreational areas.2 95
Again, it should be noted, what was said with respect to the
proposed national system of scenic roads and parkways is almost
equally applicable to the existing program of scenic enhancement of
federal-aid highways under the Highway Beautification Act. Many
of the primary and secondary roads in the present federal-aid system
would qualify for the proposed national system of scenic roads and
parkways since about 41 percent of the proposed system is already
part of the primary system and about 37 percent is already part of
the secondary system.2"6 Even though highways in the interstate
system would not become part of the proposed system of scenic roads
and parkways, scenic enhancement along the interstate system will
nevertheless add appreciably to their recreational value, and thus
contribute to the increase in tourism forecast by the President's
Council. Scenic easements, it is clear, can contribute very significantly
to the scenic enhancement of the interstate system, as well as the
primary, secondary and other roads that would make up the pro-
posed national system of scenic roads and parkways.
2U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 34-35.
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supra note 286, at 8. This assumes the recommended
minimum scenic roads program of 54,411 miles. Of this mileage, about 79% or
42,876 miles would be on existing roads to be improved, and the remaining 21% or
11,535 miles would be built on new locations. Most of the routes (about 95%) in
the recommended program are in rural areas, but all would be within reasonable
driving time of the population centers of the nation. Id. at 141.
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B. State Constitutional "Anti-Diversion" Provisions297
Assuming that acquisition of scenic easements outside the right-
of-way is considered a taking of property for a public use under
eminent domain and that expenditure of public funds is justified
by the public purpose involved, there remains a question in many
states as to whether it is lawful for the state to pay for the acquisition
of scenic easements with "dedicated highway funds."
Some 28 states have constitutional provisions which earmark
certain state revenues - typically the motor fuel excise taxes and the
vehicle registration fees - for specified highway purposes.298 These
provisions are generally known as the "anti-diversion amendments"
and have served the purpose of preventing the highway user taxes
from flowing into the states' general funds and later being appro-
priated by the legislatures for the support of governmental functions
and programs which have nothing to do with highways and confer
no benefit on the people who pay these taxes qua highway users.
In states like California, Colorado, Missouri, and South Dakota,
where the scenic easement enabling legislation precludes the use of
any state funds at all for acquisition of scenic easements, 299 or per-
mits use of state funds for this purpose only where the state will be
fully reimbursed by the federal government under the Highway
Beautification Act ° ° the effect of an anti-diversion provision in the
state constitution may not be very important.301 In states where the
scenic easement enabling legislation does not expressly preclude or
limit the use of state funds for scenic easement acquisition, however,
the proper interpretation of an anti-diversion provision will often be
of crucial importance if the state wishes to spend state funds on the
scenic easement program in addition to the federal funds available
under the Highway Beautification Act.
Although the forces that were originally mobilized in the 1920's
to promote the state anti-diversion amendments were, and still are,
9' The material dealing with this topic is based on HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD SPECIAL
REPORT No. 91, RELOCATION OF PUBLIC UTILTES 1959-1966: AN ANALYSIS OF
LEGAL ASPECTS (1966), and an unpublished speech by Ross D. Netherton at a
seminar held by the Nevada Department of Highways in the fall of 1966. Mr. Nether-
ton is Counsel for Legal Research, Highway Research Board, National Academy of
Sciences - National Research Council.
See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. X, § 18; MASS. CONST. art. 78. The others are Alabama,
Arizona, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, West Virginia,
and Wyoming.
29 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.780 (Supp. 1966).
300 See, e.g., CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 895 (West Supp. 1966) ; COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 120-3-10 (1963), as amended, Ch. 38, [19661 Colo. Laws 178.
301 Where the statute permits use of state funds only to the extent they are reimbursable
by the federal government, an "anti-diversion" provision in the state constitution may
still create difficulties if the state's general funds are insufficient to cover the initial
costs of scenic easement acquisition.
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
energetic in their efforts, they were not able to secure uniformity of
language in the amendments that were adopted. As a result, each
state legislature which faces the problem of squaring its scenic ease-
ment program with its state constitution must look carefully to the
wording of the anti-diversion amendment in its own constitution.
All the amendments, naturally, are chiefly concerned with
directing highway user funds into road construction and mainte-
nance. The most liberal amendments simply specify "highway pur-
poses'' "0 2 or "highway purposes as defined by law" 803 or the creation
of a special highway fund,80 4 or add "other statutory purposes" to
the list. 05 In all these states, it seems clear that the legislature, by
designating the acquisition of scenic easements as a highway purpose,
can make available dedicated highway funds for acquisition of scenic
easements if it wishes. Minnesota, for example, has already taken
this step by including in its scenic easement enabling legislation a
provision that "all costs of acquisition of such rights" shall be
deemed "necessary for a highway purpose."' 06 New Mexico has a
similar provision in its scenic easement enabling legislation.
07
In many states, 08 the anti-diversion amendments prescribe in
substance that "construction, reconstruction, maintenance, and repair"
are the only permissible uses of highway user funds. Even under
such amendments, however, it would seem that highway user funds
could be properly expended for acquisition of scenic easements if
the scenic easement enabling legislation expressly states that such
acquisition may be deemed to constitute "a part of the establishment,
construction, or reconstruction of state highways on the federal-aid
highway system 309 or that "[l]and, or any interest therein, acquired
under... this act is hereby declared to be part of the adjacent or
nearest highway.''310
A few states have other general language in their anti-diversion
amendments which offers a possible interpretation permitting use
of highway user funds for scenic easement acquisition. For example,
the California and Utah provisions speak of "construction, improve-
302 E.g., KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 10.
303 E.g., MIcH. CONST. art. 9, § 9.
304 E.g., LA. CONST. art. 6, § 23.
305 E.g., ORE. CONST. art. 9, § 3.
306 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 173.05 (Supp. 1966).
307 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-11-14(c) (Supp. 1967), which says, "Acquisition of any
land under this section is for highway purpose."
308 Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, West
Virginia, and Wyoming.
309 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36 § 670-413.1 (Supp. 1966).
310 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 27-12-109.1, -.3 '(Supp. 1967).
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ment, repair and maintenance of highways.""' And Washington's
provision speaks of "construction, reconstruction, repair and better-
ment of public highways." 1 ' Of all the amendments, however, only
that of Oregon specifically authorizes expenditure of highway user
funds for "acquisition, development, maintenance, care and use of
parks, recreational, scenic or other historic places." 313
Where the anti-diversion amendments expressly limit expendi-
ture to "construction, reconstruction, maintenance and repair," high-
way agency lawyers and right-of-way agents going out to acquire
scenic easements may well feel that in view of the restrictive lan-
guage of these amendments they are buying a lawsuit at every step
of the way. This is especially true if the scenic easement statute does
not expressly make scenic easement acquisition a part of highway
"construction or reconstruction."
Up until the late 1950's there was practically no case law inter-
preting the anti-diversion amendments. In recent years, however, as
a result of the enactment by Congress in 1956 of legislation 314
authorizing the use of federal-aid highway funds to reimburse states
for 90 percent of the cost of relocating utility fixtures from the high-
way right-of-way, a series of cases has dealt with the anti-diversion
principle. Following the authorization by Congress to use federal-aid
funds to reimburse for utility relocation costs, there was a rash of
state legislation designed to liberalize existing state limitations on
payments of this type, 15 and a number of suits were brought to test
its constitutionality. Decisions on the constitutional issue have been
rendered in the highest courts of Delaware, Idaho, Iowa, Maine,
Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
In three of the states just mentioned 1 ' the constitution con-
tains no anti-diversion provision, and the constitutional issue with
regard to relocation payments was necessarily decided without refer-
ence thereto. In those states with a constitutional anti-diversion pro-
311 Likewise, the Missouri provision authorizes use of dedicated highway funds to com-
plete, widen, or improve the state highway system, and also for "such other purposes
and contingencies relating . . . to the construction and maintenance of such highways
as the commission may deem necessary and proper." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 226.780
(Supp. 1966) (emphasis added). But, as indicated in the text at note 299 supra, the
Missouri scenic easement legislation precludes the use of any state funds at all for
acquisition of scenic easements.
312 WASH. CONSr. art. 2, § 40b, amendment 18 (emphasis added).
313 ORE. CONST. art. 9, § 3 (emphasis added).
314 Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 § 111, 23 U.S.C. § 123 (1964).
315 A majority of the states with statutory provisions for reimbursement of utility reloca-
tion costs have included statements therein that such costs are to be considered a part
of the cost of the highway improvement itself. Of the 21 states with such statutory
declarations, 13 have "anti-diversion" provisions in their constitutions: Alabama,
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Texas,
Utah, Washington, and West Virginia.
316 Delaware, New Mexico, and Tennessee.
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vision where the constitutionality of utility relocation payments has
been litigated, the decisions are divided, but a majority of the deci-
sions has sustained the legislation authorizing relocation payments
and has expressly held that such payments do not violate the consti-
tutional anti-diversion provisions. There are decisions to this effect
in Iowa, 17 Minnesota,"*8 Montana,31 New Hampshire,32 North
Dakota 2 Texas S2 2 and West Virginia.
8
3
In New Hampshire, the proposed statute authorizing reimburse-
ment of utility costs was ultimately not passed, but the New Hamp-
shire court, when requested to advise on the constitutionality of the
proposed statute, held that such reimbursement would not constitute
a violation of the anti-diversion amendment to the state constitution.
The court took a broad view of the term "highway purpose," declar-
ing that although relocation of utilities was subordinate to the pri-
mary use of highways, it was "an integral part of highway improve-
ments."
3 2 4
The Minnesota court said that the state was already committed
to the view that "the use of rights-of-way by utilities for locating
their facilities is one of the primary purposes for which highways
are designed, even though their principal use is for public travel
and transportation of persons and property. '3 2  It would be unrea-
sonable, the court held, to decide that dedicated highway funds
could not be used for anything reasonably necessary to the accom-
plishment of all the basic purposes for which a highway exists.
The North Dakota court held that the word "construction"
embraces " 'everything appropriately connected with, and necessarily
incidental to, complete accomplishment of the general purpose for
which the [highway] fund exists.' 326
The Iowa court noted that "It~he Congress and the legislatures
of many states . . . have determined the cost of relocating public
utility facilities is a proper part of the cost of construction of a high-
way."27 Although the General Assembly could not by subsequent
legislation define the scope of a constitutional provision, the deter-
mination of the Congress and the various legislatures, said the Iowa
court, was entitled to weight in consideration of the scope of the
317 Edge v. Brice, 253 Iowa 710, 113 N.W.2d 755 (1962).
318 Minneapolis Gas Co. v. Zimmerman, 253 Minn. 164, 91 N.W.2d 642 (1958).
319 Jones v. Burns, 138 Mont. 268, 357 P.2d 22 (1960).
320 Opinion of the Justices, 101 N.H. 527, 132 A.2d 613 (1957).
321 Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Wentz, 103 N.W.2d 245 (N.D. 1960).
322 Texas v. Austin, 160 Tex. 348, 331 S.W.2d 737 (1960).
323 State v. Gainer, 149 W. Va. 740, 143 S.E.2d 351 (1965).
324 132 A.2d at 615.
325 91 N.W.2d at 651.
326 103 N.W.2d at 256.
32 113 N.W.2d at 759.
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constitutional anti-diversion provision. The court concluded, "It is
fair to say the intent of the term 'construction' as used in the (Iowa
anti-diversion] amendment includes all things necessary to the com-
pleted accomplishment of a highway for all uses properly a part
thereof."'
In Utah, the court sustained the statute authorizing utility
relocation payments without discussion of the anti-diversion issue,329
since the anti-diversion amendment was not passed until after the
decision was handed down. In Maine, Idaho, and Washington, how-
ever, it has been held that utility relocation does not constitute a
highway purpose and that use of dedicated highway funds to reim-
burse utility companies for the cost of relocation would violate the
anti-diversion amendments to the constitutions of these states.3 3 1 In
the Washington case, the court noted that such reimbursement could
result in substantially decreasing funds reserved for "safety, admin-
istration and operation of the highway system," and concluded that
expenditures for relocation of utilities could not be viewed as "exclu-
sively for highway purposes" as required by the anti-diversion
amendment.3 '
An issue more directly parallel to the question whether dedi-
cated highway funds can be used for scenic easement acquisition in
states with constitutional anti-diversion provisions was recently raised
in North and South Dakota. In 1963 the attorneys general of these
states were asked to render opinions on the constitutionality of legis-
lative bills then pending which would have authorized the state high-
way departments to enter into agreements with the Secretary of
Commerce under the 1958 federal-aid legislation providing for bill-
board control along the Interstate System.
South Dakota's Attorney General was of the opinion332 that use
of dedicated highway funds to purchase outdoor advertising rights
would violate the state constitutional provision which requires that
328 Id.
3 29 State Road Comm'n v. Utah Power & Light Co., 10 Utah 2d 333, 353 P.2d 171
(1960).
330Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 449, 132 A.2d 440 (1957); State v. Idaho Power
Co., 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 596 (1959); Washington State Highway Comm'n v.
Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 216, 367 P.2d 605 (1961).
The Maine court, however, declared that reimbursement of relocation costs would
further a public purpose and that there would be no constitutional objection to such
reimbursement out of the state's general fund. The Maine legislature subsequently
passed the utility relocation bill, amended to provide for use of general funds. The
Idaho court, on the other hand, held that reimbursement of utility relocation costs
would not serve any general public purpose, since utilities are private, profit-making
rorporations not owned or controlled by the state, and the fact that they furnish
service to the public was held insufficient to remove the payment of relocation costs
from the constitutional ban on expenditure of public funds for non-public purposes.
3 Washington State Highway Comm'n v. Pacific N.W. Bell Tel. Co., 59 Wash. 2d 216,
367 P.2d 605 (1961).
332 S.D. Op. A'rT'Y GEN. 1963-64 at 34 (Feb. 18, 1963).
1968
DENVER LAW' JOURNAL
such funds be spent "exclusively for the maintenance, construction and
supervision" of highways and bridges. In passing, he distinguished
the use of highway funds to pay for relocation of utilities from the
highway right-of-way by noting that no vested property rights were
disturbed by relocation and that it was merely incident to actual high-
way construction.
Shortly after the South Dakota opinion was issued, the Attorney
General of North Dakota issued his opinion.3 33 He noted that North
Dakota's constitution limits the use of dedicated highway funds to
"construction, reconstruction, repair and maintenance of public high-
ways," a limitation which he felt was even tighter than South
Dakota's, which includes "supervision." He also noted North Da-
kota's legislation providing for payment of utility relocation costs
and cited the North Dakota court's approval of that law on the
ground (stated above) that " 'construction' embraces everything
appropriately connected with and necessarily incidental to the com-
plete accomplishment of the general purpose for which the fund
exists." Despite this, however, the Attorney General found no author-
ity for regarding the acquisition of outdoor advertising rights, either
in the form of additional right-of-way or rights in land adjacent to
the right-of-way, as part of highway "construction." Instead, he
viewed control of roadside advertising as an independent project
and expressed "serious doubts" that dedicated highway funds could
lawfully be spent for this purpose.
Two years later, however, the Attorney General of North
Dakota was compelled to argue in support of the state's program
of billboard control through purchase of advertising rights and, in
Newman v. Hjelle,38 4 succeeded in convincing the court that this
practice should be sustained. The anti-diversion issue was squarely
raised in Newman by plaintiff's attempt to enjoin the state's use of
revenue from motor fuel taxes and vehicle license and registration
fees for the purchase of advertising rights. The court's opinion care-
fully traced the history of the North Dakota anti-diversion amend-
ment, and concluded:
It is clear the purpose of the amendment was to prevent any
use of the earmarked revenues for anything but highway purposes
and not to restrict the terms of the amendment by a narrow construc-
tion of the purpose for which the revenues may be used within the
area designated.
... [Ilt is clear the people intended. . . to make the scope
broad enough to include such matters as were considered within the
area of the powers of the State Highway Department, as those
powers may exist in relation to public highways. We find this
3 N.D. Op. ATr'Y GEN. 1962-64 at 148 (Mar. 16, 1963).
334 133 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. 1965).
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included the right to control advertising signs, billboards, and other
signs erected on the right of way, as well as on lands abutting there-
on, if such control was provided for by law.3 8 5
Although the case law dealing with the anti-diversion amend-
ments is certainly not conclusive, it presents substantial reason to
believe that these amendments will generally not be construed so
narrowly as to preclude the use of dedicated highway funds for the
purchase of scenic easements.
C. Equal Protection of the Laws
Any program of scenic easement acquisition along highways
may run into a two-pronged attack on the ground that it denies the
"equal protection of the laws" guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. An example of the first type of equal protection attack, and
the Wisconsin court's answer thereto, may be found in the Kamrow-
ski opinion, as follows:
Plaintiffs assert that scenic easements are being taken from
owners of agricultural lands along the Great River Road, but for one
reason or another will not be taken from the owners of all lands
abutting that highway. They point out that the Burlington railroad
tracks run between the highway and the river and that there are
cities along the highway, where the adjacent property is developed
for urban use. They suggest that the highway commission will not
take scenic easements from the railroad and from urban owners so
as to restrict all those lands to agricultural and limited residential
use. Plaintiffs argue that as a result they are being denied equal
protection of the laws.
The fact that urban land has been developed for commercial,
residential, or similar purposes, and the fact that the railroad prop-
erty is used for railroad purposes, and those uses cannot readily or
economically be destroyed is probably basis enough for classification
if a reasonable classification is needed in this context. We consider,
however, that once it has been determined that the use for which
property rights are taken is a public use, and that the taking is neces-
sary for such use, neither a property owner whose property is taken
in return for just compensation nor a property owner whose prop-
erty is not so taken is in a position to claim that he is denied equal
protection of the laws.
"It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary
line nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once
the question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and
character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a par-
ticular tract to complete the integrated plan rests in the discretion
of the legislative branch."38 6
It should be noted that the Wisconsin court, quoting from
Berman v. Parker, said, "the need for a particular tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legislative branch."
(Emphasis added.) This strongly suggests that some sort of "inte-
33
5 Id. at 557-58.
338 31 Wis. 2d 256, 266, 142 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (1966) (footnote omitted).
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grated plan" for scenic easement acquisition may be neceessary to
provide a rational basis for determining what land is to be subjected
to scenic easement restrictions. It should also be observed, however,
that the power to formulate an appropriate integrated plan and to
make decisions for scenic easement acquisition can certainly be dele-
gated to an administrative agency, such as the state highway depart-
ment, provided the enabling statute lays down a sufficient general
standard for the exercise of the delegated powers. In the Kamrowski
case, the court expressly approved the delegation of power in the
following language:
It is also clear that the legislature has determined that the protection
of scenic resources along highways is a public purpose, has set the
policy of acquiring scenic easements along particular routes, in order
to protect such resources, and has delegated to the state highway
commission the function of deciding the exact terms of the ease-
ments to be acquired, and of exercising the power of eminent domain
to acquire them.
... [W]e consider that the concept of preserving a scenic cor-
ridor along a parkway, with its emphasis upon maintaining a rural
scene and preventing unsightly uses is sufficiently definite so that
the legislature may be said to have made a meaningful decision in
terms of public purpose, and to have fixed a standard which suf-
ficiently guides the commission in performing its task.337
The federal courts have repeatedly sustained the delegation of
power to administrative agencies under such vague standards as
"just and reasonable," "in the public interest," and the like. 8'
Indeed, as Professor Davis has pointed out,339 "In the federal courts,
nothing but a congressional abdication or clear abuse is likely to be
held an invalid delegation." And even though "the law of state
delegation differs substantially from the law of federal delega-
tion, "340 most state courts have consistently upheld the delegation
of power to administrative agencies under relatively vague standards.
For example, state courts have generally upheld the delegation
to local zoning boards of the power to grant "variances" under such
standards as the following: "such variance from the terms of the
ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest, where owing
to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the
ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done" ;341
337 Id. at 263, 266, 142 N.W.2d at 796-97.
338 1 K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.03 (1958).
339 Id. § 2.15 at 150.
340 Id. § 2.07 at 101.
341 This is the variance provision in § 7 of the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE., STANDARD
STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (1923) (revised in 1924 and 1926), which served as
the model for a majority of the state zoning acts adopted from 1925 to 1940. This




"where there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship in
the way of carrying out the strict letter of such ordinances,... [and]
so that the spirit of the ordinance shall be observed, public safety
and welfare secured and substantial justice done" ;342 where "(1) the
property in question cannot yield a reasonable return if permitted
to be used only under the conditions allowed by the regulations in
that zone; and (2) the plight of the owner is due to unique circum-
stances; and (3) the variation, if granted, will not alter the essential
character of the locality" ;343 or "in particular cases and for special
reasons" where "such relief can be granted without substantial detri-
ment to the public good and will not substantially impair the intent
and purpose of the zone plan and zoning ordinance.' '
44
Similarly, the delegation of power to local zoning boards of the
power to grant "special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in
harmony with its general purpose and intent and in accordance with
general or specific rules therein contained, ' '3 45 has generally been
sustained even where the local zoning ordinances "merely echo the
words of the statute, and authorize the granting of exceptions under
a generalized standard which may vaguely be termed as a reference
to the general welfare. ' 3 41 Moreover, an ordinance providing, with-
out specific statutory authorization, for the issuance of "special use
permits for 'the location of special classes of uses which are deemed
desirable for the public welfare within a given district or districts,
but which are potentially incompatible with typical uses herein per-
mitted within them,' . . . [subject to conditions considered] necessary
to protect the public health, safety and welfare," has been upheld
against the attack that the standard is too vague. 47
In Wisconsin at the time of the scenic easement acquisition
challenged in the Kainrowski case, an "integrated plan" for such
acquisition did exist as a result of the general legislative designation
of areas where scenic easements were to be acquired with ORAP
funds and the more detailed scenic corridor plans prepared by the
state highway agency. If the enabling statute in Wisconsin is broad-
ened to permit scenic easement acquisition in other areas, further
3 42 N.Y. TOWN LAW § 267(5) (McKinney 1965), N.Y. GEN. CI' LAW § 81(4)
(McKinney 1951), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW § 179-b (McKinney 1966).
34 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-13-4 (Smith-Hurd 1962) (applicable to cities larger
than 500,000).
3 4This is the well-known "special reasons" variance provision in N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:55-39(d) (1967).
3 5 Special exception provision in the STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT, § 7,
supra note 341.
36 Mandelker, Delegation of Power and Function in Zoning Administration, 1963
WASH. U.L.Q. 60, 76.
347 Kotrich v. County of Du Page, 19 II. 2d 181, 166 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (1960),
appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 475 (1960).
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detailed plans can be formulated on the basis of the inventory of
scenic resources which comprises a part of the outdoor recreation
plan prepared by the Wisconsin Department of Resource Develop-
ment. 48 Similarly, scenic easement acquisition planning in Vermont
can be based on the recently published Study of Scenic Values and
Location of Scenic Sites and Views in Vermont, 49 and scenic ease-
ment acquisition plans in California can be based on the criteria for
selection of scenic areas contained in a recent report to the legisla-
ture.33 ' Presumably all states which undertake programs of scenic
easement acquisition will find it both necessary and desirable to base
their programs on some sort of "plan" which, in turn, is based on an
inventory of scenic resources in existing or proposed highway
corridors.
However, this may not solve all the problems of equal protec-
tion. Since all or almost all of the states with scenic easement enabling
legislation have also enacted billboard control legislation designed
to implement Title I of the Highway Beautification Act of 1965,351
most of the areas in which scenic easements are likely to be acquired
are already subject to state or local police power controls over new
advertising signs; and in order to avoid the 10 percent penalty
provided by Title I of the Act, existing billboards within 660 feet
of the right-of-way in areas which are neither industrial nor com-
mercial in character must, with some exceptions, be removed by
July 1, 1970. But Title I also requires the payment of just compen-
sation not only for taking the sign itself, but also for taking from the
owner of the real property the right to erect future signs.
As a result of the provisions of Titles I and III of the Highway
Beautification Act, many state highway agencies may want to develop
an integrated highway beautification plan for different areas along
the following lines:
(1) In some areas which are neither industrial nor commercial
and where there are lawfully existing signs, the agency may remove
the existing signs and acquire a standard scenic easement which will
prohibit the erection of new signs and prohibit any substantial
change in the existing use of the land adjacent to the highway.
Payment to the landowner for the scenic easement, together with
payment to the owners of the signs themselves, will satisfy the just
compensation requirements of Title I.
348 WISCONSIN DEP'T OF RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT, RECREATION IN WISCONSIN
(1962).
349CENTRAL PLANNING OFFICE, STATE OF VERMONT, VERMONT SCENERY PRESERVA-
TION, ch. V '(1966).
350 
DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, REPORT ON
AcQuismoN OF SCENIC AREAS ADJACENT TO STATE HIGHWAYS (1966).
35179 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1964).
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(2) In some areas which are neither industrial nor commercial
and where there are lawfully existing signs, the agency may remove
existing signs and acquire a scenic easement which merely prohibits the
erection of new signs. Again, payment to the landowner for the
scenic easement, together with payment to the owners of the signs,
will satisfy the just compensation requirements of Title I.
(3) In some areas where there are no existing signs, the agency
may acquire a standard scenic easement which will prohibit the erec-
tion of signs and also prohibit substantial changes in the existing
use of the land. Title I does not require payment for the prohibition
of new signs in such a case, but payment to the landowner will be
necessary in order to acquire the complete scenic easement package.
(4) In some areas where there are no lawfully existing signs,
the agency may be satisfied with the newly-imposed police power
prohibition against the erection of new signs.
(5) In some areas, the agency may want to supplement its
scenic easement program by imposing, under the police power, a
package of restrictions equivalent to those which comprise a standard
scenic easement. This, of course, would require new enabling legis-
lation in nearly all states.
It is obvious that action along the lines suggested in (1), (2),
and (3), without more, does not raise any equal protection issues
provided there is a rational basis (some sort of 'plan") for treating
the different areas differently. In all these situations, the landowner
is fully compensated for the rights purchased or taken from him.
Equal protection problems may arise, however, if action along the
lines suggested in (4) and (5) above is added to the action sug-
gested in (1), (2), and (3). The problems arise from the attempt
to supplement land-use controls based on purchase or condemnation
with police power controls.
In many areas, at least, use of the police power to preserve
scenic beauty may be reasonable and therefore constitutional when
viewed in isolation. But the combination of a scenic easement acquisi-
tion program - where land owners are compensated for the restric-
tive easement which is acquired - and a program of police power
regulation, such as highway zoning - where landowners are not
compensated for the restrictions imposed upon them, even though
the restrictions are exactly the same as those imposed by a scenic
easement - raises an obvious equal protection problem. The problem,
of course, is not whether the scenic easement acquisition program is
valid, but whether the supplementary program of police power
regulation is valid in view of the discrimination between landowners
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who are compensated for land use restrictions imposed on them and
those who are not.
Theoretically, of course, equal protection could be assured by
using police power restrictions only in cases where there clearly is no
taking of the landowner's property in a constitutional sense, and by
acquiring scenic easements with compensation to the landowner in
any case where there is a taking of property. Unfortunately, however,
there is no way to be sure whether there is a taking in many cases
unless and until a court decides that there is or is not a taking. The
mere fact of loss of value to the landowner is clearly not enough to
establish a taking,352 and in some states, at least, nothing short of a
total loss of value to the landowner will constitute a taking where
the landowner retains the right to possession of the land.35 3 Thus,
there is a substantial gray area within which the imposition of land
use restrictions may or may not constitute a taking in the constitutional
sense, and within which any distinction between cases where com-
pensation is paid and cases where it is not paid ought to be based on
a reasonable classification.
It would no doubt be possible to classify land abutting highways
on the basis of the amount of immediate loss in value which will
result from imposition of scenic restrictions. The police power could
be used where the immediate loss is relatively small, and negotiated
purchase or condemnation used where the immediate loss to the
landowner is relatively large. But such a simple system of classifica-
tion is not likely to work well because it gives too little consideration
to the development potential of a particular tract of land.
In many rural areas the land may have so little development
potential that virtually no loss will occur, even in the distant future,
as a result of imposition of scenic restrictions. In other areas, how-
ever, although the immediate loss to the landowner from imposition
of scenic restrictions may be small, the land may have sufficient
potential for development so that, as time goes on, the loss is likely
to become greater and greater, as is the vigor of the landowner's
attack on the police power restrictions to which his land may be
subject. It would seem, therefore, that a policy of acquiring scenic
easements and compensating the landowner wherever the land has
substantial development potential would be wise, even though the
anticipated development may appear to be rather far in the future.
The equal protection guarantee would certainly be satisfied by
a classification which based compensation upon a finding of sub-
352 This proposition needs no citation of authority. If reduction in value were enough to
establish a taking, practically all zoning ordinances would be unconstitutional.
353 See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 57 Cal.2d 515, 370
P.2d 342 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
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stantial development potential in a particular tract of land, and
which denied compensation where no substantial development poten-
tial is found. Moreover such a classification would also tend to
assure the relative permanency of scenic restrictions because, in areas
where development potential exists, the state would have a perma-
nent scenic easement restricting land use rather than a mere police
power regulation subject to repeal, amendment, or variance by legis-
lative or administrative action.
How would the principle suggested for determining when to
purchase (or condemn) and compensate and when to impose police
power regulations apply to an integrated highway beautification
program of the type outlined above? In areas where there are law-
fully existing signs, it can be presumed that the land adjacent to the
highway has sufficient development potential to justify purchase or
condemnation of at least some of the landowner's development
rights - either the full standard scenic easement package or the
right to erect new signs. Whether the state highway agency should
acquire the full scenic easement package or only the right to erect
new signs should depend upon a determination of the development
potential of the particular location for other than advertising uses.
In areas where there are no lawfully existing signs, the decision
between acquisition with compensation and police power regulation
can be based on the same criterion. But an additional problem may
arise. Since all such areas are (or will be) subject to police power
restrictions against new signs in most states, should the compensation
paid to the landowners in areas where scenic easements are acquired
include the full value of the right to erect new signs?
One possible answer is that when a scenic easement is acquired
in an area already subject to a police power restriction against new
advertising signs, the landowner should be paid, as compensation
for the additional restriction against advertising signs, only the dif-
ference between the value of the land subject to a temporary police
power restriction and the value of the land subject to a permanent
scenic easement restriction. But such a distinction may present a very
difficult, if not insoluble, problem of valuation. In this connection
it should be noted that the 10 percent penalty provided by Title I
of the Highway Beautification Act might be sufficient to induce the
states generally to maintain adequate police power controls over out-
door advertising - at least so long as highway construction with
federal-aid funds continues to be an important activity of the state
highway agencies. Thus the distinction between the value of perma-
nent restrictions against advertising signs imposed by scenic easement
and the value of temporary restrictions imposed under the police
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power may be difficult to maintain. In the final analysis, the differ-
ence in treatment of landowners may have to be justified on the
ground that administrative convenience and feasibility require pay-
ment for all the restrictions imposed when a scenic easement is pur-
chased or taken, without any deduction on account of the existing
police power restrictions against advertising signs.
Although the author favors use of the principle already dis-
cussed to determine when to acquire and compensate and when to
impose police power regulations, it is possible to make the determi-
nation on other grounds. For example, the state highway agencies
might decide to rely entirely on the police power to exclude new
signs in areas where there are no existing signs. In such areas, the
restrictions imposed by the standard scenic easement would not
include the usual restriction against advertising signs, and the land-
owners would not be compensated for that restriction. But where
existing signs must be removed in order to avoid the 10 percent
penalty imposed by Title I, the removal of the existing signs would
be accompanied by the acquisition of a scenic easement package
which would, inter alia, prohibit new signs, with the landowners
being compensated for all the rights they lose. This procedure would
seem to satisfy the requirements of Title I and also the requirements
of equal protection.
It can, of course, be argued that the treatment of sign restric-
tions suggested in the preceding paragraph would result in denial
of equal protection because landowners who have no existing signs
on their land would not be compensated for the loss of their right
to erect signs in the future, while landowners with signs on their
land would be compensated for the loss of such right as well as the
loss caused by removal of existing signs. It would appear to be an
adequate answer, however, that the existence of signs on the land
can be regarded as sufficient evidence of the value of the land for
future sign use to justify compensation for loss of that value; and,
contrariwise, that where there are no existing signs, such evidence is
lacking.
The major objection to relying solely on the police power to
prohibit advertising signs where none lawfully exist at present is
that police power regulation is not necessarily permanent. As we
have previously noted, the 10 percent penalty of the Highway Beauti-
fication Act may be sufficient to induce the states to maintain effec-
tive roadside control until completion of the Interstate System and
perhaps even longer. But Title I of the Act provides a loophole
which may enable the advertising industry, in many states, to pre-
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vent achievement of the goal of effective control by means of the
police power. Section 101(d) of the Act8 4 provides:
In order to promote the reasonable, orderly and effective dis-
play of outdoor advertising while remaining consistent with the
purposes of this section, signs, displays, and devices whose size,
lighting and spacing, consistent with customary use is to be deter-
mined by agreement between the several States and the Secretary,
may be erected and maintained within six hundred and sixty feet
of the nearest edge of the right-of-way within areas adjacent to the
Interstate and primary systems which are zoned industrial or com-
mercial under authority of State law, or in unzoned commercial or
industrial areas as may be determined by agreement between the
several States and the Secretary. The States shall have full authority
under their own zoning laws to zone areas for commercial or indus-
trial purposes, and actions of the States in this regard will be
accepted for the purpose of this Act. [Emphasis supplied.]
Under the above provision, local governments with zoning
power under state enabling acts can, unless restrained by state legis-
lation, emasculate the proposed "effective control" of highway adver-
tising by zoning or rezoning substantial areas adjacent to the Inter-
state and primary highway system for industrial or commercial use,
despite the fact that there are presently no such uses, and no adver-
tising signs, in these areas. The state statutes on billboard control
enacted in response to the Highway Beautification Act appear gen-
erally to leave the zoning power with the units of local government,
free of any restraint which might close the loophole under discussion.
It would thus appear that acquisition of standard scenic easements
by the state highway agency, including a prohibition on erection of
new signs, may provide a desirable permanency of restriction which
would not be assured if police power controls are relied upon.
Similar equal protection problems may arise because of the over-
lap between the scenic easement programs developed under Title III
of the Act and the junkyard control program established by Title
11.
3 5
5 Title II imposes the same 10 percent penalty as does Title I
upon any state that does not make "provision for effective control
of the establishment and maintenance along the Interstate System
and the primary system of outdoor junkyards." The Act defines
"effective control" to mean that "junkyards shall be screened by
natural objects, plantings, fences, or other appropriate means so as
not to be visible from the main traveled way of the system, or shall
be removed from sight." Title II further provides that "the federal
share of landscaping and screening costs under this section shall be
75 per centum," and that the federal share of the cost of relocation,
removal, or disposal of junkyards which "as a practical matter can-
not be screened" shall also be 75 percent.
54 79 Stat. 1028, amending 23 U.S.C. § 131 (1964).
355 79 Stat. 1030, amending 23 U.S.C. § 136 (1964).
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Although Title II fails to make this absolutely clear, it would
seem that the "federal share" is only payable for screening and land-
scaping existing junkyards. It seems to be implied, therefore, that
control over establishment of new junkyards- either total prohibi-
tion within sight of the "main traveled way of the system" or require-
ments as to screening and landscaping - should be exercised by the
states through their police power. In many areas, at least, police
power controls will certainly be held valid. But prohibition of the
establishment of new junkyards is normally a standard feature of
scenic easements. If the police power is relied on in some areas and
in other areas landowners are compensated (through purchase or
condemnation) for loss of the right to establish junkyards in the
future, equal protection problems arise which are similar to those
already discussed in connection with the control of outdoor adver-
tising.
D. "fNecessity" for Acquisition of Easements at Particular Locations
Let us assume that any challenge to a program of scenic ease-
ment acquisition based on the alleged absence of any public use or
public purpose, or the alleged denial of equal protection, or the
alleged lack of adequate standards to guide the exercise of discretion
by the state highway agency can be defeated. When the highway
agency decides to condemn scenic easements at particular locations,
the landowner might still challenge the condemnation on the ground
that there is no "necessity" for the taking of a scenic easement at
that location.
If the legislature were to determine the precise locations at
which scenic easements should be acquired, any challenge to its deter-
mination would be practically certain to fail. As Nichols points out,
The overwhelming weight of authority makes clear beyond any
possibility of doubt that the question of the necessity or expediency
of a taking in eminent domain lies within the discretion of the legis-
lature and is not a proper subject of judicial review....
There are various aspects of this principle which have crystal-
lized into specific questions. In accordance with the general prin-
ciple, it has been held that the courts may not inquire into the
question
(1) Whether there is any necessity for the taking,
(2) Whether there is any need for resorting to eminent
domain in effecting such acquisition,
(3) Whether the time is a fitting one,
(4) Whether there is a need for the property to the extent
sought to be acquired,
'(5) Whether there is a need for the particular tract sought to
be acquired (and, correlatively, whether another tract would not
better serve the purposes of the condemnor),
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(6) Whether there is any need for the particular estate sought
to be condemned,
(7) Whether the mode of acquisition with respect to the
instrumentalities employed, such as a state officer, an individual,
or a corporation, is proper insofar as the exercise of the legislative
discretion is concerned.3 5 6
In implementing the scenic easement acquisition program, how-
ever, decisions as to the precise location of scenic easements and the
precise terms of the scenic easement restrictions will have to be dele-
gated to the state highway agency. The state highway agency will
have to operate in practically all states on the basis of a general
delegation of power to acquire interests in land adjacent to federal-
aid highways "necessary for the restoration, preservation, and en-
hancement of scenic beauty adjacent to such highways," or some
similar formula. And so the question recurs: what is the likelihood
of successful attack on highway agency determinations on the ground
that the taking of a particular scenic easement at a particular location
was not necessary? The answer, unfortunately, is not so clear-cut as it
would be if all such determinations were made by the legislature.
According to Nichols,
the necessity is for the condemnor and not for the courts to decide,
and the decision of such condemnor is final as long as it acts reason-
ably and in good faith. If the land is of some use to it in carrying
out its public object, the degree of necessity is its own affair.
Whether there is any necessity whatever to justify the taking is,
however, a judicial question, and as a taking without necessity in
such a case would be unauthorized, the courts may hold it to be
unlawful without the reluctance they feel in declaring acts of the
legislature unconstitutional.
3 57
In short, the determination of an administrative agency on the
question of necessity may be subjected to judicial scrutiny with
respect to its reasonableness or good faith or both. Hence it would
seem to be very important for state highway agencies to work out a
"plan" or a set of general criteria upon which the choice of scenic
easement locations and restrictions is to be based. Any determination
as to condemnation of a scenic easement imposing particular restric-
tions on a particular tract of land based on the plan or the general
criteria developed in advance can then be successfully defended as
having been made reasonably and in good faith.
Reference has previously been made to the plans or general
criteria for scenic easement acquisition developed in Wisconsin,
Vermont, and California. 358
356 1 P. NicxHoLs, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 4.11 at 540, 545-51 (3d rev. ed.
1964) (footnotes omitted).
3 i7 ld. at 570-73 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
358 Text accompanying notes 348-50 supra.
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VI. SOME TECHNICAL LEGAL PROBLEMS
A. Enforcement of Scenic Easements Against Successive Owners of
the Servient Land: Does the Burden "Run"?
1. General Rules as to "Running" of Burdens With Land
As previously indicated,"8 9 it is quite doubtful whether the
burden of a scenic easement can "run" with the servient land, so as
to be enforcible against subsequent owners of the land, if the benefit
is only "personal" or "in gross." This is true whether the scenic ease-
ment is viewed as a legal negative easement or as an equitable servi-
tude. But the burden of an appurtenant scenic easement will run with
the servient land, so as to be enforceable against subsequent owners of
the land, provided the instrument creating the scenic easement is
properly recorded. The running of the burden with the servient land
is an inherent characteristic of a scenic easement if it is viewed as a
legal negative easement. And the burden will also run with the
servient estate, subject to the notice requirement discussed below, if
it is viewed as an equitable servitude.
No privity of estate between the parties to the instrument creat-
ing the scenic easement need be shown, beyond that arising from
the easement or servitude thereby created, in order for the burden
of an appurtenant easement or servitude to run with the servient
land.8"' Subject to the satisfaction of the requirements of the local
recording statute, a legal negative easement will be protected against
interference by both legal and equitable remedies. A purely equit-
able servitude, on the other hand, will be protected against interfer-
ence only by equitable remedies. However, as previously noted, "
in many instances a restrictive covenant may be enforced not only
as an equitable servitude but as a covenant running with the land at
law. If the covenant is contained in a deed of conveyance and
restricts the use of land conveyed for the benefit of land retained
by the grantor, or restricts the use of land retained by the grantor
for the benefit of the land conveyed, practically all United States
courts hold that there is sufficient privity of estate between the
parties to the covenant to permit the burden of the covenant to run
with the land at law. 62 Thus, in many cases, if a scenic restriction
is not deemed to create a legal negative easement, it may be enforced
359 See notes 60-62 supra and accompanying text.
360 This has always been clear with regard to "legal easements." That it is also true
with regard to equitable servitudes, see 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.26
(A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY f 674 (1968).
11 Text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
3 62 See note 58 supra.
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either at law as a covenant running with the land863 or in equity as
an equitable servitude.
As noted above, enforcement of restrictions on land use is sub-
ject to certain recording or notice requirements.86 4 But in the United
States the requirements appear to be identical whether we consider
a restriction to create a legal negative easement, an equitable servi-
tude, or a covenant running with the land at law.
In the English cases... enforcement of an equitable servitude
can only be had against a subsequent purchaser of the burdened
land who takes with notice. In other words, the equitable remedy
by way of injunction to enforce an agreement as an equitable servi-
tude is subject to the defense that equitable interests are cut off by
a transfer of the legal title of the burdened land to an innocent
purchaser for value. However, since these covenants or agreements
respecting the use of land create an equitable property interest upon
the burdened land, they are entitled to be recorded under the usual
[American] recording statutes, so that the constructive notice arising
from such recording prevents the existence of a subsequent bona
fide purchaser. Likewise, since the same recording statutes provide
that an unrecorded conveyance of a legal easement or of a covenant
running with the land at law shall be void as against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser, there is today no fundamental difference
between the enforcement of legal easements or covenants and equit-
able servitudes, as against subsequent purchasers of the servient
land in respect to this defense of bona fide purchase for value.3 68
If it is desired to provide, in connection with a scenic easement,
for performance of affirmative duties by the servient land owner,
- e.g., to require him to keep fields mowed, brush cleared, or the
like - the easement deed may include a covenant by the servient
land owner, for himself and his successors, to perform such affirma-
tive duties. In almost all American jurisdictions the burden of such
a covenant would run with the servient land at law ;366 and in many
states it could also be enforced against successors of the covenantor
as an equitable servitude.
6 7
363 Most kinds of restrictive covenants, of course, may be enforced at law against a sub-
sequent owner of the servient estate if all requirements, including the privity require-
ment, for running of the burden at law are satisfied.
364 See discussion of Tulk v. Moxhay, London and S.W. Ry v. Gomm, and London
County Council v. Allen in the text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
365 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.24, at 404 '(A.J. Casner ed. 1952) (footnotes
omitted). Accord, C. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RUN WITH LAND" 183 (2d ed. 1947). See also 5 R. POWELL, supra note 360,
680.
36 6 The fact that the covenant is in a deed conveying the scenic easement would satisfy
the privity of estate requirement in most states where there is such a requirement,
although the interest conveyed is an easement rather than an estate. See Carlson v.
Libby, 137 Conn. 362, 77 A.2d 332 (1950). Since the covenant is "in aid of an ease-
ment," the Massachusetts privity requirement is also satisfied.
367 Although in England affirmative covenants cannot be enforced as equitable servitudes
the weight of authority in the United States is to the contrary. See Fitzstephens v.
Watson, 218 Ore. 185, 344 P.2d 221 (1959) and cases cited therein; 2 AMERICAN
LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.36 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF
REAL PROPERTY § 859 at 481 (3d ed. 1939).
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2. Can Scenic Easements be Deemed Appurtenant to the High-
way Right-of-Way?
Because of the doubt as to whether restrictions imposed by a
scenic easement can be enforced against a transferee of the servient
land (even when the transferee has actual notice of the restrictions)
if the scenic easement is not "appurtenant" to some dominant tene-
ment, it becomes important to determine whether a scenic easement
acquired by a state highway agency for the purpose of preserving
scenic beauty adjacent to a highway can be classified as an easement
"appurtenant" to that highway, with the highway serving as the
dominant tenement.
As Professor Powell has pointed out:
Historically, easements appurtenant were substantial factors in the
agricultural set-up of England. Such easements were required to
have been created for the purpose of benefiting the owner of the
dominant estate as the possessor of the dominant estate. In an agri-
cultural community, where dominant estates were always farm lands,
this test was easy to apply, and became crystallized to mean that, to
be found appurtenant, the easement must be found serviceable to
the agricultural utilization of the dominant estate. As the types of
land utilization have become more diversified in modem society,
especially in the United States, it has become necessary to loosen the
crystallized English rule and to recognize that serviceability to the
dominant estate can exist even when the dominant estate is devoted
to business purposes .... This liberalization of the scope of appur-
tenant easements makes a corresponding increase in the burden of
such easements.... The basic requirement that to be appurtenant,
the easement must have been created for the purpose of benefiting
the owner of the dominant estate as the possessor of such estate
remains, but the content of this requirement has altered with
changes in land utilization. It is also required that the easement shall
in fact benefit the possessor of the dominant estate in his use of
such land. A constructional preference for the finding of an ease-
ment to be appurtenant (rather than in gross) exists and is very
strong. It is not normally regarded as essential that the dominant
and servient tenements be contiguouss6s
There can be little doubt that scenic easements are intended to
benefit the public generally, insofar as the public makes use if its
highways. Since the state holds title to the highway right-of-way in
trust for the public, the highway itself can readily be regarded as
a dominant tenement to which scenic easements may be appurtenant,
provided the state's interest in the highway right-of-way is of a
nature which permits it to be so regarded.
The highway right-of-way may be regarded as a dominant tene-




ment if the state's interest therein is a fee simple estate.369 But if
the state's interest therein is merely an easement, there is likely to be
difficulty in persuading the courts that a scenic easement can be
appurtenant to the "easement of way" held by the state. This follows
from the traditional classification of easements as an incorporeal
species of real property3 70 and the ancient common law rule that an
easement may only be appurtenant to corporeal property.3 71
In 43 states, the state highway agency has express statutory
authority to acquire by purchase or condemnation either a fee simple
estate or an easement for right-of-way purposes. In Kansas, the high-
way agency may acquire either a fee simple estate or an easement by
purchase, but only an easement by condemnation. Only Alabama and
Pennsylvania expressly restrict the highway agency to acquisition of
an easement for right-of-way purposes, regardless of the method of
acquisition. In three states3 72 the statutes are wholly silent as to the
interest that may be acquired for right-of-way purposes. And although
the Iowa statute generally authorizing right-of-way acquisition is
silent on the subject, 7 8 the statute authorizing acquisition of prop-
erty for controlled-access highways expressly prescribes that acquisi-
tion is to be in fee simple only.374
It thus appears that, at the present time, the great majority of
the state highway agencies have statutory authority to acquire a fee
simple estate for highway right-of-way purposes. In the future, it
seems probable that this authority will be exercised in all, or almost
all cases. As recently as 1958,175 however, nine states8 76 had express
statutory provisions limiting the highway agency to acquisition of
an easement for right-of-way purposes, and nine other states 77 had
statutes which were wholly silent on the subject. In the latter nine
states, as a general rule, the highway agencies could acquire only an
369 "A dominant tenement is one the possessor of which is, by virtue of his possession,
entitled to the benefit of the uses authorized by the easement." 2 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY § 8.13 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952). See also id. §§ 9.28, 9.29 with respect to
the land which the benefit of land-use restrictions imposed by covenant "touches or
concerns" and which the parties intend to be benefitted.
3 7
0E. WASHBURN, EASEMENTS AND SERVITUDES 3 (4th ed. 1885); L. JONES, EASE-
MENTS 4 (1898).
371 E. WASHBURN, supra note 370; L. JONES, supra note 370.
372 Missouri, South Dakota, and Washington.
373 IOWA CODE ANN. § 306.13 (Supp. 1966).
374 Id. § 306A.5.
3
75 HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD SPECIAL REPORT No. 32, CONDEMNATION OF PROP-
ERTY FOR HIGHWAY PURPOSES: A LEGAL ANALYSIS, PART I, at 9-12 (1958).
376 Alabama, Alaska, Kansas, Montana, New Mexico Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah.
North Dakota also had such a provision in its general condemnation statute, but this
seems to have been rendered inapplicable by a 1953 amendment to the highway code
which expressly provided that a fee simple estate may be acquired for highway
purposes. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15-03(2) (1960). See also Wallentinson v.
Williams County, 101 N.W.2d 571 (N.D. 1960).




easement for right-of-way purposes by condemnation, and this is
still true in the three states where the statutes are wholly silent on
the subject. This conclusion follows from the general rule that
statutes authorizing condemnation are strictly construed against the
condemnor- a rule which means, as applied to the question now
under consideration, that authorization for the acquisition of a fee
simple estate must appear either by express provision or by neces-
sary implication.8
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In some 18 states,3 79 therefore, the state's interest in the high-
way rights-of-way acquired up until the very recent past will gen-
erally, if not always, consist only of an easement, and in some five
states380 this will continue to be the case as to rights-of-way acquired
in the future. In these states, the question whether a scenic easement
can be regarded as appurtenant to the highway easement may become
important.
In dealing with this question, it may be helpful to remember
that a highway easement is an easement of a very peculiar character.
As against the "fee owner," - usually the abutting landowner -
the public has what amounts practically to an exclusive right of pos-
session and use. Hence it can be argued that a highway easement is
not really an incorporeal or nonpossessory interest at all, but rather
an estate in the nature of a fee simple determinable in the surface
of the land, with an easement of support in the soil below.38' Such
an argument is supported by the frequent judicial references to the
abutting landowner's right of reversion when the highway is aban-
doned.38 It would appear, arguably, at least, that the real distinction
378 See 3 P. NicHoLs, supra note 356, § 9.2[1] at 268, and § 10.1 at 338; see also
HIGHWAY REsEARcH BOARD, supra note 375, at 11.
37 Listed in notes 376-77 supra.
380 Alabama, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Washington.
381 3 P. NicHoLs, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN 273 (3d rev. ed. 1965):
The estate or interest which is acquired by eminent domain when it is
not necessary to condemn the fee is usually called an easement or servitude.
This designation has been criticized, since there is a wide difference between
such an estate or interest and a private easement; it is appurtenant to
nothing, there is no dominant tenement, and it is commonly held by the
public at large rather than by any definite person or organized body.
In the case of a state highway, of course, the "easement or servitude" is held by the
state in trust for the public at large, but the criticism of the term seems well-directed.
It goes without saying that the fee owner of land within a modern highway right-
of-way can make no use of the land except for travel in the same manner as the
public at large. Hence it seems strange to refer to the public interest in the surface as
a mere "easement or servitude," and the abutting landowner's interest therein as a
fee simple.
382 Id. at 327:
It is well settled that when an easement has been taken by eminent
domain for the public use or has been acquired by purchase, prescription or
dedication .... if the public use is subsequently discontinued or abandoned,
the public easement is extinguished, and the possession of the land reverts to
the owner of the fee free from any rights in the public.
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with respect to highway rights-of-way is not between fee simple and
easement, but between fee simple absolute" 8 and fee simple deter-
minable in the surface.
Moreover, it can be argued that the ancient common law rule
requiring a corporeal property interest as the dominant tenement is
really not a strict requirement, but rather a reflection of the usual
fact situation in which the question of the appurtenancy of an ease-
ment was raised. As a practical matter, during the formative period
of the common law, and down to relatively recent times, there was
no reason to try to make one easement appurtenant to another. But
the common law is capable of change, as history graphically demon-
strates, and there is no reason why, in order to serve the general
public interest in scenic preservation, the courts should not regard
the state's interest in the highway right-of-way as sufficient to con-
stitute a dominant tenement to which scenic easements may be made
appurtenant.
In any case where the state's right-of-way interest is an easement
and doubt may exist as to the enforceability of scenic easement
restrictions against transferees of the servient land, it will be desir-
able for the legislature to provide expressly for enforcement against
transferees with notice of the restrictions, without regard to the
question whether the scenic easement is appurtenant or in gross.
B. Transfer of Benefit of Scenic Easements
If scenic easements are deemed to be appurtenant to a highway
right-of-way, no problems are likely to arise with respect to transfer
of the benefit of such easements. The right-of-way and the scenic
easement will generally both be owned by the state, and it is un-
likely that the state will want to transfer the benefit of the scenic
easement. It is possible, of course, that occasionally a state highway
right-of-way might be transferred to county jurisdiction, or vice versa,
but this should create no problems since the scenic easements appur-
tenant to the highway right-of-way will pass with it.3s4
Suppose, however, that public-spirited individuals or conserva-
tion organizations desire to acquire scenic easements adjacent to or
near highways, and then to transfer these scenic easements to the
state. An attempted transfer to the state would raise a serious ques-
tion because in nearly all cases such a privately purchased scenic
383 If the highway right-of-way is held in fee simple absolute, then upon discontinuance
or abandonment of the highway use, the state "may leave it idle, or devote it to a
different use, or sell it in the same manner and to the same extent as an ordinary
private owner." Id. at 331.
384 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.71 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, THE
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 9 418 (1967).
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easement would be in gross rather than appurtenant. As a recent
study concludes,
The question of the assignability of an easement in gross pre-
sents ... difficult problems, and there is an enormous amount of
confusion in the authorities. The general rule is that easements in
gross are not assignable, but there are so many conflicts in the
authorities that it is very difficult to generalize. A quite general
exception to the "rule" is that easements with a profit are assign-
able. Easements which include the right to sever and remove a por-
tion of the servient land are alienable "in all situations involving
easements of a commercial nature and in most other situations as
well." There are so many other exceptions to the general statement
above that it can scarcely be stated to be a rule at all. In an apparent
effort to reconcile the conflict in the cases, the Restatement took the
position that easements in gross are assignable if they are "commer-
cial" in nature, but not if they are not, but this attempted distinction
drew such heavy criticism that it can scarcely be looked to as a reli-
able guide by either the practitioner or by the courts. Lacking a clear
holding in his jurisdiction that easements in gross are assignable,
which the researcher is unlikely to find, it should not be assumed
that they can be assigned. Even if there are cases in a particular
jurisdiction holding that some interests having the characteristics of
easements in gross are assignable, it cannot be assumed that these
holdings will apply to all easements in gross; the cases must be
examined with care....
... The fact is that in many jurisdictions critical questions
simply have not been decided.... In some jurisdictions the drafts-
man may feel that he can insure assignability by a clear expression
of intent to permit assignment. But there are many statements that
such interests are simply not assignable, and the parties cannot make
them so. The path of safety lies in the most careful scrutiny of the
authorities in the jurisdiction. In the absence of clear authority in
support of alienability, it should be assumed that the easement can-
not be assigned.8 85
There appear to be no authorities on the question whether the
benefit of an equitable servitude in gross can be transferred. It seems
to the writer that decisions in favor of transferability are unlikely in
the absence of a statutory declaration to that effect.
C. Termination of Scenic Easements
It has been assumed in all of the foregoing discussion that
scenic easements will normally be of perpetual duration. But unless
care is taken to draft the enabling statute or the scenic easement deed
itself in such a way as to assure perpetual duration, there is always
38 5 R. BRENNEMAN, PRIVATE APPROACHES TO THE PRESERVATION OF OPEN LAND 30-32
(1967). See also C. CLARK, supra note 365, at 67-89; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY §§ 8.75-.83 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952); 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 419 (1967); RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY §§ 489-92 (1944). It should
be noted that the Restatement does not state that "non-commercial easements in gross"
are never alienable, but rather that their alienability "is determined by the manner or
terms of their creation"; the stated factors which determine alienability include the
ersonal relations of the parties at the time of creation, the extent of the increased




a possibility of adventitious termination by operation of law or -
more accurately- by judicial decision. This possibility is especially
strong if the scenic easement is viewed as an equitable servitude
rather than a legal negative easement.
The courts, in exercising their discretion to grant or withhold
equitable remedies, have frequently refused to enjoin violation of
restrictive covenants in cases where a "change in conditions in the
neighborhood" is found to have frustrated the purpose of the
restriction3 86 Although the author has found no authority on the
point, it is conceivable that the changed conditions rule might be
carried over and applied to legal negative easements. In any case,
there is a well-settled analogous rule in the law of easements. If an
easement is created for a particular purpose, the easement is extin-
guished by operation of law if that purpose becomes impossible of
realization or is no longer served by the easement.
8 8 7
The significance of these rules in connection with scenic ease-
ments is obvious. If a servient landowner challenges scenic easement
restrictions, a court may decide that the purpose of the restrictions
has been frustrated and is no longer capable of realization because,
e.g., there is substantial new commercial or residential development
nearby, or a group of new billboards on nearby land not covered by
the scenic easement. In that event, the court may hold either that the
easement has been extinguished or that it cannot be enforced by
injunction. Either holding means, in substance, that the state's inter-
est in the scenic easement is extinguished without compensation.
This is clearly an undesirable result.
The power to terminate scenic easement restrictions should rest
with the state highway agency and not with the courts. If circum-
stances change over time and the highway agency decides that the
maintenance of a scenic easement is no longer in the public interest,
it should have authority to effect its termination in such a way as to
minimize the loss to the public - e.g., by obtaining compensation for
the release of the scenic easement restrictions.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The scenic easement would appear to be an extremely useful
device for implementing the highway beautification program. In
rural areas where the land is not yet ripe for development, the cost
of scenic easements is quite low as compared to the cost of fee simple
388C. CLARK, supra note 365, at 184; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 9.39 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952); 5 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 684 (1968).
387 3 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 422 (1967), and authorities cited;
HIGHWAY RESEARCH BOARD, supra note 375, at 9; N. WILLIAMS, LAND ACQUISITION
FOR OUTDOOR RECREATION -ANALYSIS OF SELECTED LEGAL PROBLEMS 52 (Out-
door Recreation Resources Review Commission Study Report No. 16, 1962).
1968
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
acquisition. This is particularly true when scenic easements are
acquired over wetlands, flood plains, and areas of rough topography,
but it is also true in agricultural areas where the scenic restrictions
do not interfere with the continued use of the land for agricultural
purposes and where development potential for other than agricultural
uses is limited. Even where the development potential of the land for
other uses is greater, the cost of a scenic easement may be consider-
ably less than the cost of fee simple acquisition.
The experience of the Wisconsin highway commission indicates
that it is possible to operate a program of scenic easement acquisition
and maintenance very successfully if (1) landowners are fully edu-
cated as to the objectives of the program and the rights they are
relinquishing when they grant a scenic easement; (2) a system of
periodic inspections is established, with prompt reporting of any
violations of scenic restrictions; and (3) the local courts are well-
informed as to the objectives and mode of operation of the scenic
easement program.
It is likely that use of the power of eminent domain and the
expenditure of state funds to acquire scenic easements will be sus-
tained in most states, if challenged, on the ground that scenic ease-
ments promote a "public purpose" and make possible a "public use"
of the servient land. In some states with constitutional anti-diversion
provisions, the use of dedicated highway funds for scenic easement
acquisition may present more of a problem. Equal protection may
also raise problems, not with respect to scenic easement acquisition
per se, but in connection with related police power restrictions on
land use adjacent to highways.
In connection with the constitutional public purpose and public
use requirements, it would seem desirable to include in scenic en-
abling legislation an express declaration that acquisition of scenic
interests in land adjacent to highways is for a public purpose and
will provide for a public use. One of the few current enabling stat-
utes with such a declaration is the California statute, which provides
as follows:
The Legislature hereby declares that the acquisition of interests
in real property for the preservation, maintenance or conservation
of scenic lands or areas adjacent to any highway included in the
national system of interstate and defense highways or the federal-
aid primary highway system or to preserve, improve or enhance the
natural beauty of points of interest in the lands or areas traversed
by such highways ... constitutes a public use and purpose3 88
Such a declaration is, of course, not conclusive on the issues of "public
purpose" and "public use," but it is accorded substantial weight by the
388 CAL. STS. & H'WAYS CODE § 896 (West Supp. 1966).
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courts. It could well be strengthened by an express declaration that
the contemplated public use may be either active - as where there
is a public right of entry on scenic overlook areas - or passive - as
where the only public rights are negative and the public use consists
of visual occupancy.
A few other conclusions as to scenic easement enabling legisla-
tion may be in order:
(1) It is desirable to state in the enabling act - as most of the
current acts do - that scenic interests may include the fee simple or
any lesser interest, and to mention scenic easements expressly - as
most of the current acts do not.
(2) The enabling act should include some definition of a
scenic easement - a feature conspicuously lacking in practically all
of the current enabling legislation.
(3) The enabling act should provide for acquisition of scenic
interests, including easements, by condemnation, as well as by pur-
chase, exchange, and gift, for without the power to condemn the
state highway agency is severely handicapped in negotiating for
the purchase of scenic interests and may, on occasion, find it impos-
sible to preserve an especially significant scenic area at a reasonable
price.
(4) If the power to condemn scenic interests is given to the
state highway agency, it should also be authorized to withdraw from
a condemnation proceeding on payment of the landowner's costs, in
the event the condemnation jury finds a value grossly in excess of
what the highway agency believes the scenic interest is worth.
(5) The enabling act should authorize not only acquisition of
the fee simple and less-than-fee interests, but also the acquisition of
the fee simple and resale of the fee subject to scenic restrictions.
(6) The enabling act should expressly provide that all scenic
easements acquired by the state highway agency adjacent to or in
locations visible from the highway shall be deemed appurtenant to
the highway, and that all scenic easements shall be binding upon and
enforceable against the original owner of the servient land and his
heirs and assigns in perpetuity unless the scenic easement deed
expressly provides for some lesser duration.
(7) The enabling act should expressly provide that no court
may declare a scenic easement to be extinguished or unenforceable on
the ground of changed conditions or frustration of purpose.
(8) The enabling act should expressly authorize the state high-
way agency, in certain defined situations, either to release the state's
rights under a scenic easement or to grant an appropriate variance of
the scenic easement restrictions.
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In drafting scenic easement deeds, it would seem that the cur-
rent Wisconsin practice has substantial advantages in terms of tailor-
ing the land-use restrictions and the grant of affirmative rights to
fit the particular situation. It will be recalled that the current prac-
tice in Wisconsin is to select from a substantial list of restrictions
and affirmative rights those most appropriate for the particular scenic
easement location, and to type these into the deed when agreement
is reached between the landowner and the negotiator. The latter is
given authority to add other provisions not contained in the standard
list where necessary to deal with an unusual situation.
Finally, additional thought should be given to the problems
involved in developing an integrated highway beautification pro-
gram combining the acquisition of scenic interests with police power
scenic controls.
REGULATORY ASPECTS OF FEDERAL
WATER POLLUTION CONTROL
BY MURRAY STEIN*
Since the turn of the century, Congressional interest in federal
water pollution control has increasingly reflected a belief shared by
Commissioner Stein: the people's interest in maintaining safe and
pleasant waterways must be given a higher priority than industrial
property and profits. Mr. Stein traces the historical development of
major federal legislation pertaining to water quality, culminating
in the important 1965 provision for state participation in establishing
desirable quality standards for interstate waters. He describes the
enforcement procedures available to the Secretary of the Interior
once a state's criteria are adopted as federal standards. Central to his
discussion is the thesis that the success of regulatory measures de-
pends upon the percentage of cases that can be effectively disposed
of by federal-state negotiation and cooperative action - and not by
court action.
ONSIDER the following quotation taken from a classic case
dealing with the effects of industrial water pollution:
The exigencies of the great industrial interests must be kept
standing in view; the property of large and useful interests should
not be hampered or hindered for frivolous or trifling causes. For
slight inconveniences or occasional annoyances, they ought not to be
held responsible....
It is certainly true that owing to the want, if not necessities, of
the present age . . . some changes must be tolerated in the channels
in which water naturally flows, and in its adaptation to beneficial
uses. Reasonable diminution of its quantity, in gratifying and meet-
ing customary wants, has always been permitted. So, its temporary
detention for manufacturing purposes, followed by its release in in-
creased volume, is a necessary consequence of its utilization as a
propelling force. Nor must we shut our eyes to the tendency - the
inevitable tendency - of these and other uses, in which water is an
indispensable element, to detract somewhat from its normal purity.
These modifications of individual right must be submitted to, in
order that the greater good of the public be conserved and promoted.
But there is a limit to this duty to yield, to this claim and right to
expect and demand. The water course must not be diverted from its
channel, or so diminished in volume, or so corrupted and polluted
as practically to destroy or greatly impair its value to the lower
riparian proprietor.'
This 1893 decision was one of the earliest of any significance
in the history of United States court action regarding water pollution.
It has great relevance, for better or worse, to attitudes widely held
* Assistant Commissioner -Enforcement, Federal Water Pollution Control Adminis-
tration, United States Department of the Interior.
'Tennessee Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 260, 14 So. 167, 170
(1893) (emphasis added).
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today, even though the riparian rights doctrine it discusses does not
prevail in the United States, and the conditions of our waters have
since vastly changed.
As might be expected, industries as they came into being and
underwent booming growth did not keep the judge's ideas on com-
parative injury in mind. Even this relatively benign judicial restraint
applied only to litigated cases, and the paucity of reported water
pollution cases attests to the negligible social effect of private litiga-
tion in this area. In the development of this country, industries were
by no means the only offender. Towns and cities with their burgeon-
ing populations also indulged for decades in a profligate use of one
of the most valuable natural resources this richly endowed nation
offered. The combined indulgence was so widespread and so strong
that the natural assimilative process of many water courses could not
keep up with the amount of wastes being spewed into them. There
was no public insistence that money should be spent for proper
waste treatment even though the costs generally would have been
much less than the cost of cleaning up an environment fouled by
pollution. Consequently, it did not take very long before the majority
of our major rivers and many smaller ones were seriously polluted.
The court in Tennessee Coal speaks of modification of the indi-
vidual right for the benefit of the common weal. Today this concept
still guides us, but we now realize that the promotion of the public
interest has far wider implications than were obvious to the author
of that opinion, and that much more is at stake now than when he set
forth his guidelines. His words sound eminently reasonable, but in
the light of the status of the present environment and our rising
expectations they can be seen as somewhat deceptive. The time is
long overdue for taking a more rigid view than that taken by the
judge on what to accept and what not to accept in water quality.
Because we are all too familiar with the damaging consequences of
pollution, we cannot afford to be as tolerant as he was when he urged
that degradation of water should be prevented only if it is so per-
vasive as "practically to destroy or greatly to impair" the value of
water.' It has been estimated that industry contributes equally as
much biochemical oxygen demand to the nation's streams as all
municipalities combined and generates and discharges even more
of most other pollution materials.
Today our general awareness has shifted from mere appreciation
of the economic advantages a water-using industry brings to a par-
ticular area to a broader realization that many more human and other
factors are pertinent to an area's quality of life and that they are




by any one industry. This new awareness stems from the realization
of many important points, not the least of which is the knowledge
that the effects of pollution can far outweigh the advantages to
industries and municipalities and thus to the public of intemperate
disposal of unsatisfactorily treated wastes. We need to emphasize a
reversal of the 19th century approach and to give people a higher
priority than property and profits.
I. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
Perhaps the current water supply and pollution problems should
be blamed on the fact that earlier water conditions were not over-
whelming soon enough to prompt recognition of the trouble that
was forthcoming. Until recently, not enough of a hue and cry was
raised to translate into preventive action and, worse still, not enough
anxiety was articulated to carry over into remedial action once the
damage was done. Despite the general feebleness of the public voice,
at the turn of the 19th century, Congress passed the first piece of
legislation which bore on water quality.
The authority of Congress to legislate in matters of water
pollution control and prevention derives from the commerce clause
of the Constitution.3 In the exercise of its jurisdiction over the navi-
gable waters of the United States in connection with the regulation
of interstate and foreign commerce, Congress has asserted the federal
interest and responsibility in protecting the quality of these waters.
The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, among other things,
prohibited the discharge of deposit into any navigable waters of any
refuse matter except that which flowed in a liquid state from streets
and sewers.4 As the first specific federal water pollution control legis-
lation, its primary purpose was to prevent impediments to navigation.
In the 20th century, legislation pertaining to water quality has
come before every Congress except during the war years. However,
prior to the end of World War II, Congress had enacted into law
but two of these proposed bills. Health implications of water pollu-
tion received attention in the Public Health Service Act of 1912
which authorized investigations of water pollution related to dis-
ease.5 The Oil Pollution Act of 1924 was enacted to control oil
discharges in coastal waters damaging to aquatic life, harbors and
docks, and recreational facilities.6
The measures described were only indicative and not represen-
tative in themselves of the many varied proposals introduced in
3 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (3).4
Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152.
5 Act of Aug. 14, 1912, ch. 288, § 1, 37 Stat. 309.
6
Act of June 7, 1924, ch. 316, 43 Stat. 604, 33 U.S.C. §§ 431-37 (1964).
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Congress during the first half of this century. Many different
approaches to the problem were put forth in these proposals. Some
of them conceived the federal role in water pollution as being
strongly regulatory with wide enforcement powers. Among the bills
that found their way into the hoppers were those which provided for
a federal permit system for the discharge of wastes and a prohibition
against the purchase of paper by the federal government from any
manufacturers who discharged wastes into a stream. On three separate
occasions, in 1936, 1938, and 1940, comprehensive water pollution
control legislation narrowly missed final enactment or approval.
After World War II renewal of efforts resulted in the enactment
by the 80th Congress of the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948.'
This law was admittedly experimental and initially limited in dura-
tion to a period of five years, which was extended for an additional
three years to June 30, 1956.8
Comprehensive water pollution control legislation of a perma-
nent nature was finally attained by the amendments enacted in 1956.'
The amended Act was administered by the Surgeon General of the
Public Health Service under the supervision and direction of the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Among other things,
this act
(1) Reaffirmed the policy of Congress to recognize, pre-
serve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
states in preventing and controlling water pollution;
(2) Authorized increased technical assistance to states and
broadened and intensified research by using non-governmental
research potential; authorized collection and dissemination of
basic data on water quality relating to water pollution prevention
and control;
(3) Directed the Surgeon General to continue to encourage
interstate compacts and uniform state laws;
(4) Authorized grants to states and interstate agencies
for water pollution control activities, and to municipalities for
the construction of waste treatment plants;
(5) Modified and simplified procedures governing federal
abatement actions against interstate pollution;
(6) Authorized the appointment of a Water Pollution
Control Advisory Board; and
(7) Set up a program to control pollution from federal
installations.
7 Act of June 30, 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66j
(1964).
8 Act of July 17, 1952, ch. 927, 66 Stat. 755, 33 U.S.C. § 466f (1964).
9 Act of July 9, 1956, §§ 1-14, 70 Stat. 498, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466-66j (1964).
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Proposals to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
to provide for a still more effective program of water pollution
control were introduced early in the first session of the 87th Congress,
and received the endorsement of President Kennedy in his February
1961 message on natural resources.
In July 1961, President Kennedy signed into law the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961.10 These amend-
ments improved and strengthened the Act by
(1) Extending federal authority to enforce abatement of
intrastate as well as interstate pollution by making "navigable"
waters subject to enforcement jurisdiction; and strengthening
enforcement procedures;
(2) Increasing amounts authorized for financial assistance
to municipalities in the construction of waste treatment works
for each of the six following fiscal years; raising the single
grant limitations; and providing for grants to communities
combining in a joint project;
(3) Intensifying research toward more effective methods
of pollution control; authorizing for this purpose annual appro-
priations and the establishment of regional and field labora-
tories;
(4) Authorizing the inclusion of storage to regulate
stream flow for the purpose of water quality control in the
planning of federal reservoirs and impoundments; and
(5) Designating the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare to administer the Act.
As in prior legislation and all succeeding legislation, the Act
declared Congressional policy affirming the primary responsibilities
and rights of the states in preventing and controlling water pollution.
Consequently, the federal functions in the area were designed to
be carried out in the fullest cooperation with state and interstate
agencies and with local public and private interests.
It may be readily perceived that the programs authorized by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act grouped themselves into three
major areas of effort - financial and technical assistance, research,
and enforcement. All stimulated voluntary action. Where such vol-
untary action was not forthcoming, enforcement authority could
make remedial action mandatory. The end product, abatement of
pollution and its prevention and control, has always been the aim
and purpose of all three of these coordinated program areas.
Extensive changes in the federal water pollution control program
were made in 1965 by enactment of the Water Quality Act." The
10 Act of July 20, 1961, 75 Stat. 204, 33 U.S.C. §§ 466a, 466g, 466i, 466j (1964).
11 Act of Oct. 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 903, 33 U.S.C. § 466 '(Supp. I, 1965).
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program was entirely removed from the Public Health Service and
constituted as an independent agency, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Administration.'" It is clear from the legislative history that
Congress had been dissatisfied with the slow tempo of regulatory
action and hoped, by upgrading the program, to emphasize the im-
portance and urgency of pollution control. On May 10, 1966, the
Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was transferred to
the Department of the Interior, and shortly thereafter an Assistant
Secretary of the Interior for Water Pollution Control was appointed.1
3
With most of the federal government's water programs under one
roof, better coordination and elimination of duplicated effort has
been effected, and the entire Department is united to fight the water
problems of the country.
II. ESTABLISHING WATER QUALITY STANDARDS
The most important addition to water pollution legislation has
been the establishment of national water quality standards for inter-
state waters. Section 10(c) (1) of the Water Quality Act of 1965
required all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Territories of
Guam and the Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico to submit to the
Department of the Interior proposed water quality criteria, or stand-
ards, for interstate or navigable water.' 4 These standards are, in the
words of the legislation, to "protect the public health or welfare,
enhance the quality of water .... ." Those establishing the standards
should consider "their use and value for public water supplies,
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes, and agricul-
tural, industrial, and other legitimate uses."'" With their proposals
for standards, which were to be submitted by June 30, 1967, the
states included plans for implementing and enforcing them. The
Secretary of the Interior is required to review them and either pass
them or institute procedures, as outlined in the Act, to work with the
states in devising acceptable standards. By now, he has judged that
the standards of most of the states adequately serve the cause of
water pollution control, and he has approved many as official federal
water quality standards.
To aid the states in establishing these water quality standards,
the Department of the Interior issued guidelines which explained
their purpose and desired function. These guidelines pointed out
that the water quality standards were designed to upgrade existing
water quality, except in those few cases where rivers are still in a
12 Id. § 2.
13 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1966, 80 Stat. 1608.
14 Act of Oct. 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 903, 33 U.S.C. § 466g (Supp. 1, 1965).
151d. § 5, 79 Stat. 908, 33 U.S.C. § 466g (Supp. I, 1965).
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state of natural purity. The standards could not "lock in" existing
low levels of water quality, or condemn rivers to serve as sewers.
No standards could allow any treatable wastes to be discharged
without treatment or without the best practicable treatment unless
it could be proven that lesser degrees of treatment were enough to
provide high water quality. The standards were to be designed with
a view to future water quality, taking into consideration urban and
industrial growth and increased demands for recreational oppor-
tunity.
The Interior Department also issued guidelines for the enforce-
ment and implementation plans required by the legislation. The
plans submitted by the states include time schedules for achieving
the water quality objectives. These time schedules include target
dates by which each waste discharger must provide adequate treat-
ment. The degree of treatment required depends, of course, on the
quality of water required by the standards. The time schedules
provide, generally, for the abatement of all existing conventional
municipal and industrial pollution within five years. Programs for
more complicated problems, such as combined sanitary and storm
water sewer overflows, have been scheduled over periods as long
as ten years. The measures to be used by the state pollution control
agencies to ensure compliance are specified in the enforcement plans.
The standards themselves were set by the states after public
hearings. At these hearings public testimony concerning all the
water uses which involved interstate or navigable streams was
invited. All water users, large and small, were considered - from a
few solitary fishermen to a large fishing fleet, from a farmer water-
ing a few head of cattle to a giant steel plant. The water uses under
consideration also included those not yet in existence. A small
town's potential as a future tourist center could have been deemed
a critical economic fact. The obsolescence of an industry, and its
likelihood of folding within a few years, also could have been
important in determining the best use of the region's waterways.
Predicted population changes over a long period of time had to be
considered, although they could not be allowed to obscure the
desires of the present population.
Water quality standards could not be established generally and
then applied to specific bodies of water as they had been in some
states prior to the Act. Each river, stream and lake may have its
own characteristics. The people of a region may prefer to swim in
one river, to fish in another. On some rivers industries are already
established; other rivers are still pristine. The wildlife in one stream
may already have been destroyed by pollution. Some rivers are
dredged frequently for navigational purposes. Some are naturally
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silty. Others have natural growths of algae. All kinds of facts, physi-
cal and human, were to be judged in deciding the best that could
be done with each body of water.
The Department of the Interior fully respected the desires of
the states to treat each stream as a separate case. Uniformity was
not the goal of the legislation. In fact, the only generalization to be
made about the water quality standards is that they are all to serve
in overcoming pollution. None of them will be permitted to allow
respite in the anti-pollution struggle. 6
III. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY
It is not intended that the water quality standards be mere
promises of good intentions. They are to be powerful weapons in
combatting pollution because they are to be effectively enforced.
The authority of the new federal Water Pollution Control Admin-
istration was expanded by the 1965 amendments to cover enforce-
ment of these standards so that the Secretary of the Interior is
empowered to act when the quality of interstate waters or portions
thereof has been reduced below the level set. 7 Once a state's quality
criteria and implementation plans are adopted as federal standards,
any violation of these standards is subject to abatement by enforce-
ment action. If the violation of the standards has interstate effects,
the Secretary of the Interior may proceed immediately to a suit
against the polluters.'
This does not mean that preference for cooperative action has
been discarded at all. In certain situations, the Secretary will con-
tinue to base enforcement action on the existing order of procedures.
Such situations are pollution of intrastate waters when a state gov-
ernor requests federal action, and interstate cases when a state
water pollution agency requests action. Current enforcement pro-
cedures will still be employed in another matter of pollution which
was placed under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior
by the 1965 Water Quality Act. This new authorization, termed the
"shellfish provision," directs the Secretary to initiate enforcement
action on his own when he finds that substantial economic injury
is resulting from the inability to market shellfish or shellfish prod-
ucts in interstate commerce because of pollution of interstate or
navigable waters and the action of federal, state, or local authorities.'"
16 Some States have taken advantage of the travail, hearings, and publicity accompanying
the establishment of the standards and have either updated or expanded existing intra-
state standards or established intrastate standards for the first time.





By the Clean Water Restoration Act of 1966, federal enforce-
ment authority was extended to international pollution when the
Secretary of State requests the Secretary of the Interior to initiate
an action.2 ° The regular conference and public hearing technique
also is retained in such a case. To date, this new authority has not
been applied to pollution involving boundary waters or rivers which
the United States shares with Mexico and Canada, but the existence
of such pollution situations involving international waters persuaded
Congress to provide for it.
As laid down by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
enforcement authority covers interstate or navigable waters where
pollution causes damage to the health or welfare of any persons.
21
According to the Appalachian Coal case2 2 and similar decisions, a
stream is considered navigable when it either is navigable in fact or
has once been navigable or by the reasonable expenditure of funds
can be made navigable. Being navigable means carrying some kind
of commercial traffic.
Where pollution emanating from sources in one state endangers
the health or welfare of persons in another state, initiation of the
enforcement process is mandatory upon the request of a state gov-
ernor, or an official state water pollution control agency, or a
municipality in whose request the governor and state agency concur.
It is similarly mandatory in intrastate pollution situations upon the
request of the governor of the state concerned, when the effect of
such pollution on the legitimate uses of waters is judged sufficient
by the Secretary of the Interior to warrant federal action. The exer-
cise of federal jurisdiction to abate interstate pollution without state
request is required when the Secretary of the Interior believes on the
basis of reports, surveys, or studies that such interstate pollution is
occurring.
The enforcement procedures give ample opportunity for coop-
erative federal-state action. The procedures specified to be taken
are (1) a conference, (2) a public hearing, and (3) court action.
Each successive step is taken only if the preceding step is unsuccess-
ful in securing compliance.
A. Conference
The initial stage of the enforcement process brings together the
federal government and the state and interstate water pollution
control agencies concerned. An enforcement conference operates
2OAct of Nov. 3, 1966, § 206, 80 Stat. 1250, amending 33 U.S.C. § 4 66g (Supp. I,
1965).
2133 U.S.C. § 466g(a) (1964).
2 United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416-17 (1940).
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informally and is not an adversary, courtroom proceeding. There are
no defendants and no prosecution, although in a few instances the
non-federal conferees have conceived of themselves in such a rela-
tionship. No strict rules of evidence are applied, and all state-
ments offered are accepted as relevant. The conference inquires
into the occurrence of the pollution subject to federal abatement,
the adequacy of the measures taken to abate it, and the delays, if
any, that are being encountered. As the conferences are public, each
of the conferees is permitted to bring as many people as he wishes
to speak, and each conference continues as long as anyone has any-
thing to contribute. There is a distinction between the conferees
and other participants, of course, since under the statute the con-
ferees alone must come to conclusions and recommendations. How-
ever, private citizens, representatives of conservation groups, man-
agers of industrial plants, politicians, and professors attend these
conferences and are heard.
After an opening by the chairman, a conference normally begins
with the presentation of a federal report on the condition of the
waters in question and the requirements for their improvement.
The strategy is to present a factual report, win agreement on the
diagnosis of the situation, and let the recommendations for action
follow unavoidably as the only means of correcting the situation.
The federal report is offered first as a courtesy to the state repre-
sentatives, giving them an opportunity for responding to it if they
so desire. However, any other conferee may report first; the agenda
is arranged in consultation with the state representatives. As each
state makes its statement, the industries and towns within that state
often make separate statements. In line with Congress' declared
policy of respecting the primary rights and responsibilities of the
states in pollution control, private industries and cities are dealt
with only through the state agencies.
At the conclusion of all statements, the conference usually
recesses for an "executive session" among the conferees for the
purpose of working out an agreement. In our concern for openness
in conducting these conferences, we have tried to dispense with these
closed sessions whenever possible.
The entire purpose of the conference is to see how much prog-
ress can be made toward a free, mutual agreement on a program of
corrective action, assuming a finding that the waters under discus-
sion are polluted and that such pollution is subject to abatement
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. However, in the
absence of adequate scientific and technical data, the conferees may
agree that further study is necessary before a schedule can be estab-
lished. The 1966 amendments added a new tool for acquiring infor-
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mation necessary to producing a remedial schedule. The new section
provides that upon request of the majority of conferees in any
enforcement conference (or during the next stage, the public hear-
ing) the Secretary may ask an alleged polluter to file with him a
report on the kind and quality of discharges he is putting into a
river or other body of water.
It has been impressively experienced that it is possible for the
conferees to arrive at unanimous conclusions and recommendations
to place before the public, the press, and the Secretary of the In-
terior for approval.
After the conference, the Secretary issues formal recommen-
dations for pollution abatement which are usually identical to the
recommendations of the conferees. If the conferees have reached no
agreement, the Secretary must issue his own recommendations. Upon
establishment of a remedial schedule, the states are encouraged to
obtain compliance under their own authorities and are allowed at
least 6 months to take the necessary actions.
At the enforcement conference, the public is the chief ally.
Progress in pollution control depends almost entirely on the forma-
tion of community understanding of the problem and support for
strong and vigorous action. Experience has demonstrated the im-
portance of elucidating the future as well as the immediate con-
sequences of water pollution; the urgency of the problem and the
disastrous effects of procrastination; the widespread implications
of water pollution, not only for commercial fishermen, conserva-
tionists, and other special interest groups but for the entire public
and the entire economy of a region. Above all, it is important to
project the water pollution problem on a canvas of future population
growth and economic expansion.
Once these points are made clearly to a broad audience, half
the battle is won. The best weapon against resistance to the require-
ments of pollution abatement is a widespread public knowledge of
the problem and the efforts being made to combat pollution. Few
industries want to incur a reputation of disregard for a community's
water resources, particularly those which market directly their own
finished product as compared to those which manufacture an inter-
mediate product which is then turned into a finished product else-
where. Few cities can refuse to provide adequate sewage treatment
if their citizens really understand the penalties of water pollution,
and are willing to vote the necessary funds to take care of remedial
facilities.
Since the conference step of the enforcement procedures is held
to be the method of choice in securing compliance, in my opening
statement as chairman of an enforcement conference, I frequently
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quote from a United States Supreme Court opinion of 1921.23 In
a suit against the State of New Jersey by the State of New York,
the Court at that time pointed out the unsuitability of court action
for settling disputes involving large concentrations of population
and industry, the solutions to which require complicated technical
judgment, mutual concessions, and detailed plans of action. Even
though the conference is only the first step, it is most frequently the
only step necessary. Of the 43 enforcement actions to date, only
four have gone to the hearing stage, and of these only one went to
the final stage of court action. Cooperative action taken in agree-
ment with state and local authorities is therefore a method likely
to be more earnest, more effective, and easier and less expensive
for all concerned than action enforced as a result of moving to the
next step or beyond.
B. Public Hearing
When remedial action within the period allowed is not taken,
the Act provides that a public hearing shall ensue.24 The alleged
polluters are made direct participants before a hearing board of five
or more persons appointed by the Secretary. Testimony is sworn
and statements of witnesses are subject to cross-examination. The
hearing board makes findings on the evidence presented and recom-
mends to the Secretary the measures which must be taken to secure
abatement. The board's findings and recommendations are sent by
the Secretary to the polluters and to the state agencies, together
with a notice specifying a reasonable time, which may not be less
than 6 months, to secure the abatement of the pollution.
C. Court Action
The last stage may be requested by the Secretary to be brought
by the Attorney General when remedial action is not taken by the
polluters within the time specified in the notice. In an intrastate
pollution matter, the written consent of the governor is necessary
to proceed with the court action.
In the operation of the water quality standards, when they are
adopted and acquire federal stature, enforcement successes will
continue to be measured by the number of cases that do not require
court action. The assumption that the vast majority of cases can be
solved through negotiation shall remain as a guidepost. When state,
federal, and local authorities combine with private organizations
and industries to pool technical know-how, financial resources, and
their commitment to restoring the waters of our country, the stage
is usually set for meaningful effective action.
2 New York v. New Jersey & Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm'rs, 256 U.S. 296, 299-300
(1921).
24Act of Oct. 2, 1965, 79 Stat. 908, 33 U.S.C. § 466g (Supp. 1, 1965).
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THE TAxING POWER AS A LAND USE
CONTROL DEVICE
By ORLANDO E. DELOGU*
Not only have local governmental bodies overlooked the
potential value of taxation policies in the encouragement of desired
land uses, but they also have far too often established tax policies
in direct conflict with the land use planners' objectives. Many of
the existing conflicts could be obviated by the uncomplicated legisla-
tive changes suggested by Mr. Delogu. In addition, he argues for
the development of a variety of positive tax programs which would
induce desirable uses of land - or penalize landowners who persist
in uses adverse to the interests of the total community.
T HE subject of land use control normally evokes notions of zoning,
subdivision control, or some similar application of the police
power. Some persons recognize that a wider range of powers exists
capable of affecting land use, such as the power of eminent domain,
governmental proprietary power, the power of governmental spend-
ing, and the persuasive ability of the executive. Unfortunately, how-
ever, the power to tax is rarely recognized as an available land use
control device;' and rarer still are examples and programs which use
the taxing power to achieve desired land use objectives.
*Associate Professor, University of Maine School of Law; B.S., 1960, University of
Utah; M.S., 1963, J.D., 1966, University of Wisconsin.
1 This paper makes no attempt to lay out or justify the historical and changing relation-
ship between taxation as a revenue-gathering device and taxation as a regulatory
device. Instead it assumes what to almost all authorities in the field of taxation is
self-evident, viz., that both of these goals are explicit or implicit parts of every form
of taxation historically used or in use today. See, e.g., S. SURREY & W. WARREN,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1-2 (1962); S. RATNER, AMERICAN TAXATION, ITS
HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY '(1942); J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY (1966); J. COMMONS, INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (1934); E. GRISWOLD,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 3-12 (4th ed. 1955).
[T]he American distinction between the taxing power and the police power
is, to a great extent, a legal fiction growing out of our system of govern-
ment, and is unnecessary from the economic and fiscal standpoint....
For the police power is none other than the sovereign power to restrain
or suppress what is deemed, by the dominant interests, to be disadvantageous,
and to promote and foster what they deem advantageous for the common-
wealth. Taxation then, is the most pervasive and privileged exercise of the
police power ....
J. COMMONS, supra at 820.
Some believe that special [tax) provisions go too far toward promoting
economic incentives, others believe that these provisions do not go far
enough. Nonetheless, tax policy is generally regarded as a legitimate and
useful device for promoting economic growth and stability, provided the
particular measures chosen are effective means of accomplishing their
objectives. Within these broad areas of agreement, there is considerable
controversy regarding the relative emphasis to be placed on [tax] equity
and economic objectives.
J. PECHMAN, supra at 5-6.
The title of the Tariff Act of 1922, of which § 315 is a part, is "An Act to
provide revenue, to regulate commerce with foreign countries, to encourage the
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I. THE FAILURE TO RECOGNIZE THE POWER TO TAX
AS A LAND USE CONTROL DEVICE
The extent of the failure to recognize the relationship between
the power to tax and land use objectives is best evidenced by the
almost total lack of coordination in municipal government between
property tax assessment policy and land use planning policy.' Local
tax assessors, acutely aware of revenue needs, tend to value lands not
at their present use value but at their potential market value if used
in some problematical highest and best capacity.3  For example,
agricultural or open land in the path of future subdivision develop-
ment will often be valued as land capable of being subdivided many
years before the area is actually needed or desired for that purpose.
This practice raises the tax burden substantially and often forces
industries of the United States and for other purposes." Whatever we may think of
the wisdom of a protection policy, we can not hold it unconstitutional. So long as the
motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure revenue for
the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in the selection
of the subjects of taxes can not invalidate congressional action. United States v. Kah-
riger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953) (combined tax collection with regulation of off track
betting); United States v. Sanches, 340 U.S. 42 (1950) (combined tax collection
with marihuana regulation) ; J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 412 (1928) ; see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 '(1922) ; United States v.
Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919) (combined tax collection with narcotics regulation);
McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904) (combined tax collection with oleo-
margarine regulation).
2W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASE-
MENTS (Urban Land Institute Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959).
As more land is developed, the more the community needs money to meet
the new burden of services, and thus the more it needs to raise taxes. Result;
more scatteration. The assessor has become de facto a master planner, and
the fact that it is by inadvertency only makes the problem worse.
It can be pointed out to him that the "highest and best use" of land is
often not residential subdivision; that open land frequently returns benefits
to the community out of all proportion to the services it requires; conversely,
the developed land which yields higher taxes may require services so costly
that the community pays out far more than it gains. It can also be pointed
out that his assessment policies may be negating many of the long-range
plans the community is set on. To all of which the assessor can reply that his
job is to collect taxes; it's not to do the master planning; and until the
public, through its state government, changes the rules for him, he has to
ep on doing just as he's been doing.
id. at 38.
3 Hagman, Open Space Planning and Property Taxation - Some Suggestions, 1964
WIs. L. REv. 628.
Finally, the owner of vacant rural-urban or fringe land is feeling the
pinch of high property taxes to a greater extent than in the past. In the
past such land may have enjoyed an illegal preference because of a practice
of undervaluing, strong taxpayer resistance accompanied by assessor sym-
pathy, a recognition of basic policy beliefs that vacant fringe land should be
valued lower, and an inability of assessors to make accurate assessments. A
number of counter-pressures have arisen, however, which may result in the
land now being taxed at nearer its proper value. These pressures include:
widespread revaluation programs; pressure for raising assessed values in
communities which are hard-pressed for tax dollars while, at the same time
approaching debt limits tied to assessed valuations; greater state supervision
of assessment practices; more frequent reassessments in areas of rapidly
rising values; more competent assessors; and greater focus on the require-
ment of following statutory valuation provisions.
Id. at 636-37 (footnotes omitted).
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subdivision, simply to pay the tax when both the owner of the land
and the local planning agency may have desired to retain the area in
its open or agricultural state. The past and present disappearance
of many rich agricultural areas and scenic open-space or wooded
areas near growing urban and suburban complexes can be attributed
in part to these assessment practices.4 The irony of the situation is
made complete when we recognize that the community may (now
or in the future) be spending a portion of its tax revenue to acquire
land for park and open-space purposes, which the land use planner
has recommended. In this situation there is not only a failure to use
the power to tax positively to achieve land use control objectives
but taxing policy is actually at cross purposes with and serves to
defeat land use objectives.
Another aspect of local government tax policy which has a
negative effect on local land use objectives is the practice of immedi-
ately raising the assessed value and thus raising the property tax on
properties which have recently completed improvements. These im-
provements may have been made as a matter of personal or civic pride,
in response to the enforcement of a building or housing code, or as
part of a neighborhood rehabilitation program. Whatever the
motivation, the fact is that a desired land use objective, viz., the care,
maintenance, and improvement of real property, is less likely to occur
because an immediate and direct penalty attaches. The greater the
extent to which the land use objective is sought to be advanced (the
higher the value of the improvement), the greater is the penalty.'
4 Krueger, The Rural-Urban Fringe Taxation Problem: A Case Study of Louth Town-
ship, 33 LAND EcoN. 264 (1957); Stocker, How Should We Tax Farmland on the
Rural-Urban Fringe?, in NATIONAL TAx ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS 463 (1961);
Walker, Land Use and Local Finance, TAx POLICY, July, Aug., Sept. 1962; Note,
Techniques For Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1622, 1641 (1962). An
argument in favor of undervaluing open or agricultural land in proximity to urban-
izing areas runs as follows:
Land used in agriculture produces an income and supports a value that is only
a fraction of what a developer or foresighted investor would pay. Because
farm income barely covers expenses as it is, the farmer does not have suffi-
cient capital to pay the current taxes and speculate on the future capital
gain. At some point the stakes become so high that the farmer becomes prey
to the interim speculator. To tax the farmer at the higher rate is not fair
because he is not receiving the benefits which cause the high rates on the
urbanized property. Moreover, in terms of ability to pay, the farmer is in a
bad position because of his low income.
Hagman, supra note 3, at 637, n.34.
5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1452b (Supp. II, 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30,
§ 4804.2.A, C (1964).
8 J. PICKARD, TAXATION AND LAND USE IN METROPOLITAN AND URBAN AMERICA
(Urban Land Institute Research Monograph No. 12, 1966); Harrison, Housing
Rehabilitation And The Pittsburgh Graded Property Tax, 2 DUQUESNE L. REV. 213
(1964).
Present city property tax policies place a premium on neglect and discourage
owners from renewal rehabilitation, or adequate maintenance of property.
Property taxes are not the only factor contributing to blight in our cities,
but they certainly weigh in on the wrong side of the scale in terms of incen-
tives for urban renewal.
J. PICKARD, supra at 10.
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These examples clearly evidence a failure either to perceive the
relationship between taxing power and land use objectives or to
reconcile tax policy with these objectives. Theoretically tax policies
having negative effects on land use objectives are capable of being
corrected, and, perhaps of greater importance, a range of positive
uses of the taxing power can be developed which will encourage
acceptance and achievement of land use objectives. Both devices
which eliminate (or minimize) existing conflicts between taxing and
land use policy and positive programs capable of using the power to
tax to achieve land use objectives can be designed. Whether or not
these devices and programs, as simple as some of them may be, will
be used is another question - a question of political will.
II. CORRECTING CONFLICTS BETWEEN TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES
In many instances the conflict between local tax assessors and
land use planners could be remedied by legislation which required
that the market value of comprehensively zoned land, and thus its
assessment value, reflect only those alternative uses permitted under
the applicable zoning ordinance instead of those land uses which
necessarily presuppose a zoning change. California has enacted legis-
lation specifically aimed at achieving this end:
In the assessment of land, the assessor shall consider the effect upon
value of any enforceable restrictions to which the use of the land may
be subjected. Restrictions shall include but are not necessarily limited
to zoning restrictions limiting the use of land and any recorded
contractual provisions limiting the use of lands entered into with a
governmental agency pursuant to state laws or applicable local
ordinances. There shall be a rebuttable presumption that restrictions
will not be removed or substantially modified in the predictable
future and that they will substantially equate the value of the land to
the value attributable to the legally permissible use or uses.
7
A similar Florida statute directs that "[a]l lands being used for
agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural lands ...re-
gardless of the fact that any or all of said lands are embraced in a
plat of a subdivision or other real estate development." These stat-
utes do not conflict with constitutional or statutory requirements of
7
CAL. REv. & TAX CODE § 402.1 (Supp. 1967).
8 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 193.11(3) (Supp. 1966) ; Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla.
1963) (sustaining the statute).
The lower court also fell into error in holding that "full cash value"
had reference to value for any and all potential uses. This interpretation
ignored the legislative classification of agricultural lands for tax purposes
on the basis of actual use which the legislature was authorized to make....
... The said act classified property being used for agricultural purposes
in a category by itself for assessment purposes and directed that it be
assessed as "agricultural lands upon an acreage basis" when so used. The
only restriction on the legislature's power appears to be that it be "not arbi-





tax uniformity if these requirements are interpreted (as they usually
are) to mean that taxes must be uniform only within reasonably
differentiated classes and categories of property.' The process of
zoning establishes such classes and categories of property. Conse-
quently, the highest and best land use permitted in one zoning district
(and thus the property tax burden imposed) may be substantially
different from that of another district without breaching the concept
of uniformity. Uniformity will only demand that all land similarly
zoned be similarly taxed.
The conflict between local tax policy and land use objectives
caused by the immediate upward reassessment of properties which
are improved seems capable of being remedied by establishing a period
of years during which the assessed valuation on improved or repaired
properties would not be raised. This time period would allow repair
and improvement costs to be assimilated into the fair market value
of the whole property before a reassessment takes place; and in the
case of commercial and industrial properties a major portion of these
costs could be recovered under existing depreciation, improvement
write-off, and maintenance and repair expense provisions of federal
and state tax codes.' 0 Thus, tax policy would become an incentive
rather than a deterrent to achieving land use objectives. Existing
Wisconsin tax legislation, which includes a lengthy justification of the
substantive tax provision and a statement of the desired land use
objectives, takes this approach exactly.
(a) Any city, town or village may establish a conservation area
(hereafter in this subsection referred to as "area") by resolution of
its governing board. Such resolution shall state:
(1) The boundaries of the area;
(2) The substandard, outworn or outmoded condition of the
industrial, commercial or residential buildings in the area;
(3) That such conditions impair the economic value of the
area;
(4) That the continuation of such conditions depreciates
values, impairs investments and reduces the capacity to pay taxes;
(5) That it is necessary to create with proper safeguards in-
ducements and opportunities for the employment of private invest-
ment and equity capital in the replanning, rehabilitation and con-
servation of the area;
(6) That through rehabilitation, conservation or replanning
the area may improve the general welfare of the city, town or village
and protect its tax base;
(7) That by virtue of additions, betterments, or alterations
made to the structures in the area, the health, safety, morals, welfare
and reasonable comfort of the citizens will be protected and
enhanced.
9 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 36 (1954).
10 E.g., INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, §§ 167, 178.
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(b) Any improvement made by an owner commenced after the
adoption of a local ordinance or resolution, through private invest-
ment to any existing completed structure in the area shall be deemed
to be made for the purposes and objectives of the area and shall be
excluded by the assessor of such locality in arriving at the assessment
of the real estate, but not to exceed the maximum amount established
by the municipality in the exemption period specified in par. (c),
provided that the actual cost of such additions, betterments or altera-
tions to the owner of the property is $200 or greater.
(c) The assessment exemption granted by this subsection may
continue for five assessment years and shall not be extended beyond
that time. The maximum value of any assessment exclusion for said
five-year period shall be either $1,000 or 10 per cent of the value of
the improved property."
The approach which this statute embodies also does not appear to
conflict with tax uniformity requirements. A reasonable classifica-
tion of property is established (improvements to existing structures)
to which a different assessment or tax policy may legitimately be
applied. Furthermore, uniformity requirements have never been inter-
preted to mean that the legislature is deprived of its power completely
to exempt certain classes of property from taxation. 2
III. POSITIVE PROGRAMS WHICH USE THE TAXING
POWER TO ACHIEVE LAND USE GOALS
In addition to eliminating tax policies having a deleterious effect
on land use, tax programs can be devised to facilitate the achievement
of planning goals. Some of these programs appear quite innocuous
in scope while others are more far-reaching. Most will require legis-
lative action to bring them into being. However, some may require
nothing more than appropriate action by the Internal Revenue
Service or by state departments of taxation. A commercial or indus-
trial taxpayer, for example, could be allowed to have the benefit
of an accelerated depreciation schedule under federal and state
income tax codes for expenditures which serve stated land use
objectives.'" This approach was taken by the federal government to
"1 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 70.11(24) (Supp. 1967).
12 Opinion of Justices, 141 Me. 446, 42 A.2d 47 (1945).
It is settled in this State that full power over taxation is vested in the
Legislature including that of determining upon what kinds and classes of
property taxes shall be imposed and what shall be exempt from taxation ....
... We are of opinion that the Legislature still has the power to deter-
mine what kinds and classes of property shall be taxed and what kinds and
classes shall be exempt from taxation.
Id. at 446-47, 42 A.2d at 49.
13 Cf. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 179.
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spur investment spending during the early and mid-1960's. 14 It seems
particularly well-suited to situations where repairs or improvements
as part of an area rehabilitation program are desired or where instal-
lation of costly air or water pollution control equipment is desired.
Wisconsin has enacted legislation limited to stimulating construction
of waste treatment plants and purchase of pollution abatement
equipment.' 5 The legislation provides for a complete write-off in the
year of cash disbursement of the full cost of such equipment or con-
struction. Similar federal or state legislation could be broadened to
benefit a much wider range of land use objectives. Furthermore, this
approach could be extended to individual income taxpayers who repair
or improve their properties in accordance with a publicly declared
land use objective by allowing them to deduct all or part of the cost
of these repairs or improvements on their individual federal and
state income tax returns. 16
Another opportunity to use the taxing system to achieve land
use objectives arises when the public's interest in a given piece of land
can be fully satisfied by acquiring less than the "fee" interest in that
piece of land, i.e., purchasing an easement.' 7 Easement purchase is
widely advocated by planners today,'" and an increasing number of
governments (local, state, and federal) '9 have used this device to
gain access to or over certain lands, to preserve scenic areas, or to
conserve marsh, woodland, and open-space areas. Permitting private
landowners to treat payments received for relinquished property
rights as a capital gain instead of ordinary income would tend to
encourage the sale of easements to agencies of government.2 ° There is
14 W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1966).
Most important among the measures to speed the advances of productivity
were $3 billion of tax incentives to investment in plant and equipment rec-
ommended in April 1961 and put into effect in 1962. Added to these were
another $3 billion of corporate tax rate deductions in 1964. The combination
of investment tax credits, more liberal depreciation, and lower corporate
rates may be thought of as a $6 billion shift from public to private saving,
one that offered direct investment stimulants in the form of expanded cash




WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71.04(2b) (Supp. 1967).
16 Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163 (interest paid) ; id. § 164 (taxes paid) ; id. § 165
(losses); id. § 166 (bad debts); id. § 170 (charitable contributions); id. § 213
(medical dental expenses) ; id. § 214 (child care deduction).
17 Colson v. Salzman, 272 Wis. 397, 75 N.W.2d 421 (1956). "An easement has been
defined in Wisconsin as a liberty, privilege or advantage in lands, without profit, and
existing distinct from the ownership of the soil." Id. at 423.
18 W. WHYTE, OPEN SPACE ACTION (Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commis-
sion Study Report No. 15, 1962); W. WHYTE, SECURING OPEN SPACE FOR URBAN
AMERICA: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (Urban Land Inst. Tech. Bull. No. 36, 1959);
Jordahl, Conservation and Scenic Easements: An Experience Resume, 39 LAND ECON.
343 (1963).
19See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 15.60(6) (i), 62.22(lm) (Supp. 1967).
20 A thorough and competent note evaluating this and other aspects of Wisconsin's ease-
ment purchase program was prepared by James A. Olson in 1965. Note, Progress and




some indication that such treatment would be allowed for the sale of
a perpetual affirmative easement;21 but, if the easement purchase
device is to become a useful tool in the hands of governmental
agencies, every conceivable type of easement (positive, negative, per-
petual, and those for a term of years) should be accorded capital
gains treatment.
A more far-reaching tax program which seeks to achieve land
use objectives is one which frankly recognizes that uniformity may
not be desirable in all situations. For example, Wisconsin's taxation
of forest crop lands largely frees these lands from general property
taxes but subjects the lumber crop to taxation at the time of severance
(or harvest) .22 Forest crop land is statutorily defined and represents
a category of real property into which any landowner may place his
lands. The purpose of the program is to
encourage a policy of preserving from destruction or premature
cutting the remaining forest growth in this state, and of reproducing
and growing for the future adequate crops of forest products on
lands not more useful for other purposes, so that such lands
shall continue to furnish recurring forest crops for commercial
use .... 28
By removing the burden of general property taxation based on some
present market value which looks to a more or less future speculative
or potential highest and best use, the taxing system induces land-
owners to use their land for forest crop purposes.24
Recently New Jersey took a similar approach to meet a desired
land use objective. The state constitution was amended to allow
agricultural and horticultural lands to be taxed at non-uniform rates
2 5
thus allowing their continued existence in close proximity to rapidly
urbanizing areas. Like the Wisconsin forest crop tax, the New Jersey
approach recognizes a land use objective and then seeks to adjust the
taxing system to allow the achievement of that objective. Both states
frankly recognize that there are some public goals which justify non-
uniform property taxation.
21 However, even as to this type of easement the suggested tax treatment is not com-
pletely assured but turns on a limited number of Internal Revenue Rulings and
possibly on the quantum of rights relinquished by the landowner. Id. at 358-59 & n.35.
2Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 77.02-.16 (Supp. 1967). Forest crop taxes in Maine are dis-
cussed in Comment, Timberland and Taxes in Maine: Property and Federal Income
Taxes, 17 MAINE L. REv. 227 (1965).
2WIs. STAT. ANN. § 77.01 (1957).
24 Waite, Land Use Controls and Recreation in Northern Wisconsin, 42 MARQ. L. Rv.
271 (1959).
The tendency of the tax features of the Forest Crop Law is to encour-
age owners to allow timber to mature before cutting and to follow good
forestry practices while the trees are growing. To the extent that owners do
use the land for forestry purposes, its recreational potential is protected and
enhanced through the exclusion of conflicting uses of an industrial, agri-
cultural or commercial nature.
Id. at 273.
2N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(b) (Supp. 1965).
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Completely eliminating uniformity requirements in property tax-
ation might also be considered. Some will think this suggestion radical
- a complete departure from concepts of equal protection and fair-
ness. However, when one recognizes that there is really very little
uniformity in the property tax system today because of variations in
local assessment,26 the early failure to insist upon state-wide uni-
formity (uniformity is demanded only within individual municipal
units), 27 and a failure to demand uniformity among all types and
classes of property (uniformity is demanded only within individual
classes of property) ,2 the suggestion hardly appears more than a
candid recognition of present reality. Non-uniform property taxation
could incorporate any number of safeguards and would as a matter
of course be expected to deal equally with property taxpayers who in
fact were similarly situated. The rationale for such an approach to
property taxation is that there are so many combinations of land type
and land use in existence that are not uniform that a system of prop-
erty taxation which recognizes this non-uniformity is fully justified.
The legislature could establish a hierarchy of land use objectives
to be accorded appropriate tax treatment. For example, dumps and
junk yards adjacent to major highways, scenic lakes, or coastal areas
2 F. BIRD, THE GENERAL PROPERTY TAX: FINDINGS OF THE 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERN-
MENTS (1960); 1 ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE
ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX (No. A-17, 1963).
A mildly exacting evaluation of the Census Bureau's findings discloses that
the indicated quality of assessment administration ranged from superior to
reasonably satisfactory in only one-fifth of the areas, while, at the other
extreme, it was incredibly poor in one-sixth of the areas. The selected areas
included 395 with populations of 50,000 and more in 1950, and therefore
clearly large enough to have competent professional assessment administra-
tion. An acceptable degree of uniformity was indicated for 22 percent of
these areas, including a number with high-quality accomplishment; but the
index in 20 percent of the areas disclosed almost incredible inequity. The
differences among the States, as indicated by comparison of the median area
indexes, were as conspicuous as for the individual areas. Wisconsin, Con-
necticut, and Maryland made a superior showing, a few others a good
showing; but in 5 States there were no selected areas with acceptable per-
formance and in 13 other States less than one-tenth of the areas could be
so ranked.
While the findings of the Census Bureau's study seemed to indicate
that the quality of local assessing ranges from mediocre to almost unbeliev-
ably inferior over a wide portion of the Nation, they were encouraging in
their indication that some results (at least for one important class of
property) reach a very satisfactory degree of uniformity.
Id. at 42-43.
2 7 Jensen v. Board of Supervisors of County of Polk, 47 Wis. 298, 2 N.W. 320 (1879).
The fact that one county, town or city is burdened with a greater weight of
taxation than another is not a violation of the rule of uniformity. If it were
there would be no lawful tax levied in the state, as nearly every municipality
raises a different amount of taxes upon the same amount of taxable property,
the amount depending upon the necessities of the municipality, or the will of
its officers.
Id. at 331.
2 Note 9 supra.
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could have a high property tax. Similar activities situated more dis-
cretely could have a lower property tax. Slum tenements, old ware-
houses, abandoned or damaged buildings, and unusable dockyard
facilities could be taxed heavily while low-income housing, sub-
divisions which cluster house units in order to retain an open or
natural area, and rehabilitation projects could be induced by favorably
low property tax treatment. 9 Property taxes aimed at discouraging
certain land use activities can be increased (made more onerous) in a
step process over a series of years until the objective is achieved."0
Highly favorable property tax treatment designed to induce a desired
type of land utilization could be ended after a given number of years
or could also employ a step process which eventually levels out at the
average rate of taxation for such activities and which thus serves to
concentrate the tax incentive in the early years of the undertaking.
1
The point is that such an approach is a direct harnessing of the prop-
erty tax system to land use goals: The system can act as a deterrent to
remove or relocate undesirable land uses or as an incentive to induce
desirable uses.
An even more dramatic departure from present methods of tax
collection which might serve land use objectives in our society is
complete abandonment of property taxation as a means of revenue
collection. Many critics feel that the property tax is inherently in-
equitable because it raises general revenues by taxing only some
property owners or types of property within the community. It is
alleged that if the property tax is not inherently inequitable it none-
theless produces inequitable results because of the limitations we have
placed on the concept of uniformity and because of the difficulties of
2 The proposal being made is an extension of Hagman's approach, supra note 3, which
accepts the concept of preferential property tax treatment but which limits its use to
land controlled for open space preservation purposes.
Lands controlled for exclusively agricultural, ranching, recreational, airport,
golf course or conservation uses would seem to be the prime candidates for
special tax treatment. Lands kept in reserve as water storage areas, flood
plains or potential sites for parks, community facilities and industrial tracts,
might also be eligible if land use controls are applied. Forest land might be
included if special forest tax provisions are non-existent or inadequate.
Hagman, supra note 3, at 648-49. The view of this paper, however, is that once the
concept of preferential property tax treatment to achieve land use objectives is
accepted, the legislature after viewing the complete spectrum of such objectives can
and should establish a hierarchy or set of preferences as between them and accord to
each appropriate property tax treatment.
30 This proposal is loosely analogous to a number of other concepts in the law which
utilize essentially coercive devices to achieve desired ends or to deter undesirable
types of action, e.g., punitive damages, triple damages, penalty taxes.
31 Cf. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(b) (concentrates depreciation allowances in the
early years of the useful life of depreciable property by allowing use of the declining
balance and sum of the years-digits methods of computation) ; ADVISORY COMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LOCAL TAXATION AND INDUSTRIAL LOCA-
TION (No. A-30, 1967) passim.
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administering the tax.82 Many feel that it stifles investment and that
the historical nature of statutory and case law in existence with respect
to this tax renders it relatively inflexible - incapable of adapting to
meet other community goals such as land use objectives.33 In short,
persuasive arguments can be made for raising needed governmental
revenues by some alternative means - a method free from all of the
defects listed above and one which would leave local governments
free to determine land use goals and objectives without the necessity
of working within or around the present property tax system. A trend
in the direction of reducing state and local governments' reliance
on the property tax as a source of revenue is already evident. In 1929
over 60 percent of all state and local receipts were derived from prop-
erty taxes. In 1966 only 28 percent of such receipts were derived from
the property tax.34
The proposal to abandon the property tax at this time is con-
sistent with recent proposals by Walter Heller and Joseph Pechman
3 2 Notes 9, 26 & 27 supra; cf. ADvISoRY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS,
1 THE ROLE OF THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAx (No. A-17,
1963).
Strong arguments have been advanced, time and again, for abolition of
all ad valorem taxation of personal property and restriction of the property
tax to real property. (Many of the advocates of this general policy would
retain business machinery and equipment in the tax base.) Cited in support
of this program are the unadministrable features of personal property taxa-
tion, the widespread condoning of evasion, the injustices inherent in some
of the legal provisions, and the need to focus all resources on improving
administration of the tax on real property.
Actually, the case for thus narrowing the tax base is not as strong as it
might appear. Personal property, no less than real property, is part of the
wealth of individuals; an owner of personal property is as much an owner
of property as the owner of land and improvements. The property tax is a
tax on things, not on net wealth or net income of persons, and when it dis-
criminates among classes of property it favors some classes at the expense
of others.
Id. at 32.
33 A tax as ancient as that on property tends to become an institution and
to accumulate fondly clinging traditions as it evolves over the years. Certain
concepts more admired a hundred years ago than now found their way into
State constitutions from which some States have not yet been able to extri-
cate them, and rudimentary methods of administering the tax that worked
only fairly well in colonial days are still cherished in some areas with what
has been described as "a touching though misplaced fidelity." Since reha-
bilitation of the property tax involves a challenge of some of its institutional
idiosyncrasies, their identification may be useful.
Id. at 3; M. MEYERSON & E. BANFIELD, BOSTON: THE JOB AHEAD (1966).
But the most serious defect of the real property tax is that it discourages new
investment. As it stands, the tax offers property owners no incentive to tear
down old houses, office buildings, stores, and factories and build better ones
in their places. On the contrary, it actually penalizes efforts at moderniza-
tion; a new building is at a tax disadvantage as compared to an old one.
Id. at 28.
"' King & Lefkowitz, The Finances of State and Local Governments, SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS, Oct. 1967, at 26, table 5.
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which advocate an increased reliance upon the income tax revenue
gathering capacity of the federal government.35 They argue that the
progressive income tax is more equitable, that the administrative
machinery for collection is established, efficient, relatively inexpensive
to maintain, and could easily be expanded if necessary. 6 Their pro-
posals call for a sharing back to the states of a portion of the total
revenues collected, and one can easily imagine a second stage of shar-
ing by states to local governments. 7 The advantage that such an
arrangement would have with respect to land use objectives is that
incentives aimed at corporations and individuals could be made part
of a taxing system which would uniformly cover the entire nation
and which would thus give uniform national impetus to these objec-
tives. Furthermore, the formula for sharing back the collected rev-
enues from the federal government to the states and from the states to
local units of government could take into account the degree to which
these state and local units of government adhere to legislatively
adopted land use objectives. For example, states which make an effort
to deal effectively with air and water pollution would be entitled to
relatively more money than states which neglected these problems.
Cities which make a vigorous attempt to ameliorate problems of
ghetto schools and housing, waste disposal and treatment, and urban
transportation would be entitled to relatively greater sums than cities
which neglect their responsibilities in these areas.
35 W. HELLER, NEW DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 117-72 (1966).
In capsule, the revenue-sharing plan would distribute a specified portion of
the Federal individual income tax to the states each year on a per capita
basis, with next to no strings attached. This distribution would be over and
above existing and future conditional grants.
Id. at 145.
so One of the false issues of efficiency that besets the debate is the peren-
nial charge that channeling Federal Funds to the states increases govern-
ment costs by "the additional freight of a round-trip to Washington." This
charge would hardly merit serious debate were it not such a stubborn weed
in the garden of fiscal coordination. Yet it should wither before the facts.
First, costs of collecting Federal taxes are far below costs of collecting state
and local taxes. Second, given vast advantages in jurisdiction, size, and scale,
the Internal Revenue Service is an inherently more efficient tax administer-
ing agency than those of the states. Third, with respect to plans like revenue
sharing, there would need to be no new machinery and no added administra-
tive costs of any consequence. The round-trip to Washington would cost less
than a round-trip to the state house or city hall. On these, admittedly narrow,
efficiency grounds, the flow-through of Federal income tax funds to the
states would get high marks.
Id. at 167.
37 This second stage of sharing will pose few difficulties. Most states to some extent
already share general state tax revenues with local units of government either on an
unrestricted basis to augment local tax revenues or on an earmarked basis for par-
ticular local expenditures of state-wide concern '(most frequently education).
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To some extent these incentive devices already exist in federal
and state tax sharing and aid programs, 8 but they would have greater
weight if incorporated as part of a national system of income taxation
and revenue sharing which at the same time contemplated the aban-
donment of the property tax and which consequently would be the
principal source of revenue for all levels of government.
The abandonment of the property tax does not depend on
expanding the federal income tax mechanism to fill the void and
produce needed revenue. Individual states, many of which already
have an income tax and collection machinery, could perform the
function quite satisfactorily. They could program into their respective
income tax structures incentives designed to achieve land use objec-
tives, and they also could share the taxes collected with local govern-
mental units in a manner which induces compliance with land use
goals.
It would not be impossible to extend the principle inherent in
federal and state tax-sharing programs (or grant-in-aid programs) to
individuals and corporations. That is, individuals and corporations
that undertake to carry out at their own expense legislatively endorsed
federal, state, or local land use objectives would qualify for a subsidy
or grant-in-aid which would cover a portion of the total costs in-
curred.39 Tax revenues expended in this manner induce private funds
to be spent on essentially public land use objectives. The partnership
of public and private funds is healthy, and the fact that private as
well as public benefits may accrue should not deter an exploration of
this approach.
Milton Friedman and others have advocated a "negative income
tax" as a means of assisting (making payments to) individuals whose
38 A familiar example is state school aid formulas which favor consolidated districts
over independent or unconsolidated districts: e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 40.70(5),
(6) (1957). Federal aid programs which condition assistance on the existence of
coordinated and comprehensive planning efforts similarly create a strong incentive to
act in the desired manner: e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1964) (highway construction);
33 U.S.C. § 466(e) (1964) (construction of sewerage-treatment plants) ; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1500(b) '(1964) (open-space acquisition).
39 The federal income tax system in the form of personal deductions and exemptions
and in the manner it allows corporations to define and handle business expenses and
depreciation already gives incentive and impetus to a wide range of goals which
Congress has deemed socially or otherwise desirable. These include dental and medical
care; consumer purchases of housing, automobiles, and other durable goods; religious
and charitable contributions; capital goods investment spending; and soil conservation
expenditures. A more complete listing of congressional beneficence can be compiled
by examining the Topical Index headings "business expenses," "depletion," "depre-
ciation, .... exempt income" and "personal deductions" of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954.
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income falls below some minimum level.40 A variation of this ap-
proach might be applied, for example, to housing improvement.
Individuals whose residences did not measure up to building code
standards would qualify for a money payment which could be used
only to make those necessary improvements which would bring the
house up to code standards. The farther below the code standards
(that is the more rundown the structure was initially) the larger
would be the payment. If the substandard housing unit is a rental or
an apartment house and the owner is indifferent to its condition, the
payment could be made to the tenant, to a tenants' union, or to a local
court to insure that the sums paid were in fact allocated to the
improvement of the housing unit. 1 The owners of such structures
should not object to their improvement by these means, and to prevent
the possibility that owners with newly refurbished structures would
either raise the rent or evict the present tenants, lease arrangements
could be entered into at the outset of the repair and improvement
program.
Another taxing approach which would further land use objec-
tives is one which relies on a combination of special assessment con-
cepts and the concept of effluent charges. Special assessment tax
theory holds that a levy on property for special benefits conferred
upon such property by a governmental act or improvement may be
40 M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Tobin, Pechman, & Mieszkowski,
Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J. 1 (1967).
The arrangement that recommends itself on purely mechanical grounds
is a negative income tax. We now have an exemption of $600 per person
under the federal income tax (plus a minimum 10 per cent flat deduction).
If an individual receives $100 taxable income, i.e., an income of $100 in
excess of the exemption and deductions, he pays tax. Under the proposal,
if his taxable income minus $100, i.e., $100 less than the exemption plus
deductions, he would pay a negative tax, i.e., receive a subsidy. If the rate
of subsidy were, say, 50 per cent, he would receive $50. If he had no income
at all, and, for simplicity, no deductions, and the rate were constant, he
would receive $300. He might receive more than this if he had deductions,
for example, for medical expenses, so that his income less deductions, was
negative even before subtracting the exemption. The rates of subsidy could,
of course, be graduated just as the rates of tax above the exemption are. In
this way, it would be possible to set a floor below which no man's net
income (defined now to include the subsidy) could fall - in the simple
example $300 per person. The precise floor set would depend on what the
community could afford.
M. FRIEDMAN, supra at 191-92.
41 Davis & Schwartz, Tenant Unions: An Experiment in Private Law-Making, 2 HARV.
CIv. RIGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 237 (1967), reprinted and expanded in N.Y.U.
SCHOOL OF LAW, PROJECT ON SOCIAL WELFARE LAW, Supp. No. 1, HOUSING FOR
THE POOR: RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 100 (1967).
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collected.42 The concept of effluent charges maintains that an eco-
nomic entity that disposes of its waste products in the waters of a
state may be required to make a payment to the state for that privilege.
It is in the nature of an excise tax.4 3 The revenues collected by such
a charge either could be paid over to those individuals injured by the
water pollution or could be expended to erect water pollution control
and treatment facilities.44 The present proposal is simply to subject
every undesirable or offensive land use situation to a system of taxa-
tion based on one or the other or both of these two theories. The size
of the tax would be measured by the costs incurred by the public
to remove or correct the undesirable or offensive situation. For
example, public improvement of a slum tenement would confer a
special benefit on the owner of the building justifying a tax in the
nature of a special assessment. The tax could cover all or only a part
of the total costs incurred.4 5 The costs to the public of planting and
maintaining a screening to block from view a dump or junk yard
would be the measure of a tax more akin to the effluent charge.
The privilege of carrying on this activity in an undesirable and indis-
criminate manner may be allowed to continue, but the cost of amelio-
rating the undesirable effect upon the rest of the community will be
forced back on the owner of the dump or junk yard facility. Should
the community desire to create by purchase and then to maintain a
park or open-space area in a particular neighborhood, a portion of
the costs of such an endeavor might well be passed on to those land-
owners whose property values are enhanced by the creation of such a
facility. To the extent that the creation and continued maintenance
of such a facility in the neighborhood is more nearly a privilege than
42 J. FORDHAM, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1949).
A familiar method of financing local improvements is the special assess-
ment. It is usually and properly classified as a form of taxation and, like
general taxes, may be levied only for public purposes. While jurisdiction
to impose general taxes is conventionally made out by reference to the
general benefits of government extended by the taxing unit, a special assess-
ment is based upon benefits in a more exacting sense. The tax is laid for
a special purpose, which is calculated to benefit the property burdened to a
degree not enjoyed by property not assessed.
The device is far from new. In English law and practice it goes back to the
Sixteenth Century improvement commissioners. It was employed in colonial
America. A statute of 1691 made provision for such financing by New York
City. That and other early instances of legislation on the subject are noted
in the leading case of People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 438
(1851).
Id. at 451.
43 A. KNEESE, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL WATER QUALITY MANAGEMENT (1964);
Delogu, Effluent Charges: A Method of Enforcing Stream Standards, 19 MAINE L.
REV. 29, 39-44'(1967).
44 Id. at 41-42 & 44-47.
45 A tax which covered only part of the total costs incurred would simply recognize, as
many special assessment situations actually do, that there is some degree of general
benefit in almost every public improvement, even those which ostensibly and most
directly benefit only a few individuals.
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a right and clearly confers a special benefit on neighborhood residents,
a tax measured by the costs of initial acquisition and upkeep does not
seem unreasonable.46
Once again, a hierarchy of undesirable land use situations and
countervailing public actions could be constructed by the legislature
and appropriate tax rates imposed designed not only to discourage
the private continuation of these undesirable situations but also to
produce a fund which would enable public repairs or improvements
to be made. In some instances the public action will confer a direct
benefit on a private landowner, and in other instances the public
action will simply provide for an adequate buffer or shield so that
adverse effects of the undesirable situation will not be felt by an entire
community. In either case the essential fairness of such an approach
is clearly evident, for the direct beneficiary of a public improvement
is called upon to bear part of the cost of such governmental action
and the creator of an unsightly or otherwise adverse land use condition
bears the cost of amelioration.
CONCLUSIONS
Present systems of taxation in this country neither provide for
accomplishing land use objectives nor do they remain neutral. In
far too many instances taxing systems contradict and serve to defeat
land use objectives. However, contradictions can be corrected, and tax
programs which facilitate the attainment of land use objectives can
be developed. A range of such programs in outline form only has
been presented in this paper. Each is capable of being expanded,
tailored to meet individual objectives, and developed in the course of
actual application - but the promise is there.
The extent to which oil and gas depletion allowances in the
federal income tax system 47 have spurred extractive and land exploit-
ing activities is ample proof that a similar harnessing of the taxing
power to the attainment of a wide range of land use objectives would
also be successful. It is hard to imagine that a tax-incentive program
which even approached present oil and gas depletion allowances
would not be capable of producing clean air over cities most in need
of air pollution control activities or clean water in lakes, rivers, and
streams most in need of attention. It also seems hard to believe that
many other undesirable and offensive land use conditions which today
exist in our society could not be induced to change for the better by
taxing systems which provide adequate tax incentives or penalties.
However, tax reform has never been an easy process in our society.
Advocates of conservation, the wise use of resources, and environ-
4It is very analogous to the concept of waste load surcharges employed by municipal-
ities to defray sewage disposal costs and user charges generally.
47 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 611-14.
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mental improvements have no strong lobby in Congress or state
legislatures. Our society is only now awakening to the dimensions
of the problem in these areas and is rather belatedly discussing and
developing tools capable of achieving land use objectives. The power
to tax is such a tool and should be thoroughly examined and effec-
tively used. The principle of the carrot and the stick is an old one.
It has been made to work before - it can be reasonably and fairly
applied and made to work again.
SEARCH WARRANTS AND SANITATION
INSPECTIONS-THE NEW LOOK IN
ENFORCEMENT*
By SIDNEY EDELMAN**
Two 1967 Supreme Court decisions brought the protections of
the fourth amendment to bear on administrative searches into both
private homes and commercial premises. These cases, Mr. Edelman
points out, require the federal and local governments to alter their
approach to housing, sanitation and safety inspections. The author
suggests that an understanding of the private rights guaranteed by
the Constitution is necessary to the development of legislation and
administrative procedures which will allow social programs for the
public health and welfare to be carried out without invading those
private rights. With this goal in mind, Mr. Edelman discusses the
legal problems surrounding the exclusionary rule, consent to a war-
rentless search, who may consent, standing to challenge seizure,
enforcement of warrants, and consent to warrantless searches as a
condition of the license. Mr. Edelman suggests that statutory author-
ization will be necessary at any governmental level to provide a
workable procedure for obtaining search warrants. The necessity of
describing particularly the things to be seized is not an insurmount-
able problem, according to Mr. Edelman. He asserts that a court can
constitutionally issue a warrant if the purpose of the search is stated.
He reasons that with this information a court can determine the
necessity of the search and verify its limits. To illustrate the proce-
dure used by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, one
set of forms developed for obtaining warrants is included in an
appendix to the article.
"It is not admissible to do a great right by doing a little
wrong.... It is not sufficient to do justice by obtaining a proper
result by irregular or improper means."
- Miranda v. Arizona'1
INTRODUCTION
T HE RECENT decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States
in Camara v. Municipal Court2 and See v. City of Seattle5 call
for a thorough reexamination and revision of the concepts and proce-
dures which have previously guided the conduct of housing, sanitation,
and safety inspection programs in this country.
*Presented at the 95th Annual Meeting of the American Public Health Association,
Inc., at Miami, Florida, Housing and Health Session, Oct. 25, 1967. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and should not be understood as expressions
of any official position.
**Chief, Environmental Health Branch, Public Health Division, Office of the General
Counsel, Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare.
1384 U.S. 436, 447 (1966).
2387 U.S. 523 (1967).
3 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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The Camara case arose out of the refusal of Camara, the lessee
of the ground floor of an apartment building, to permit a housing
inspector access to a part of the leased premises used by Camara as a
personal residence. This residential use was alleged to be in violation
of the occupancy permit for the building. Camara was advised that
section 503 of the San Francisco Housing Code authorized the entry
of housing inspectors into any building, structure, or premises in the
city, but he persisted in refusing the inspector access to his apartment
without a search warrant. Thereafter he was arrested and charged
under section 507 of the Code4 with refusing to permit a lawful
inspection. Contending that section 503 was contrary to the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, Camara sought a writ of prohibition in
a California superior court against his trial on the charge of violating
that section.
Upholding Camara's contention and overruling Frank v. Mary-
land,' Mr. Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court, held that
administrative searches for housing violations are significant intru-
sions on the privacy and security of individuals - interests which are
protected by the fourth amendment' against arbitrary invasions by
government officials and enforceable against the states under the
fourteenth amendment.' The Court declared that "such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the
traditional safeguards which the Fourth Amendment guarantees to
the individual . . . ."' This is true, Mr. Justice White noted, whether
discovery of a violation on the initial inspection leads to a criminal
conviction or results only in an administrative compliance order. In
the latter case, he pointed out, refusal to comply is a criminal offense,
with the fact of compliance verified by a second inspection, again
without a warrant, and the refusal to permit the inspection is itself
a crime.9
Having concluded that a search warrant was necessary to support
the inspection at issue, Mr. Justice White turned to the fourth amend-
ment requirement that "no warrants shall issue but upon probable
4 Under section 507, such refusal is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more
than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 6 months or by both such fine and
imprisonment.
5 359 U.S. 360 (1959). This case held that sanitation and housing inspections not
seeking evidence for criminal prosecution were not unreasonable searches within the
fourth amendment and did not require search warrants.
6 The fourth amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
7 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
9 Id. at 531.
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cause." Recognizing that "the only effective way to seek universal
compliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes
is through routine periodic inspections of all structures," 10 he declared
that the area inspection approach was a reasonable search of private
property within the meaning of the fourth amendment," and pro-
vided the following guidelines for the determination of "probable
cause" to issue a warrant:
[I]t is obvious that "probable cause" to issue a warrant to inspect
must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for
conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular
dwelling. Such standards, which will vary with the municipal pro-
gram being enforced, may be based upon the passage of time, the
nature of the building (e.g., a multi-family apartment house), or the
condition of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend
upon specific knowledge of the condition of the particular dwelling.'
2
The Court noted three significant reservations to its general
holding:
[1] [N]othing we say today is intended to foreclose prompt inspec-
tions, even without a warrant, that the law has traditionally upheld
in emergency situations. ... [2] [A]s a practical matter and in light
of the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant specify the
property to be searched, it seems likely that warrants should normally
be sought only after entry is refused unless there has been a citizen
complaint or there is other satisfactory reason for securing immediate
entry. [3] Similarly, the requirement of a warrant procedure does
not suggest any change in what seems to be the prevailing local
policy, in most situations, of authorizing entry, but not entry by
force, to inspect.' 3
In See,'4 the owner of a locked warehouse refused to permit a
representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and
inspect the warehouse without a warrant. The intended inspection
was part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to compel compliance
with Seattle's Fire Code and was authorized by section 8.01.050 of
the Code. That section authorized entry into buildings and inspections
without a search warrant. See, who was convicted and given a
suspended fine of $100.00 for violation of the section, contended
that the warrantless inspection authorized by the Code would violate
his rights under the fourth and fourteenth amendments.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the Court in this case also,
declared there was no justification for distinguishing between private
W Id. at 535-36.
11 Id. at 538.
121d.
13 Id. at 539-40. The opinion cites, with regard to emergency situations, North American
Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (seizure of unwholesome
foods); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory smallpox
vaccination); Compagnie Francaise v. Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902) (health
quarantine); Kroplin v. Truax, 119 Ohio St. 610, 165 N.E. 498 (1929) (summary
destruction of tubercular cattle).
14 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
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houses and commercial premises insofar as the protection of the fourth
amendment was concerned, saying:
As we explained in Camara, a search of private houses is presump-
tively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The business-
man, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go
about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his
private commercial property. The businessman, too, has that right
placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation
of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the
field without official authority evidenced by a warrant.15
The Court concluded that "administrative entry, without consent,
upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the
public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force
within the framework of a warrant procedure."' 6
This holding, like that in Camara, was hedged about by com-
ments and reservations:
(1) The Court, with respect to the timing of a warrant, stated:
We do not decide whether warrants to inspect business premises may
be issued only after access is refused; since surprise may often be a
crucial aspect of routine inspections of business establishments, the
reasonableness of warrants issued in advance of inspection will nec-
essarily vary with the nature of the regulation involved and may
differ from standards applicable to private homes.17
(2) The Court did not "imply that business premises may
not reasonably be inspected in many more situations than private
homes .... "Is
(3) The Court did not question "such accepted regulatory
techniques as licensing programs which require inspections prior to
operating a business or marketing a product." 9
The teaching of these cases is that an entry upon and inspection
of private property - residential property or commercial property
not open to the public- by government officials without proper
consent is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the fourth
amendment and may not be enforced unless authorized by a valid
search warrant. ° Accordingly, the occupant may not be punished for
refusing to permit a warrantless inspection. The restriction against
Is Id. at 543.
16 Id. at 545 (footnote omitted).
17 Id. at 545 n.6. This language would appear to limit the issuance of warrants in
advance of refusal to permit inspection of residential premises to two situations,
i.e., a citizen complaint or other satisfactory reason (an emergency?) for securing
immediate entry. Id. at 539-40.
18 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
19 Id.
2 Although not an issue in these cases, corporations are protected by the fourth
amendment against warrantless entries and inspections. "[T]he Fourth Amendment
has been held applicable to corporations notwithstanding their exclusion from the
privilege against self-incrimination.. " Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 205 (1946) (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) ; Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
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entry on private commercial property would, of course, be applicable
to the portions of multi-family houses reserved by the landlord, e.g.,
boiler rooms.
CONSTITUTIONAL INSPECTIONS AND THE NEED FOR
ADMINISTRATIVE INGENUITY
Putting aside the problems relating to the development of
inspection criteria designed to meet the probable cause requirement of
the fourth amendment, as suggested by the Court, let us examine
some of the other legal problems not mentioned in the decisions
which will attend the administrative implementation of the Court's
holdings.
A. Availability of Warrants
At the very threshold of our consideration we are confronted
with the question: Is there an available procedure for obtaining a
search warrant to make an inspection?
In Camara, the brief on behalf of the government pointed out
that there was no specific provision in the San Francisco Code or in
the state law under which a search warrant for inspection of the
premises could have been obtained." This situation is a generally
prevailing one, since most state laws authorizing the issuance of
search warrants are patterned on the federal authority, which is lim-
ited to searches for fruits of crime, instrumentalities, and certain
contraband.2 Congress has never authorized the issuance of search
warrants for the seizure of mere evidence of crime, although the
Supreme Court has recently indicated that a search warrant could be
authorized for such a purpose after fulfilling the probable cause and
particularity requirements of the fourth amendment and after the
intervention of "a neutral and detached magistrate." 23 Research has
disclosed only eight states which, subject to the probable cause and
specificity requirements of the fourth amendment, authorize the issu-
ance of search warrants to search for and seize property constituting
evidence of crime or tending to show that a particular person com-
mitted a crime." Only one state - New Jersey - specifically author-
21 Brief for Appellee at 4.
22 Rule 41 (b), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides:
(b) Grounds for Issuance.
A warrant may be issued under this rule to search for and seize any property
(1) Stolen or embezzled in violation of the laws of the United States; or
(2) Designed or intended for use or which is or has been used as the
means of committing a criminal offense; or
(3) Possessed, controlled or designed or intended for use or which is or
has been used in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. § 957.
23 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 309-10 (1967).
24 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524 (West 1956) (only in case felony has been committed);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 108-3 (1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 626.07 '(1947);
MONT. REV. CODE ch. 95, § 705 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:11-16 (1964);
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 792 (McKinney 1958); ORE. REV. STAT. § 141.010 (1953);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4701 (1959).
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izes the issuance of a search warrant to enter and inspect multi-family
dwellings for housing code violations.2 5 Clear authorization to issue
inspection warrants (or equivalent court orders) under fourth amend-
ment safeguards is thus a matter of the highest priority and need.
In the light of the rulings in these cases, the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare has taken the position that inspection
warrants may be issued under specific authorities for inspection pro-
vided in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and in the Federal
Hazardous Substances Act. A few of these warrants have already
been obtained, and one set of the forms developed for such purpose
is included in the appendix. Whether a similar approach is feasible
under state and local laws would, of course, depend on an evaluation
of the prevailing statutory situation.
B. The Exclusionary Rule
Lest there be any temptation to do business as usual on initial
inspections, one consequence of an illegal search which should be
noted here is that any seizure made during an illegal search would
itself be illegal, and if timely and appropriate objection is made, such
items may not be used or remain in evidence.26 This exclusionary
rule, flowing from the command of the fourth amendment imple-
mented by the fifth amendment, is applicable to the states under the
fourteenth amendment.2" The rule has traditionally barred from trial
physical tangible materials obtained either during or as a direct result
of an unlawful invasion.28 But the policies underlying this rule do
not invite any distinction between tangible and intangible evidence
so that a verbal statement made during an illegal search has been
suppressed and testimony concerning objects illegally observed has
been excluded.29 Nor may conditions illegally observed be the basis
for subsequently swearing out a search warrant.30 The applicability
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:11-16 (1964).
2 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 391-92 (1920); Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) ; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
27 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). As the Court declared in Ker v. California:
In Mapp v. Ohio, at 646-647, 657, we followed Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886), which held that the Fourth Amendment, imple-
mented by the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth, forbids the Federal
Government to convict a man of crime by using testimony or papers obtained
from him by unreasonable searches and seizures as defined in the Fourth
Amendment.... This means, as we said in Mapp, that the Fourth Amend-
ment "is enforceable against them [the states) by the same sanction of
exclusion as is used against the Federal Government," by the application of
the same constitutional standard prohibiting "unreasonable searches and
seizures." 367 U.S., at 655.
374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
28 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385'(1920).
29 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (involving seizure of conversation by
wiretapping) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961); McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (lst
Cir. 1955) ; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (involving seizure of con-
versation by electronic device).
30 McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598 (1st Cir. 1955).
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of this rule emphasizes the importance of establishing clearly that
consent has been obtained for a warrantless search based on consent.
C. Consent to Warrantless Search
With these considerations in mind, let us now examine the
question of consent to a warrantless search, a consent which is needed
under the fourth and fifth amendments to assure the legality of the
search as well as the availability of evidence so obtained. While the
Supreme Court has held that constitutional rights protected by the
fourth and fifth amendments may be voluntarily waived,3 1 the cases
identify a gulf between acquiescence or submission and the consent
necessary to constitute a voluntary waiver. Where officers demand
admission to private premises in the name of the law or under color
of office, their subsequent explorations have been held searches within
the bar of the Constitution, even though the occupant opens the door
to admit them."2 Such entry, it has been said, is "granted in sub-
mission to authority rather than as an understanding and intentional
waiver of a constitutional right." 
33
In short, the consent must be unequivocal and specific, freely and
intentionally given. When entry into a person's premises by officers
of the law not having a warrant is sought to be justified by that
person's consent, the applicable standard is a rigorous one, and the
Government has the burden of proving by clear and positive evidence
that such consent has been given.3 4
Evidence of consent may be oral or written, and experience in
the inspection field will show which is preferable. 5 Where a verbal
consent is relied on, some federal courts have held that nothing short
of specifically advising the person of his right to refuse a warrantless
31 Zapv. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946).
3 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921).
33 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
34 Simmons v. Bomar, 349 F.2d 365, 366 (6th Cir. 1965); McDonald v. United States,
307 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir. 1962); Channel v. United States, 285 F.2d 217, 219
(9th Cir. 1960); Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1951);
Kovach v. United States, 53 F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1931).
35 The Department of Justice Handbook on the Law of Search and Seizure recommends
that the consent be in writing and suggests the following form:
I, John Doe, know of my constitutional rights to refuse to allow a police
search of any part of my house at 711 Royalty Road, Alexandria, Va.
However, I have decided to allow Tom Smith and Bill Jones, members of
the Metropolitan Police, to search every part of my house. They have my
permission to take any letters, papers, materials, or other property they
want. I have decided to make this consent carefully, of my own free will,
and without being subject to threats or promises. I know that anything
discovered may be used against me in a criminal proceeding.
Jan. 22, 1967
Signed John Doe
Witness 1. Bob Janitor.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTIcE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE
52 (1967).
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search will meet the fourth amendment requirement of a knowing
waiver imposed to prevent the possibility that the ignorant may sur-
render their rights more readily than the shrewd."'
D. Who May Consent
The general rule is that immunity from unreasonable search and
seizure can be waived only by the person whose rights are otherwise
to be invaded or by someone known to have authority to make a
waiver of that right for the person to be affected in his absence, and
such authority cannot be implied or presumed. 7
Thus, the occupant of residential premises can give an effective
consent to a search of the apartment or room occupied by him. The
landlord or other proprietor of residential premises, hotels, or board-
ing houses cannot, however, give an effective consent to a search of
the apartment or room actually occupied by another person.3
A person having equal rights to the use or occupation of premises
may consent to a search, and evidence thus obtained may be used
against the other joint occupant even though the latter has not
consented.
3 9
The cases are in conflict as to whether a wife can give effective
consent as against her husband for a search and seizure of property
in the family living quarters. Thus it has been held that the constitu-
tional protection against unreasonable searches is a personal one
which neither the husband nor the wife can waive for the other.4
Other cases have held that where the wife is a joint owner of the
41premises, or is recognized as a joint occupant, her consent to a
search of family quarters is valid.4 2 The authority of the wife to give
36 United States v. Nickrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Blalock, 255 F. Supp. 268 (E.D. Pa. 1966). Contra, Gorman v. United States, 380 F.2d
158 (1st Cir. 1967), which held a specific fourth amendment warning unnecessary in
the following factual situation:
[W~hen the accused is directly asked whether he objects to the search, there
must be at least some suggestion that his objection is significant, or that the
search waits on his consent. When this is combined with a warning of his
right to be silent, and his right to counsel, which would seem in the circum-
stances to put him on notice that he can refuse to cooperate, we think it fair
to infer that his purported consent is in fact voluntary.
Id, at 163-64.
37 Raine v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1924); United States v. Ruffner, 51
F.2d 579 (D. Md. 1931); Hayes v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 P. 232 (1927).
38 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610
(1961) ; Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74 (1949).
39 Drummond v. United States, 350 F.2d 983 (8th Cir. 1965) ; United States v. Sferas,
210 F.2d 69 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 935 (1954) ; People v. Hicks,
165 Cal. App. 2d 548, 331 P.2d 1003 (1958).
4 United States v. Rykowski, 267 F. 866 (S.D. Ohio 1920); Simmons v. State, 94
Okla. Crim. 18, 229 P.2d 615 (1951); People v. Weaver, 241 Mich. 616, 217 N.W.
797 (1928).
41 People v. Hambley, 4 I11. 2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954).
4 United States v. Best, 76 F. Supp. 857 (D. Mass. 1948); United States v. Sergio,
21 F. Supp. 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1937) ; People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665
(1957) ; Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964) ; State v. Cairo, 74 R.I.
377, 60 A.2d 841 (1948).
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such consent is based, not upon any principle of agency, but upon her
own status, and extends only to that property or area of the premises
over which the wife normally exercises as much control as the
husband.43 Under this view, which reflects the growing trend, the
wife clearly may give authority for an inspection of living quarters
jointly occupied by herself and her husband.
In the case of consent for a search of business or industrial
premises, the cases appear to turn on the scope of the authority of the
employee whose consent is relied upon. Thus, courts have upheld
consent for a warrantless search given by an office manager,44 by the
corporation general manager entitled to 50 percent of the profits,45
and by the agent placed in charge of property.46 A clerk or similar
employee cannot give an effective consent in the absence of specific
authorization for the purpose.47
While a presumption of authority to give consent to a warrantless
search does not arise from the mere fact of employment, the courts
have found such authority where the search or inspection was directed
to matters which would usually arise in and be part of the duties of
employment. Managerial employees, whose duties include the over-
sight of business operations and compliance with legal requirements
would, therefore, probably be found authorized to grant an effective
consent to the inspection of business premises.
E. Standing to Challenge Seizure
Under section 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
only a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" has
standing to move for the exclusion or suppression of the property
seized. As illuminated by the Supreme Court, this rule reaches not
just the victims of the invasion (generally described as having an
interest in the premises such as ownership, a right to possession, or
the interest of a lessee) ; as stated in Jones v. United States,48 "anyone
legitimately on premises where a search occurs may challenge its
legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed
to be used against him." 49 In Jeffers v. United States,50 the rule was
43 People v. Carter, 48 Cal. 2d 737, 312 P.2d 665 (1957) ; State v. Evans, 45 Hawaii
622, 372 P.2d 365 (1962) ; Bellam v. State, 233 Md. 368, 196 A.2d 891 (1964).
44 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied,
329 U.S. 742 (1946).
"Application of Fried, 68 F. Supp. 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1946), modified on other grounds,
161 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947).
48 Raine v. United States, 299 F. 407 (9th Cir. 1924).
47 Lord v. Kelly, 223 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1963); United States v. Ruffner, 51 F.2d
579 (D. Md. 1931); Hays v. State, 38 Okla. Crim. 331, 261 P. 232 (1927).
4362 U.S. 257 (1960).
4Id. at 267.
50 187 F.2d 498, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
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held to extend to the owner of property seized as the fruit of an
unlawful search even though the premises searched were not his and
he was not present at the time of the search.
California has adopted an even more liberal view on the exclu-
sion of evidence and holds that evidence obtained by virtue of an
unlawful search and seizure is inadmissible whether or not it was
obtained in violation of the particular defendant's constitutional
rights.5
Thus, where an attempt is made to use evidence obtained in an
unlawful search of a tenant's apartment against a landlord (e.g.,
defective wiring or plumbing), the landlord may, under the federal
rule, be able to suppress the evidence on the grounds that he owned
the property seized or, under the California rule, simply on the
grounds that the search and seizure was unlawful.
F. "'Particularly describing.., the things to be seized"
The fourth amendment requirement that a search warrant "par-
ticularly" describe "the things to be seized" may occasion some
difficulty for general housing and sanitation inspections which
extend from defective appliances, hazardous conditions, and cleanli-
ness to window screens, ratholes, and the number of electrical outlets
in a room. Such a broad-ranging inspection may require a thorough
search of every room in an apartment, or of the entire commercial
premises as well as closets, cupboards, storerooms, and related
accounts and records. But a warrant which is so broad that the appro-
priate limits of the inspection depend on the discretion of the investi-
gator and could not be verified by reference to the warrant itself
would obviously fall short of the fourth amendment requirement. As
the Court observed in Camara, in the absence of a warrant, the appel-
lant was unable "to verify ... the appropriate limits of the inspec-
tion." 52
While it could be argued that the fourth amendment requires
that the warrant must specify in detail every item to which the inspec-
tion will be directed, a reasonable middle ground, which will permit
the court issuing the warrant to determine its necessity as well as to
verify the limits of the search, would call for a statement of the
purpose of the search, e.g., inspection of the physical condition of
the premises, plumbing, electrical wiring and fixtures, and related
51 People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855, 857 (1955). See also State v. Schaf-
fel, 4 Conn. Cir. 234, 229 A.2d 552 (1966), petition for certification for appeal
denied, 228 A.2d 560 (Conn. 1967), holding that while landlord had standing to
move for suppression of evidence obtained by warrantless inspection of tenant's apart-
ment, his rights were not infringed since tenant had consented.
52387 U.S. 523, 540 (1967). See also Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
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conditions bearing on violations of sections of
the Housing Code and of sections of the
regulations issued thereunder. It may also be desirable to attach to
the warrant copies of the cited sections of the code.
G. Enforcement of War-rants
If the occupant of premises to be searched refuses to comply with
a warrant, how is the warrant to be enforced?
In See, the Court spoke of compelling entry "through prosecu-
tion or physical force within the framework of a warrant proce-
dure," " while in Camara, it indicated that force to compel entry into
residential premises was not contemplated by the requirement of a
warrant procedure.
54
While entry by force is the traditional method of enforcing
compliance with a warrant,55 this approach appears revelant only to
seizing evidence of a crime which may be disposed of or secreted if
entry is delayed. In the case of housing violations, these can be hidden
from the inspector only by the desired remedial action, so that delay,
except in the case of emergencies, does not ordinarily frustrate the
public interest.
When entry under a search warrant is refused, the court could
punish such refusal. In addition, the provisions in most housing codes
penalizing a refusal to comply with or resistance to the execution of
the provisions of the code, would probably be adequate to support a
penalty for refusal to comply with a lawful search warrant issued to
implement the inspection provisions.
H. Consent to Warrantless Search as Condition of License
The Court's recognition of "such accepted regulatory techniques
as licensing programs which require inspections prior to operating a
business or marketing a product" 56 raises the question of whether a
license may, as a condition of its issuance, require consent to warrant-
less inspections after such issuance. Such a proposal raises the ques-
tion of unconstitutional conditions. Unlike Zap v. United States,57
where the petitioner, in order to obtain the Government's business,
specifically agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and records
and the Court found a voluntary waiver of his claim to the privacy of
such records, the licensee under this proposal would have to waive
his constitutional protection under the fourth and fifth amendments
53 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967).
54 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967).
55 Crimes & Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1964).
56 See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 546 (1967).
57328 U.S. 624 (1945).
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as a condition to engaging in business with anyone.5" The dilemma
that would confront the individual is the choice between losing the
benefit or privilege which the license would confer and the hazard
of waiving his constitutional rights in advance, not knowing when
or how they may be violated by the law enforcement agency. It could
reasonably be argued that the threat of withholding the license would
constitute duress vitiating the consent.59 Moreover, it is doubtful that
a case could now be made for the proposition that the alternative
means of a search warrant which is not subversive of constitutional
rights is inadequate to protect the public welfare.6"
CONCLUSION
The holdings of the Supreme Court in Camara and See are a
challenge to the inventiveness of administrators and lawyers to demon-
strate that social programs intended to protect the public health and
welfare can be developed and operated efficiently without invading
private rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The cases should not
be interpreted as requiring slavish adherence to the broad guidelines
indicated by the Court, but rather as giving room for a variety of
approaches to the problem which can be developed to meet the con-
stitutional requirements. It would be unrealistic to assume that these
decisions have settled the problems of regulatory inspections, or that
further litigation of these issues should not be anticipated. An under-
standing of the thrust of the constitutional guaranties involved,
and of the limitations on official actions spelled out in cases imple-
menting these guaranties, however, is an essential ingredient of the
development of legislation and programs capable of withstanding
these challenges.
In dealing with problems such as these, where community and
individual interests seem to conflict, we must bear in mind the state-
ment of the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio:
Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to
observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its
own existence. As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead
v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928): "Our Government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches
the whole people by its example.... If the Government becomes a
58 This goes far beyond the requirement that a business maintain records which are to be
made available for public inspection. Such records have been held to assume the
characteristics of quasi-public documents and their disclosure may be compelled with-
out violating the fourth amendment. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632
(1950) ; Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
59 In People v. Younger, 327 Mich. 410, 42 N.W.2d 120 (1950), the court held that a
person accepting a license to hunt could not be required as a condition of such license
to waive his constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure, even though
the search would be directed only against game taken by the licensed hunter.
60 Cf. Parrish v. Civil Service Comm'n, 425 P.2d 223, 57 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1967).
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lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy." 
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APPENDIX
I. PERTINENT STATUTORY INSPECTION PROVISIONS
A. Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1270 '(1964).
§ 1270. Examinations and Investigations
(a) Authority to conduct.
The Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations, inspections,
and investigations for the purposes of this chapter through officers
and employees of the Department or through any health officer or
employee of any State, territory, or political subdivision thereof,
duly commissioned by the Secretary as an officer of the Department.
(b) Inspection; notice; samples.
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or em-
ployees duly designated by the Secretary, upon presenting appro-
priate credentials and a written notice to the owner, operator, or
agent in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any
factory, warehouse, or establishment in which hazardous substances
are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for introduction into
interstate commerce or are held after such introduction, or to enter
any vehicle being used to transport or hold such hazardous substances
in interstate commerce; (2) to inspect, at reasonable times and
within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, such factory,
warehouse, establishment, or vehicle, and all pertinent equipment,
finished and unfinished materials, and labeling therein; and (3) to
obtain samples of such materials or packages thereof, or of such
labeling. A separate notice shall be given for each such inspection,
but a notice shall not be required for each entry made during the
period covered by the inspection. Each such inspection shall be
commenced and completed with reasonable promptness.
B. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 374 (1964).
§ 374. Inspection
(a) Right of agents to enter; scope of inspection; notice; prompt-
ness; exclusions.
For purposes of enforcement of this chapter, officers or em-
ployees duly designated by the Secretary, upon presenting appropri-
ate credentials and a written notice to the owner, operator, or agent
in charge, are authorized (1) to enter, at reasonable times, any
factory, warehouse, or establishment in which food, drugs, devices,
or cosmetics are manufactured, processed, packed, or held for intro-
duction into interstate commerce or after such introduction, or to
enter any vehicle being used to transport or hold such food, drugs,
devices, or cosmetics in interstate commerce; and (2) to inspect, at
reasonable times and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable
manner, such factory, warehouse, establishment, or vehicle and all
pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials; containers,
and labeling therein. In the case of any factory, warehouse, estab-
lishment, or consulting laboratory in which prescription drugs are
manufactured, processed, packed, or held, the inspection shall extend
to all things therein (including records, files, papers, processes,
controls, and facilities) bearing on whether prescription drugs which
are adulterated or misbranded within the meaning of this chapter,
or which may not be manufactured, introduced into interstate com-
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merce, or sold, or offered for sale by reason of any provision of this
chapter, have been or are being manufactured, processed, packed,
transported, or held in any such place, or otherwise bearing on viola-
tion of this chapter.
II. FORMS USED FOR INSPECTION WARRANTS UNDER THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
(Prescription Drugs)







To the United States District Judge: FOOD. DRUG, AND
United States District Court COSMETIC 
ACT.
District of
duly authorized inspector of the Food
and Drug Administration, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
I hereby applies
for an inspection warrant, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 374, for the inspection of the
establishment identified as follows:
1. This establishment is engaged in the manufacture, processing, packing,
holding of prescription drugs which are to be or have been shipped in interstate
commerce.
2. It is a registered establishment under 21 U.S.C. 360, and is required to
be inspected at least once every two years.
3. The establishment has not previously been inspected.
was last inspected
4. This is a scheduled inspection undertaken as a part of a statutorily
authorized inspection program designed to assure compliance with the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
5. The inspection will be conducted within regular business hours. Written
notice and the inspector's credentials will be supplied as prescribed in 21 U.S.C.
374. The inspection will begin as soon as practicable after the issuance of this
warrant and will be completed with reasonable promptness.
6. The inspection will extend to the establishment and all pertinent equip-
ment, finished and unfinished materials, containers, labeling, and all other things
therein (including records, files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities)
bearing on whether prescription drugs are being produced in compliance with
the Act, whether products not in compliance have been processed, packed,
transported, or held, or whether conditions exist which otherwise bear upon
violation of the Act.
7. Samples will be collected when necessary to a reasonable inspection and
receipt will be given therefor.
8. The inspector may be accompanied by one or more inspectors, duly
authorized pursuant to 21 C.F.R. 2.121(b).
9. A return will be made to the Court at the completion of the inspection.
10. The authority for the issuance of the inspection warrant is 21 U.S.C. 374
and Camara v. Municipal Court, No. 92, and See v. Seattle, No. 180, decided
June 5, 1967 by the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Sworn to and subscribed by
John Doe - 007
United States Food and Drug
Administration
Before me Clerk of the
United States District Court for the , District of
., on this day of
personally appeae , and upon oath stated that
the facts set forth in this application are true to his knowledge and belief.
Clerk, U.S. District Court
WARRANT FOR INSPECTION UNDER THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
To and any other authorized
United States Food and Drug Inspector:
Application having been made, and probable cause shown, by
, United States Food and Drug Inspector, for
an inspection of the establishment described as:
Pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the decisions of
the Supreme Court in Camara v. Municipal Court, No. 92, and See v. Seattle,
No. 180, decided June 5, 1967, you are authorized to enter the above described
premises at reasonable times during ordinary business hours, and to inspect in
a reasonable manner and to a reasonable extent, including the collection of
samples if necessary, all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials,
containers, labeling, and all other things in the establishment (including records,
files, papers, processes, controls, and facilities) bearing upon whether prescrip-
tion drugs are being produced in compliance with any applicable provisions of
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, whether products not in compliance
have been processed, packed, transported, or held, or whether conditions exist
which otherwise bear upon violation of the Act.





Inspection of the establishment described in this warrant was made on
John Doe - 007
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